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A Critical Reflection on the Construction of the Cyberterrorist Threat in the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland 
 
Abstract 
 
Cyberterrorism has not occurred. Furthermore, the definitional parameters of cyberterrorism have not been 
conclusively defined by either policymakers or academia. However, in 2010 the threat posed by the terrorist 
application of cyber weaponry to target British critical national infrastructure became a ‘Tier One’ threat to 
the UK. This thesis is the first comprehensive mapping and analysis of the official British construction of the 
threat of cyberterrorism between 12th May 2010 and 24th June 2016. By using interpretive discourse analysis, 
this thesis identifies ‘strands’ from a comprehensive corpus of policy documents, statements and speeches 
from Ministers, MPs and Peers. This thesis examines how the threat of cyberterrorism was constructed in the 
UK, and what this securitisation has made possible. In addition, this thesis makes novel contributions to the 
Copenhagen School’s ‘securitisation theory’ framework. Accordingly: this thesis outlines the framework for 
a ‘tiered’, rather than monolithic audience; refines the ‘temporal’ and ‘spatial’ conditioning of a securitisation 
with reference to the unique characteristics of cyberterrorism; and lastly, details the way in which popular 
fiction can be ascribed agency in securitising moves to ‘fill in’ a lack of case studies of threat with gripping 
vicarious fictional narratives. It is identified that the 2010 British Coalition Government’s classification of 
cyberterrorism as a ‘Tier One’ threat created a central strand upon which a discursive securitisation was 
established. Despite the absence of a ‘cyberterrorist’ incident across the period under scrutiny, the 
securitisation did not recede. The threat posed by cyberterrorism was articulated partially within a ‘New 
Terrorism’ frame, and it was deemed by Ministers, MPs and Lords to be a threat that was likely to escalate in 
both severity and possibility over time. A notable finding is the positioning of the securitisation against a 
particular ‘cyberterrorist’ identity epitomised by social actors using cyberspace, rather than the tangible 
environments of cyberspace. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
  
 Following the establishment of a functional world-wide-web in 1990, the UK, along with 
international society at large, has become increasingly interconnected. Worldwide, there are roughly 3.58 
billion people who regularly use the services of the world-wide-web (Statista, 2018). In the UK, 89% of 
adults were been identified as regular users of the internet (ONS, 2017). The number of devices connected to 
the internet has increased exponentially, and this is a trend set to continue; fuelled by the huge financial and 
capital investment into IT spending, which totalled $3.7 trillion in 2013 (Whitney, 2013). Consumer demand 
is also a significant force driving the proliferation of internet access, in part due to innovation that has 
produced increasing layers of 'killer programs'; computer programs that are highly desirable and perhaps 
necessary for modern living. Email and browser-based access to the world-wide-web are examples of such 
'killer programs', but increasingly these extend beyond computers and mobile phones amidst the expansion 
of the 'Internet of Things'. Put simply, this ‘Internet of Things’ is the process in which physical objects such 
as refrigerators, ovens, heating systems and pet feeders can be embedded with electronics and software that 
permits them to both collect and exchange data, and to be controlled remotely. A study by Cisco has 
suggested that more than 50 billion 'things' will be connected to the internet by 2020 (Tillman, 2013).  
 The integral value of online services for economic prosperity is clear. Online services are so 
embedded into the functioning of modern society that any attempt to calculate the true 'value of the internet' 
would be perfunctory, although tentative figures are offered to contextualise analysis in Chapter Five. 
However, connectivity does not come without risk. Hacking, a term previously the preserve of students 
engaging in problem solving or practical jokes – not necessarily in electronic form – globally became 
increasingly legislated against in the 1980s and 1990s, and some forms of hacking have since constituted a 
criminal offence, thus integrating 'hacking' into a 'cybercrime' lexicon.  
 As the international economy rapidly became increasingly reliant on internet-mediated connectivity 
over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, a malicious economy emerged, seeking to exploit 
vulnerabilities for financial gain. A Center for Strategic and International Studies report, sponsored by 
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McAfee, estimated that the likely annual cost to the global economy implicated by cybercrime exceeds $400 
billion (McAfee, 2014). An estimate of levels of cybercrime was included in the national Crime Survey for 
England and Wales for the first time in 2015, immediately inflating the headline crime rate by 40% (Travis, 
2015).  
 Nevertheless, cybercrime is not merely represented as a matter of criminality; indeed, the 
phenomenon is also considered to be a pressing concern for the national security of the UK. “Cyber attack, 
including by other states, and by organised crime and terrorists” was listed as a Tier One threat under the 
2010 National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2010a:11). The 2015 National Security Strategy notes that 
“the range of cyber actors threatening the UK has grown … non-state actors, including terrorists … can use 
easily available cyber tools and technology for destructive purposes” (Cabinet Office, 2015a:19). The ‘Tier 
One’ label is used to classify threats that are deemed to be of high probability and high impact. As a 
discursive tool, the ‘Tier One’ label is therefore of interest to practitioners of the Copenhagen School’s 
‘securitisation theory’. This thesis is concerned with the official British discourse of the threat of 
cyberterrorism, a threat that has yet to occur. The term cyberterrorism gained traction amidst a post-Cold War 
re-evaluation of security threats, and an increased awareness of society's reliance on internet infrastructure 
(Whiting, 2013). However, cyberterrorism acquired greater prominence following 9/11, during a period of 
re-imagining of potential terrorist threats. The labelling of particular identities in cyberspace as ‘threatening’ 
legitimises public policies and expenditures in the furtherance of national security. In a July 2014 
announcement by David Cameron, the then-British Prime Minister, he stressed that part of his £1.1 billion 
investment in the armed forces was designated for the specific purposes of combating 'unseen' cyber threats 
(Dominiczak, 2014).  
 The next section outlines the thesis aims and research question that underpin the analysis of this 
thesis project. 
 
Thesis Aims and Research Questions 
 
 This thesis critically examines the British discourse of cyberterrorism, specifically for the purposes 
of revealing how a threat – real, in the sense that it has been socially constructed – but latent, because it has 
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not yet occurred, exists as a securitised phenomenon and has successfully maintained this securitised status 
over time. Through this process, this thesis will extend understanding regarding how a threat can be 
securitised. Without wishing to risk a recourse to generalisation, it is perhaps fair to suggest that most 
securitised threats maintain their status through ‘events’ and the discursive remembering and re-living of 
those events. Cyberterrorism is therefore novel because it has been ‘spoken’ into existence (Conway, 2005), 
and this novelty is further compounded because the public-facing ‘speaking’ of a threat of cyberterrorism has 
been conducted by politicians, authors and academics, but not proscribed terrorist organisations. 
‘Securitisation’ is not a banal process involving rhetorical tools or arbitrary bureaucratic decisions. 
As will be detailed later in this thesis, securitisations entail ‘extraordinary measures’, which can be costly to 
a state’s budgetary financing and can, context dependent, result in the criminalisation of individuals who 
would otherwise avoid sentencing. In some cases, the extraordinary measures justified through a 
securitisation can even entail the killing of individuals who would, in other circumstances, have enjoyed 
many more years of their natural lives. I empathise with calls for normative approaches to the study of 
security. Like many others engaged in the field of Security Studies, I am drawn to this endeavour because 
security is a universal desire – indeed, a fundamental right – for everyone. Securitisation, like Security 
Studies more broadly, engenders moral considerations. In discussing a securitised discourse, one almost 
inescapably assumes a role as a fire-lighter on an alarmist beacon, relaying and re-constituting a justification 
for a status of securitisation that may, or may not be, warranted. An unchecked engagement with a securitised 
discourse would ostensibly fuel a perception that immediate and undemocratic state-level action is the only 
viable method for the alleviation of security concerns (Charrett, 2009). By definition, a securitisation entails 
the curtailment of open and accountable government, and serves to mitigate democratic principle (Roe, 
2012:252). The key, therefore, is to acknowledge that some re-publication of a phenomenon with potentially 
negative externalities is unavoidable, but also to simultaneously ruthlessly and consistently apply a critical 
lens. This critical lens facilitates the development of the 'new thinking' that assists the academic community 
in raising awareness of the subjectivities inherent within security discourses, that serve to regenerate 
particular political 'otherings' (Charrett, 2009:32). Theories are inherently subjective entities; as Cox states, 
there is “no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space” (1981:128; 
1986:207). 
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 As Floyd (2007:338-339) has suggested, writing in a consistently critical manner permits one to 
critically evaluate one's own discursive engagement with security. The overarching ethos of this thesis is not 
normative – simply critical – but by opening the securitisation and scrutinising its constitutive strands, it is 
possible that weakness or deficiencies in the logic of the securitisation of cyberterrorism may be located. 
These deficiencies could provide an epistemic basis for counter-securitisation. Counter-securitisation is a 
concept that has been elucidated in an article by Stritzel and Chang, who suggest that counter-securitisations 
are “part of an interactive process of moves and counter-moves that are both linguistically regulated by the 
grammar and illocutionary logic of securitising speech acts and closely tied to processes of legitimisation and 
delegitimisation” (2015:552). This resistance against the (re)legitimisation of a securitisation could arise 
from a 'securitising agent', or, feasibly, from the audience that serves to either accept or reject a given 
securitisation. Whilst securitisation, as a process of security politics, can provide the fastest guarantor of 
security in extremis, it is a fundamentally undemocratic phenomenon. Consequently, even in circumstances 
where a securitisation may provide some guarantee of security, it is possible that this could be outweighed by 
the negative externalities a securitisation imposes on society and its functions. Furthermore, some types of 
threat may be more amenable to securitisation than others. For instance, a large asteroid that is expected to 
strike a large British city at a given date and time is quite a different threat to the perception of a ubiquitous, 
strike-at-any-time terrorist threat. 
This thesis analyses the official UK discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism. The research questions 
underpinning the thesis are detailed as follows:  
1. How has official discourse in the UK represented the threat posed by cyberterrorism to the UK? 
2. How do securitising actors and members of the audience securitise a threat that does not exhibit a 
historical precedent? 
3. Given that a cyberterrorist incident may not be attributable, could be delivered in a near-
instantaneous fashion, and would rely on a man-made ‘fifth sphere’ of power, what novel 
contributions for the framework of securitisation theory, if any, can be inferred from this socially-
constructed threat? 
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 The remainder of this chapter introduces the fields of Critical Terrorism Studies and Critical Security 
Studies. These critical approaches possess efficacy for the analysis of cyberterrorism, because this is a 
discursively-constructed threat that has minimal, if any at all, public-facing objective data regarding its 
likelihood or potential for harm. There is also a relative dearth of current material applying critical 
approaches to the issue of cyberterrorism, either in a British or indeed an international context. This thesis is 
intended to partially address this deficiency in the study of official discourses of cyberterrorism, whilst 
contributing to the continued refinement of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. This introductory 
chapter will also include a brief overview of the remaining chapters contained in this thesis. 
  
Critical Terrorism Studies 
 
In the endeavour to engage with the discourse surrounding threat to the UK posed by cyberterrorism, 
I adopt an approach that aligns with the field of Critical Terrorism Studies. At present, there are few bona 
fide cases where a critical approach has been brought to bear in the study of cyberterrorism. This is a 
deficiency that warrants addressing. Critical Terrorism Studies is an established sub-discipline of Terrorism 
Studies that seeks to address significant analytical and normative limitations in Traditional Terrorism Studies 
literature. It has been suggested that such traditional literature typically operates with a narrowly essentialist 
framework that neglects the processes of terrorism's construction and serves to constrain opportunities to 
discuss the (il)legitimacy of particular instances of violence (Jarvis, 2009). Traditional Terrorism Studies, if 
one can term it as such, has been criticised for being relatively ignorant regarding the application of theory; 
indeed, prior to the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies, engagement with conceptual issues was 
typically confined to matters of definition (Miller, 2011:146-147). In the obfuscation of the terrorist's status 
as a social construction, the Traditional Terrorism Studies field focuses on the terrorist actor to the extent that 
it disregards the processes through which that individual acquired a label for their specific brand of political 
violence. On this basis, Hulsse and Spencer (2008) argue that the terrorist actor can no longer be the primary 
unit of analysis. As Baker-Beall writes, the counter-terrorism discourse is based upon, and contributes to, the 
re-articulation of “an 'accepted knowledge' about what terrorism is, who the terrorists are, and what type of 
threat they represent” (2016:30). Through this critical lens, it would be misguided to take discourse as a 
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social fact that draws upon a plethora of fixed social facts. Rather, discourse is a fluid phenomenon that 
warrants scrutiny, because discourse inevitably entails the attribution and action of power relations. 
Furthermore, it would be poor practice to assume that there is just 'one discourse' on a subject or issue at any 
given instance; rather, there will be many discourses operating simultaneously. Even within governmental 
discourses, determining which actors and agencies speak with the 'official' voice can prove difficult, 
particularly if administrative wings are in contention. Chapter Two will introduce a novel ‘Pantomime’ 
framework of securitisation, which it is hoped can accommodate contestation, inconsistencies and 
contradictions in a given securitisation. 
In what has been termed an 'epistemological crisis', this tendency – for meanings of terror to be 
malleable – has real-term consequences for the direction of counterterrorism policy (Jackson, 2015). 
Misguided judgements, made by either scholars or policy makers, concerning fundamental questions such as 
‘what is a terrorist?’, or ‘what constitutes an act of terrorism or a will to terrorise’, have the effect of fuelling 
an environment in which poor policy decisions are likely to be made. In today's socio-political climate in the 
UK, the application of the label 'terrorist' carries enormous weight. The delineation between what does and 
does not constitute terrorism is a significant element of contemporary security politics. In the Terrorism 
Studies field, whole sections – or even chapters – entitled “Defining Terrorism” are so commonplace 
throughout articles and books that their appearance seems somewhat cliché. I do not say this to be tongue-in-
cheek, or to disparage such efforts – indeed, reflection on definition is an earnest project – but an alternative 
approach is to recognise that definitions and interpretations of terrorism will always be intersubjective. A 
‘true’ definition of cyberterrorism is a simulacrum. Another cliché – that “one person's terrorist is another 
person's freedom fighter” – is obviously a crude and over-simplified argument, but it aptly identifies the 
mechanics of this conceptual conundrum. 
It has been said that there are more than 100 definitions offered for terrorism (Weimann, 2005:132). 
In a slightly satirical manner, Tucker suggests that “above the gates of hell there is the warning that all that 
enter should abandon hope … less dire but to the same effect is the warning given to those who try to define 
terrorism” (1997:51). Cyberterrorism has inevitably inherited the conceptual challenges of definition that 
surrounds attempts to ascertain a universal definition of terrorism more broadly. As Jarvis, Nouri and 
Whiting note, “although [cyberterrorism as a term] has existed for over 30 years now, there remains very 
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little consensus on many of the fundamental questions surrounding this term” (2014; see also Jarvis and 
MacDonald, 2015). To some empirically-centric scholars, the search for an objective, fixed definition of 
terrorism is key, and in their view, the seeming inability of the Terrorism Studies field to cogently determine 
such a definition is a dour failure (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Meisels urged that “terrorism ought to be 
strictly defined … it is too central a concept to the moral understanding of our contemporary world to remain 
obscure” (2009:348). Whilst the “you will know it when you see it” approach to labelling a terrorist incident 
appears to lack both academic and empirical rigour, the project to find a universal understanding of terrorism 
is considered by many in the Critical Terrorism Studies community to be defunct (Douglass and Zulaika, 
1990; Erlenbusch, 2010; Jackson, 2007). This is not to imply that the Critical Terrorism Studies approach to 
the critique of (counter)terrorism discourse upholds a perception that terrorism does not exist as an avenue of 
violent resistance. Rather, proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies argue that there exists a misapplication of 
a terrorism label by governments – including the British Government – wherein legitimate forms of 
resistance, insurgency, or civil conflict are inappropriately termed incidents of terrorism (Erlenbusch, 2014).  
This will-to-(mis-)label may be exerted as a means through which a government can legitimise its 
own (potentially terrifying) acts of violence and disruption. Examples of such acts of violence and disruption 
include the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the 2014 parliamentary support for the air-bombing of ISIS 
targets in Syria, the domestic power of detention without charge for up to 28 days under the 2006 
modification to the Terrorism Act, and the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016. In the will-to-(counter)terrorise, 
the misuse of power can extend beyond a counterterrorism mandate. This was highlighted in the case of the 
detention of David Miranda, the partner of the investigative journalist, Glenn Greenwald1, for nine hours 
under Schedule 72 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This detention had been undertaken in an attempt to seize 
documents leaked by the former NSA private contractor, Edward Snowden. An initial legal challenge by 
Miranda against this detention failed in the High Court in 2014 (Travis Taylor and Wintour, 2014), but an 
appeal in 2016 resulted in a verdict in favour of the detention but against the application of Schedule 7 in an 
effort to prise journalistic material, as this was considered incompatible with the Human Rights Act 
                                                          
1 A former journalist for the US-wing of the Guardian newspaper. Glenn was one of two journalists contacted by 
Edward Snowden, and who flew to Hong Kong in 2013 to retrieve documents pertaining to the illegal online 
snooping and hacking committed American and British intelligence services, and the forced coercion of private 
communications companies including Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. 
2 Schedule 7 allows British police to stop, examine and search passengers at points of entry to the UK. 'Reasonable 
suspicion' of involvement in terrorist activity is not required. 
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(Bowcott, 2016). Invariably, for those who object to overreach by the state, such a misuse of power in the 
name of hampering the whistle-blowing of pre-existing abuses of power is a rallying call for Critical 
Terrorism Studies. 
As Richard Jackson (2012:9) has suggested, Western discourses have exhibited a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction 
to terrorist incidents, viewing the phenomenon of terrorism in a de-contextualised manner, in which attention 
is both commanded and shaped by incidents as and when they occur. One consequence of this de-
contextualised lens is that violent acts are classed as ‘terrorism’, often without due examination of the 
intentions of the perpetrators. An implicit assumption may be made; that is, it is presumed that the primary 
audience envisaged by the perpetrators were not the immediate victims (Richards, 2014). Perhaps the most 
accessible approach to defining terrorism is to regard it as a ‘social construct’ (Ramsay, 2015:211), a 
linguistic tool that contains implicit inferences of power and (il)legitimate uses of violence. Terror, manifest 
as an emotion, is arguably universal, a natural part of the trauma associated with threats to one’s existence, 
but the labels of ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ inevitably mean differing things to different people, and will be 
applied in seemingly inconsistent instances.  
In parts of this thesis, reference is made to the 'War on Terrorism'. It is worth taking a moment to 
pause and justify one's re-publication of this term. The term 'War on Terrorism' had been used as a frequent 
descriptor during the course of the George W. Bush administration, and naturally the term gained at least 
some traction within British media discourse. However, the Barack Obama administration (relatively) 
quickly dispensed with the phrasing – in a public announcement by John Brennan – stressing that the US was 
at war with Al-Qaeda only (Ward, 2009). Consequently, I acknowledge the risk of re-publicising the term, 
'War on Terrorism' beyond its 'best-before-use date' could constitute a contribution to the (re)securitisation of 
terrorism. Further consideration regarding this issue of (re)securitisation will appear later in this chapter. I 
justify this continued re-publication because whilst the overt language of war may have dissipated, the 
wartime processes remain; police forces in the UK are increasingly militarised (BBC News, 2016; 
Whitehead, 2016), at present there are British airplanes aggressively bombing targets in Iraq and Syria 
specifically in an anti-terror endeavour (The Telegraph, 2016), and there is little sign of any incoming official 
curtailing of the surveillance apparatus. Furthermore, the 'War on Terror' mentality has, to some extent, been 
ingrained into the psyche of the public. Newspapers with a high newsprint readership and online presence, 
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such as the Daily Mail, continue to use the term 'War on Terror' in news headlines (for instance, see Schwab, 
2015). The public also appears to endorse militaristic action against terrorist groups – specifically the so-
called Islamic State – indicated in a November 2015 poll for The Times, in which a majority of respondents 
supported the concept of a US-UK ground-force coalition in both Iraq and Syria (Dahlgreen, 2015).  
To sum, Critical Terrorism Studies forms a central component of the methodology applied in this 
thesis; this methodology will be discussed explicitly in Chapter Three. Discourse is central to the 
construction of any threat, but in the case of cyberterrorism it is official British discourse that has led to the 
securitisation of this threat in the UK. This does not necessitate that empirically-centred approaches to 
Terrorism Studies, utilising fixed meanings of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’, do not possess potential in the 
study of the threat of cyberterrorism. However, a critical approach is the most apt means by which to assess 
how a threat that has not occurred has been securitised. 
 
Critical Security Studies 
 
 This thesis is underpinned by an application of – and contribution to – securitisation theory. This 
thesis examines the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK through the lens of Critical Security Studies, and this 
represents an approach to accessing the discourses of cyberterrorism that has thus far received limited 
attention. Of course, the research conducted by Jarvis and MacDonald, as well as the Cyberterrorism Project 
more broadly, represents a notable exception3.  
 Critical Security Studies has developed, partly, as a critique of the historically dominant Structural 
Realist approach to the study of security. During the Cold War; a period in which formal studies of 
'international security' came to the foreground of international politics, Structural Realism was the overriding 
vanguard of the field, championed by leading figures such as Kenneth Waltz (1990; see also Hall, 2013). 
This agenda sought to focus on what it held to be the most significant questions pertaining to international 
relations; that is, matters of direct nation-state security, and quantitative reflections on the state of nature in 
which states reside. Stephen Walt (1991) argued that studies outside of this paradigm could be regarded as 
'counterproductive tangents', which, if engaged with, would diminish the practical value of Security Studies. 
                                                          
3 See http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org/ 
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Perhaps this phenomenon can be attributed to the political and geopolitical context that surrounded the 
emergence of contemporary Realist security thinking. Morgenthau (2005), as an influential Classical Realist 
scholar and one of the founding fathers of the international relations discipline, described the condition of the 
international system that he saw in the post-1945 world in dour terms. In some respects, one can observe 
how he was motivated to write by fear; indeed, he seemed “very pessimistic about the capabilities of the 
USA and the Soviet Union to maintain international peace” (Griffiths, Roach and Solomon, 2009:53). For 
Morgenthau, “peace was not an analytical puzzle but a desperate hope” (Lebow, 1994:252). Such was 
Morgenthau's personal interest in the avoidance of conflict – which he believed resulted through human 
nature – that he “provided both an explanation [of international politics] and a road map” (Hoffman, 
1987:76) for the management of American foreign policy. This focus on great-power conflict, and 
assumptions regarding the condition of the international system, has seemingly pervaded throughout Realist 
conceptions of security and historical discourse (Sluga, 1996:75).  
 Infamously, the Structural Realist approach to international security failed to predict, or adequately 
explain, the end of the Cold War and Gorbachev’s role in unilaterally dismantling the Soviet superpower. 
This failure endorsed the notion that ideas must “be conceptualised as intervening variables between 
structural conditions and the definition of actors' interests and preferences” (Risse-Kappen, 1994:212,214). 
The structure of the international system cannot omnipotently control state (and non-state) behaviour; aptly 
described in Wendt's widely-cited proclamation that “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992:424). Through 
the ideational capacity of security actors within nation-states, it is fully possible for states to overcome the 
Structural Realist's security dilemma, given that it, in itself, is a social construction (Wendt 1995:73). Citing 
events such as the abolition of slavery, Finnemore and Sikkink have propositioned that empirical research 
repeatedly demonstrates “how people's ideas about what is good and what 'should be' in the world become 
translated into political reality” (1998:916). Operating in a 'marketplace of ideas' (Snyder and Ballentine, 
1996), language “binds together what is and what ought” (Kowert, 2001:279). Security is a mercurial and 
intersubjective phenomenon. As Hopf notes, “since what constitutes a threat can never be stated as an a 
priori, primordial constant, it should be approached as a social construction of an Other” (1998:199).  
 In contrast to Walt's (1991:2013) warning that the inclusion of issues such as human health, 
wellbeing, and the surrounding environment would constitute an 'excessive' expansion of Security Studies, 
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members of the Critical Security Studies community maintain that expansion is both warranted and 
necessary. Structural Realist thinking implicitly takes the nation-state as its focal point of study, but as Booth 
(1991:320) aptly notes with the analogy of a house requiring maintenance; the upkeep of the property (the 
state) is illogical if it comes at an excessive cost to the inhabitants (the citizenry). Irrespective of the stature 
of the state, the security of the human beings within the state should be considered primary. The UN's 1994 
Human Development Report marked a refreshing invigoration of this new approach to what had been termed 
'human security' (1994).  
 If one upholds and respects the duty of social scientific inquiry to maintain relevance to society, the 
idea that the study of security should be intrinsically militarised makes little sense, given that many people 
are likely to never (personally) encounter armed conflict in their lifetime. Many citizens will only experience 
armed conflict vicariously, through popular computer games, film, documentary, news and literature; thus, 
whilst state-level armed conflict may indeed factor in their perceptions of the security or insecurity, other 
security considerations will also be present, and may be prescient. A recent novel trend in the Critical 
Security Studies field is the emergence of 'vernacular security', wherein the security concerns of citizens are 
sought. This can involve the application of a focus group methodology, and examples include articles written 
by Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015), and Jarvis and Lister (2012, 2013). Such studies have highlighted 
pertinent issues; for instance, the sense of profiling and associated negative externalities experienced by 
Islamic communities. Vernacular research has the potential for significant policy relevance; for instance, in 
the Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015) study, members of the public stated that they were reluctant to 
contact the Government's anti-terror 'hotline', because friends who had done so had quickly suffered police 
surveillance and repeated telephone calls for further information. Job prospects and housing issues appear to 
be a significant security concern that is raised in the cited focus groups, but the top-down militaristic 
approach to security fails to incorporate these issues aptly into an appropriate analysis. Inter-subjectivity is 
not a nuisance to be disregarded, but a bona fide tenet to be considered seriously. Ultimately, as Booth writes, 
“security is what we make it. It is an epiphenomenon, inter-subjectively created. Different world views and 
discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security” (1994:15-16). Burke has 
suggested that the use an approach aligned with Critical Security Studies “is to see security as an interlocking 
system of knowledge, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon 
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bodies, spaces and flows in certain ways – to see security not as an essential value, but as a political 
technology” (2002:2, original emphasis).  
 Critical Security Studies is not necessarily a monolithic project, and indeed, one can delineate the 
approach in both narrow (for instance, Booth, 2005) and broad terms (for instance, see Krause and Williams, 
1997). The aims and ontologies of the narrow and broad approaches differ. The narrow approach, such as 
that applied by the Welsh School, accepts a set logic of security in order to consider the issue of human 
security and emancipation, but in this endeavour it applies less critique and de-construction than the broad 
approach (Browning and MacDonald, 2011:242). Whilst I would not wish at all to disparage Booth's 
inspiring work on security and emancipation, this thesis aligns with the broad approach to Critical Security 
Studies; an approach that incorporates a range of “analyses drawing on elements of Marxism, Feminism, 
Critical Theory, Critical Constructivism and Post-Structuralism” (Browning and MacDonald:238). Krause 
and Williams have written of the paradox wherein it “may be necessary to broaden the agenda of Security 
Studies (theoretically and methodologically) in order to narrow the agenda of security (1996:249, original 
emphasis). In essence, in order to understand more explicitly the processes of a given security issue, and how 
that process occurs, one needs to move beyond the state-as-referent-object narrative of the Structural Realist 
community.  
 The Critical Security Studies approach to the study of cyberterrorism is pertinent, for several reasons, 
which will be briefly outlined here. Firstly, almost all commonly-found definitions of terrorism do not hold 
legitimate governments or institutions of nation-states to be culpable as terrorists; they are capable of causing 
atrocities, great crimes, and acts of war, but not acts of terror. Consequently, when we engage with the 
discourse of cyberterrorism, this is not a discourse of a structural, state-on-state violence, but rather, it is one 
of non-state actors causing violence against another entity. Furthermore, this entity-to-be-attacked is unlikely 
to be a nation-state per se (although the discourse may represent it as such); but rather it would be privately-
owned assets, for instance, banks, telecommunication systems or power-grid systems. Cyberterrorism has not 
occurred during the time period scrutinised in this thesis, nor at the time of writing. This is a threat that has 
been discursively-created, and it is reasonable to presume that this discourse is doing something. Clearly, 
discourse is key, and it is through a Critical Security Studies approach that one can assess the implications of 
discourse for the British comprehension of the threat of cyberterrorism.  
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 The next section considers the matter of defining cyberterrorism. 
 
Defining Cyberterrorism and Cyberspace 
 
 It is not controversial to suggest that cyberterrorism is an example of a buzzword in the 
contemporary security lexicon. Certainly, the term has become popular within the news media in the years 
following the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon in September 2001 (Gordon and 
Ford, 2002; Jones, 2005:7). As Weimann notes, “cyberterrorism, the media have discovered, makes for eye-
catching copy” (2005:131). However, associated with the ease with which observers can apply a mercurial 
reading of what cyberterrorism is, the media has a habit of conflating cyberterrorism with the more generic 
entity of cybercrime (Ahmad and Yunos, 2012; Berner, 2003). Taliharm observes that “referring to various 
cyber incidents without full awareness of the opposing meanings of the concept has led to an unfortunate 
outcome of technological confusion and the media inadvertently encouraging the belief that any slightly 
eminent … cyberattack could be an act of cyberterrorism” (2010:62-63). The source of the popularity of the 
term cyberterrorism is perhaps not difficult to ascertain; the word combines two eye-catching phrases, 'cyber' 
and 'terrorism' respectively. When used as a prefix, cyber simply denotes an online activity; in essence, a 
modem must be involved (Iqbal, 2004). That being said, cyber can also be considered a verb. In the mid to 
late 1990s, to ‘cyber’ was to partake in online chatroom sex, although the usage of the term in this way now 
seems dated. However, as O'Connor states, regarding cyber there is “always action, movement, evolving 
motivations, adventure and interaction … it's impossible to just be cyber … there's no steady state of being 
cyber” (2011).  
 Cyberspace – invariably the environment in which cyberterrorists operate – is a global sphere of 
power, in a similar sense to land, sea, air and space, but it is differentiated by its perceived ethereal nature. In 
pragmatic terms, no one country or geographical entity can be denoted as a 'cyberisland' (Aaviksoo, 2010). 
Cyberspace “is an intangible, fluid and counterintuitive phenomenon that defies the neat categorisations of 
the other strategic domains” (Sheldon, 2012:3,13). Cyberspace is also distinct in terms of the possibility for it 
to be constantly replicated (Libicki, 2007). One can further distinguish cyberspace from the other spheres of 
power because of its mercurial nature; whilst the fundamental characteristics of our land, sea, air and space 
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have remained relatively unchanged through history, we must acknowledge that cyberspace has no natural 
tendency, and that it is an environment that “morphs in continuous tension, creating new forms of agency 
that in turn produce effects that shape the internet itself” (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2008:147). The British 
Government currently defines cyberspace as “an interactive domain made up of digital networks that is used 
to store, modify and communicate information. It includes the internet, but also the other information 
systems that support our businesses, infrastructure and services” (Cabinet Office, 2011:11).  
 Certainly, a characteristic of the cyber landscape is that it has changed drastically over a short space 
of time. For instance, Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4), dominant since its establishment in 1981, is running 
out of viable IP addresses, and is due to be gradually replaced by Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6). Users of 
the internet will have noticed that over the course of the last two decades, the modem that they use to connect 
to the world-wide-web has changed, and that the volume and speed of the traffic they exchange will have 
drastically increased. Today's ubiquitous ADSL and cable modems may eventually be replaced by satellite 
versions. Web services and websites can emerge, flourish, and then die so quickly that they almost seem to 
represent their own miniature cyber geologic periods. Indeed, the seemingly dominant and hegemonic web 
services of today are unlikely to retain that status for many years. Researchers had previously suggested that 
Facebook was likely to lose 80% of its users by 2017 (Garside, 2014). Any prediction – even well-intended – 
of what the typical experience of the internet will look and feel like in twenty years’ time is likely to be 
arbitrary. I am aware that, whilst all research will in essence be 'of its time', the rapid and marked 
technological evolution of cyberspace – as well as the possibility of an actual occurrence of a cyberterrorist 
incident – raises a particular vulnerability pertaining to the foreseeable longevity of the case studies that are 
applied in this thesis. Nevertheless, the contributions that this thesis makes to the development of 
securitisation theory will form part of the historiographical development of the discipline of Security Studies. 
There will also be scope for the methodology and analysis that is applied in this thesis to be transferred to 
other areas of Security Studies, for instance, cyber weaponry understood more broadly, cyber criminality, as 
well as other phenomena such as asymmetrical drone warfare. The extent to which this is possible will 
become clearer in later chapters. 
A recent survey by Jarvis and MacDonald (2015) highlighted that there is divergence of opinion in 
the ‘cyberterror’ disciplinary field, regarding what cyberterrorism is, and indeed, whether cyberterrorism 
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represents a legitimate avenue of research. Green has previously suggested that, as cyberterrorism has not yet 
occurred, it is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, and he thus proposed that “there is no such thing as 
cyberterrorism … which is not to say that cybersecurity isn’t a serious problem – it’s just not one that 
involves terrorists” (2002). It is also plausible that speaking of ‘cyberterrorism’ is a discursive action that 
isolates or distinguishes an issue that already exists within the remit of ‘terrorism’. For instance, Gordon and 
Ford have noted that “we do not use the term ‘ice pick terrorism’ to define bombings of ice-pick factories, 
nor would we use it to define terrorism carried out with ice picks” (2002:645). Through this purview, the use 
of computers to directly cause violence and destruction, and/or the sabotage of computer systems could be 
termed ‘crimes’, or ‘acts of terror’, without an obligatory requirement to use a 'cyber' prefix. The decision to 
include the ‘cyber’ prefix to describe human uses of computer technologies is a conscious one, variably 
reflecting particular biases. For instance, those who use the ‘cyber’ prefix may be adopting pre-existing 
‘common sense’ interpretations of suitable language that we apply when discussing computers. They may 
also be influenced by a perception that computer technologies alter human behaviours and experiences to the 
extent that they are substantively different when juxtaposed with an ‘analogue’ alternative. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, cyberterrorism has been explicitly noted in the two most recent 
National Security Strategies as being a distinct threat facing the UK. The threat of cyberterrorism was 
detailed as one aspect of the ‘Tier One’ category of cyber threat (Cabinet Office, 2010a:11). These Security 
Strategy documents were drafted in 2010 and 2015 during an epistemological environment in which no 
cyberterrorist incident had occurred. Given that the overarching intention of the National Security Strategy is 
to outline the perceived main threats to the nation for the ensuing duration of a Parliament, this means that 
there will be policy and resource implications. For instance, one consequence might be that capital at GCHQ 
could be invested into specifically combating the potential vulnerabilities in British critical infrastructure that 
terrorists may seek to exploit through digital means. This can therefore be regarded as a process in which 
cyberterrorism has been ‘spoken’ into existence, by policymakers, academics and journalists (Conway, 
2005). Not only is a ‘cyberterrorist’ identity created, but policies and counter-identities are also implicated. 
This thesis reflects on cyberterrorism as a distinct subsection of terrorism, but I do acknowledge the 
arguments against such an endeavour, such as those voiced by Green (2002), Gordon and Ford (2002). 
Whilst I adhere to the premise that cyberterrorism is a social construct, a guiding definition is helpful. The 
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2000 Terrorism Act included a clause that can be interpreted as being the British states' legal-remit for the 
incorporation of cyberattacks within anti-terrorism legislation. Accordingly, Section (2)(e) of the Terrorism 
Act mentions attacks that are “designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic 
system” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2000:1). In a discussion of this clause, Walker (2006:632) highlights that this 
was included to offer a legal outline of cyberterrorism, and it is of particular note because it distinguishes the 
dichotomy between 'costly nuisances' and bona fide 'cyberterrorism'. With this distinction made, one can 
isolate general acts of hacking (whether criminal or benign) from serious attacks that would constitute an act 
of terror. For the purposes of clarity, hypothetical cyberterrorist attacks could be: the altering of iron 
supplement levels in a cereal manufacturing plant; modification of  formulas used by a pharmaceutical 
producer; seriously disrupting an air traffic control system; or seriously disrupting the services provided by 
financial institutions (Collin, 1997). Assessments of potential cyberterrorist attacks, particularly by the 
United States, typically revolve around a significant attack on the US powergrid (see Idaho National 
Laboratory, 2016; Natter and Chediak, 2017; Sanger and Broad, 2018). There was some (disproven) 
speculation that Chinese 'cyberterrorists' caused the 2003 blackout in eight North-Eastern US states (Poulsen, 
2008). Following a discussion by Signer and Friedman at the launch of Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What 
Everyone Needs to Know, the 'cyber squirrel' meme emerged, wherein the fairly routine inadvertent attacks 
that squirrels have successfully made against power systems were humorously juxtaposed against the 
precisely zero attacks contributed by cyberterrorists (see Dews, 2014). 
In the endeavour for a narrower comprehension of cyberterrorism, and to pay homage to existing 
literature on cyberterrorism, I draw on the testimony that Denning provided to the United States Congress’ 
House Armed Services Committee; in which she provided a definition of cyberterrorism that has correlations 
with the American legal definition of terrorism. In her testimony, Denning stated that: 
 
“Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to unlawful attacks and threats of 
attacks against computers, networks and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government 
or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result 
in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or 
bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures 
could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly 
a costly nuisance would not” (2000).  
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A definition with a markedly similar ethos has been suggested by Hua and Bapna, who described 
cyberterrorist incidents as “attacks implemented … via information systems to (1) significantly interfere with 
the political, social, or economic functioning of a critically important group or organization of a nation, or (2) 
induce physical violence and/or create panic” (2012:176). In one of her earlier pieces on cyberterrorism, 
Conway distinctly expressed that, in order to be considered as an act of cyberterrorism, the attacks must have 
“a terrorist component”, thereby installing “terror as commonly understood (that is, result in death and/or 
large-scale destruction), and they must have a political motivation” (2002). Succinctly surmised in a 
breviloquent phrase offered by Barry Collin, who originally coined the word in the 1980s, cyberterrorism 
could be regarded as ‘hacking with a body count’ (2002). 
The focus on significant attacks causing death and/or destruction is not by default an effort to 
overlook or dismiss the significance of the potential harm that can arise from less severe attacks, what we 
might call 'routine' attacks. As the international economy increasingly relies upon world-wide-web-enabled 
digital connectivity, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks represent a potentially significant threat to national 
security (Rosenfield, 2009). Routine, less frequently reported attacks can form an element of a long-term, 
gradual sapping of an adversary's economy (Kumagai, 2001). Brill (2010) suggested that the worst-case 
scenario in a cyberterrorist breach is if the terrorist is able to gain access to critical systems, but stay below 
the 'radar' of defences whilst maintaining access to systems and information for months or years. In the remit 
of this thesis, however, such a breach is not an instance of cyberterrorism, merely criminal snooping. 
Granted, the ability to snoop on critical systems would be highly desirable to a well-furnished terrorist 
organisation, but an act of terror inherently revolves around spectacles of horror and violence, rather than 
data-gathering. A pertinent tenet of routine criminal attacks is that the companies receiving such attacks are 
often hesitant to publicly report the attack because they fear that there would be a public relations backlash, 
wherein their consumer base would lose confidence in the ability of the company to retain personal 
information securely. A December 2015 agreement between the European Parliament and member state 
governments legally forces companies to report cyber breaches, but only if that company is deemed to offer 
an essential public service (Teffer, 2015). A 'death by a thousand cuts' cyber incident is not particularly 
daunting or terrorising if people outside of the affected organisation are not aware of it occurring. 
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As mentioned previously, some commentators have argued that cyberterrorism does not warrant a 
separate sub-field for academic attention. Others have suggested that there are differentiations that can be 
made within cyberterrorism as an entity in its own right. For instance, an interesting continuum was 
propositioned by Devost, Pollard and Houghton (1997:78), who differentiated the entities of ‘terrorism’, 
‘information terrorism’, and ‘pure information terrorism’. Accordingly, if both the target and the tools of an 
attack are 'physical', the incident can be considered conventional terrorism. If either the tools or the target of 
the attack can be considered 'digital', then the attack can be labelled 'information terrorism'. And finally, if 
both the target and the tools are digital, the authors of the continuum would designate the attack an instance 
of 'pure information terrorism'. This thesis does not apply this continuum, but it is worth noting in this 
section that there exists a wide range of differing perspectives on how to approach the analysis of 
cyberterrorism, and indeed, how the phenomenon should be identified in the first instance.  
‘Terrorism’ does not yet possess an adequate definition (Schmid and Jongman, 1988), nor does 
‘cyberterrorism’ (Jarvis, MacDonald and Nouri, 2014). The broad approach that is taken with respect to the 
definition of ‘cyberterrorism’ throughout this thesis is to allow the speakers of the official British discourse 
of the threat of cyberterrorism to define for themselves – or to leave undefined, as the case may be – what is 
included and excluded from the notion of ‘cyberterrorism’. 
The next section considers the threat of cyberterrorism, drawing on the existing cyberterrorist 
disciplinary field. 
 
The Threat of Cyberterrorism 
 
Having isolated cyberterrorism as an act involving violence or significant destruction, one must 
simultaneously acknowledge that an event of this kind has not yet occurred. When we engage with the 
discourse of cyberterrorism, we are essentially engaging in a discourse of constructions of the future. As 
Cavelty writes: 
“at all times, the cyber threats debate was (and is) highly political. It is not only about predicting the future, but 
also about how to prepare for it in the present … As there have been no major destructive attacks on the cyber level, 
different scenarios, which are stories about possible futures, are providing the grounds on which decisions have to be 
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made. The different actors involved – ranging from government agencies – with their divergent interests are therefore 
competing with each other by means of constructed versions of the future” (2007:22; see also Bendrath, 2001,2003). 
  
Because there is, at present, no grounds for the discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism to utilise 
narratives that are based on historically recorded events, media and policy-making agents use spectre-raising 
terminology such as an 'electronic Pearl Harbor' to artificially construct a historical analogy (Bendrath, 
2003:50).  
This process represents a discourse of engagement with 'worst-case scenario hypothesising' of 
imaginary terrifying futures (Goede, 2008; see also Grusin, 2004). As Thomas states, “cyberfear is generated 
by the fact that what a computer attack could do is too often associated with what will happen” (2003:115-
116). The worst-case scenario hypothesising is regarded by the critical scholarly community as negative, as it 
distracts attention and diverts “social resources in a way that may not be warranted by a more pragmatic 
assessment and prioritisation of all the risks that we face” (Durodie, 2007:444). The disregarding of facts, 
and reliance on worst-case scenario projections based on the possible options that may be available to 
adversaries leads to a politics of zero risk that may serve to legitimise abuses of power by a leviathan 
(Cavelty and Mauer, 2009; see also Aradau and van Munster, 2007:103). Basing intelligence and resultant 
policies on a preferred scenario and then hunting for data that might support such a scenario is a distorted 
approach to defence (Ryan, 2006:287). Nevertheless, precisely for this reason, the consequence of this kind 
of discourse is marked and interesting. Ultimately, the potentiality of threat raised by nuance and 
exaggeration simultaneously imparts a greater risk on ignoring the warnings. This process is aptly described 
by Hansen and Nissenbaum, who write that “turning the absence of prior incidents in the opposite direction, 
the difficulty of saying that it could not happen also creates a space for the projection of the (im)possible” 
(2009:1164). As Donald Rumsfeld, the then-US Secretary of Defence, stated at a 2002 NATO press 
conference, “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (2002).  
It is important to note that fears exhibited regarding cyberterrorism are not necessarily without due 
reason or precedent. Computer-mediated attacks leading to damage on physical infrastructure have been 
demonstrated as being within the realm of possibility. In 2000, an Australian man became disgruntled after 
having a prospective job application rejected by his local council, provoking him towards the (eventual) 
successful hacking of the human waste management system, which his previous employer had been 
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contracted to install. The attack lead to millions of litres of raw sewage spewing into local parks, rivers, and a 
hotel ground (Smith, 2001). Over the course of ten months in 2009 and 2010, American and Israeli 
government-sanctioned hackers launched the Stuxnet attack against Iranian nuclear facilities, to disrupt the 
contentious enrichment programme. This attack occurred despite fears of a 'new Chernobyl' (Fildes, 2011). 
In 2014, it was disclosed that a cyberattack successfully lead to infrastructural failures at a German steel mill 
(BBC, 2014a; BSI, 2014:31). In January 2016, it was revealed that unidentified hackers had successfully 
caused a significant power outage in Ukraine, using malware known as BlackEnergy to enter the utility 
company's systems, before applying circuit breakers and using the wiper utility, KillDisk – bolstered with 
denial-of-services attacks – to thwart recovery attempts (Goodin, 2016).  
Pertaining to the absence of a bona fide act of cyberterrorism up to the present day, there are several 
plausible explanations possible, and indeed these may be operating simultaneously rather than exclusively. 
Some possible examples include: today's terrorist organisations may lack the computer expertise required for 
a successful attack; the upper echelons of the groups may retain a worldview wherein delivery method does 
not involve bits and bytes; and much of the developed world's critical infrastructure uses private networks, 
which operate with the best possible internet security, which is to be completely disconnected from it (Iqbal, 
2004:404-405). These ‘air gapped’ IT systems can still be attacked; indeed, the Stuxnet worm was delivered 
against an air gapped SCADA system. These air gapped systems are designed to be isolated from the 
internet, but banal or malicious code can still be entered into them, given that they are designed with removal 
storage ports so that patches and software updates can be installed.  
Conversely, one could also proposition the possibility of an 'Edward Snowden effect', wherein 
terrorists – now aware of the continuous, pervasive data-mining conducted by Western governments and their 
associated intelligence services – eschew online methodologies in favour of 'offline' attacks that can be 
organised and delivered via conventional means. In 2013, Sir Andrew Parker (2013), the then-head of MI5, 
stated that the leaks concerning the methods of the intelligence services had been a 'gift' to terrorists. There 
are signs that terrorists have benefited from the leaks and become more conscious of surveillance; a German-
language online Islamist magazine, Kybernetic, published in December 2015, advised Islamists not to 
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possess or use a smartphone4, and detailed a step-by-guide on how to send and receive encrypted messages 
(see Flade, 2016). The front page of the magazine details two hands against a black background, with one 
hand holding a bullet, and the other a USB memory pen.  
Because the will-to-violence exhibited by terrorists is typically beyond what is perceived to be 
rational intention and action, terrorists are sometimes believed to be psychopathic. However, no study 
cogently indicates that this is the case (Hudson, 1999; Keet, 2003; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; 
McCormic, 2003; Post, 2007; Victoroff, 2005). Acknowledging the absence of insanity as a causal factor for 
terrorism allows us to examine the terrorist relationship with cyberattacks within the realm of a rational cost-
benefit analysis, wherein the forces acting on the indifference curve are (a) the preferences of terrorists and 
(b) the effectiveness of cyberterrorism in achieving objectives (Giacomello, 2004:390). Because terrorists 
have a tendency to continue a methodology that is proven successful in the achievement of their objectives 
(Denning, 2000), the threshold point where cyberterrorist attacks begin to occur will be breached when an 
attack mediated by computers would be deemed to produce similar or greater results than that relying on 
conventional methods (Flemming and Stohl, 2001). 
Psychology and emotions nonetheless play a pertinent role in the perceived efficacy of terrorism. A 
study by Lerner et al (2003) indicated that people exhibit greater negative emotion from stimuli that induce 
fear instead of anger. This may represent a structural inhibitor on the actuation of cyberterrorism, as people 
tend to be irritated rather than fearful in the midst of a power-cut, for instance. Given that the primary 
objective of terrorism is coercion through fear, terrorists may eschew certain types of cyberterrorism because 
the likely impact is perceived to be ineffective. Psychological exploration of cyberterrorism – and 
cybersecurity more broadly – is certainly a field that warrants greater attention, and it is notable that there are 
some existing forays into the role of psychology and its relationship with cyber specific threat (see 
McAlaney, Taylor and Faily, 2015). 
The seeming adversity that some members of the scholarly community believe terrorists feel towards 
‘bits and bytes’ is likely to recede over time, particularly as younger generations increasingly ascend to 
leadership roles in terrorist organisations (Rathmell, 2008:44; Prensky, 2001). Indeed, technology, broadly 
                                                          
4 The Snowden revelations highlighted that the NSA possessed the ability to remotely activate the microphone of 
most brands of smartphone (even if the phone was switched off), and use the phone as a bug (for instance, see 
Rosenbach, Poitras and Stark, 2013). 
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perceived, converges with images of masculinity and power (Faulker, 2001), and the ability to conduct 
cyberterrorist attacks would allow a terrorist to cause death and destruction without needing to put 
themselves in direct harm. That being said, given that the training associated with reaching the capability 
where an organisation can conduct significant cyber attacks on infrastructure is typically associated with 
state-level resources – with 20 to 30 states today believed to have offensive cyberwarfare capabilities 
(Paganini, 2015); cyberterrorism can be considered to possess a high barrier to entry. However, terrorists, 
like large criminal organisations have demonstrated resourcefulness, a factor that led Glenny to write that 
terrorists are excellent capitalists and “every bit as cosmopolitan as Shell, Nike or McDonalds” (2009:5-6). 
Given that in some cases, terror-crime syndicates may be capable of handling their entire chain of operations 
along an in-house, de-centralised vertical command – in some cases even possessing their own military force 
to protect their assets – it is possible that terrorists could hire competent computer hackers on a long-term 
basis (Furnell and Warren, 1999:33-34). These assertions about the nature of contemporary terrorist groups 
partially befit the ‘New Terrorism’ thesis. The ramifications of the New Terrorism thesis for the official 
British discourse of cyberterrorism will be examined in detail in the fifth chapter of this thesis. 
The next section outlines the structure of the ensuing chapters of the thesis. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
 Chapter Two, 'Theory', begins by detailing why the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory is 
relevant to critical analysis of the discourse of cyberterrorism. Whilst a broad framework for the study of 
securitisation does exist, 'securitisation theory' itself is not monolithic, and approaches can vary markedly on 
elements such as the audience, the 'speech act', as well as the means by which the analyst can gauge whether 
or not a securisation has been successful (or indeed, whether such a measurement is in fact plausible). The 
chapter addresses these nuances, and expresses justifications for this thesis’s application of components of 
both the ‘traditional’ framework offered by the Copenhagen School, and the alternative approach offered by 
the Parisian School, as pioneered by Didier Bigo (2006). The ‘Pantomime’ audience, an alternative 
framework for the agency of the ‘audience’ in securitisation is outlined. Through this ‘Pantomime’ 
framework, multiple tiers of an audience can be ascribed varying levels of access to, and influence over, a 
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securitisation. It is suggested that this ‘Pantomime’ framework would be useful for both democratic and 
totalitarian contexts, and whilst only three audience ‘tiers’ are considered in this thesis, the framework could 
be used to articulate many more distinctive tiers. 
Chapter Three, ‘Methodology’, begins by detailing the ‘interpretive approach’ to the study of Social 
Science, reflecting on both its pertinence to the study of the threat of cyberterrorism, and its drawbacks. 
Throughout this chapter, the impetus is not simply to detail how I undertook analysis and drew my findings, 
but also to convey why I undertook a given approach to analysis. There exists a wide range of approaches 
that could justifiably be used to scrutinise a securitisation, but for the purposes of this thesis I determined that 
an approach aligning with the interpretive ethos was most apt. 
 The thesis is, fundamentally, an analysis of discourse and the construction of identities; particularly 
the identity of threatening individuals and collectivities in cyberspace. Consequently, the chapter pays 
homage to what discourse is, and the matter of how identities are articulated by vested actors. From the 
standpoint of public-facing open source knowledge, it is unclear whether cyberterrorists objectively exist 
outside of discourse. In the corpus, a range of discursive tools have been used by actors to socially-construct 
the threat of cyberterrorism, but two tools, ‘metaphor’ and ‘narration’ are of particular interest given that 
these are popular means by which to project existing knowledge onto an event before it has occurred and 
also onto a ‘cyberterrorist’ identity that may or may not exist. Consequently, included in Chapter Three is an 
engagement with existing academic literature that concerns the functionality of metaphors in security 
discourses. 
 Chapter Three will then elaborate on the process of source acquisition that was conducted in order to 
gather relevant documents, statements and other materials. In order to adequately scrutinise the sources to 
ascertain meaningful findings regarding the securitisation of cyberterrorism, I asked a series of questions. I 
deemed this interpretive method to be more transparent than a fully open-ended approach. Explicitly listing 
the questions that I have asked of the sources serves to make clear to readers how I arrived at particular 
findings, and simultaneously gives an indication of why I have designed questions with a particular phrasing. 
Listing these questions also means that I have been able to be explicit about the efficacy of particular sources 
in answering the questions. 
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 Having asked these questions of the 110 unique sources that I collected, I was able to ascertain four 
central strands, and four sub-strands, which underpinned the ‘official’ British discursive construction of the 
threat of cyberterrorism. The final section of Chapter Three details these strands.  
 Chapter Four concerns the central pillar of the construction of the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK 
via the ‘official’ British discourse; the notion that cyberterrorism represented a ‘Tier One’, or severe, threat to 
the UK. This chapter explores how cyberterrorism emerged as a socially-constructed ‘Tier One’ threat to the 
UK as a result of the British National Security documents released by the Coalition and Conservative 
Governments. The 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review documents 
(Cabinet Office, 2010a; 2010b) were regarded as the securitising ‘acts’ that established the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism. This style of ‘securitising moment’, a statement published in a document with an expected 
lifespan of a full Parliament, fits relatively comfortably with the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ framework of 
securitisation theory. However, the public-facing articulation of cyberterrorism as a ‘Tier One’ threat did not 
rely on these documents alone; Ministers, MPs and Peers also espoused the idea that cyberterrorism 
represented one of the most significant threats to the UK. Cabinet Ministers with Privy Council access could, 
quite feasibly, be assimilated within securitisation theory under the guise of ‘securitising actors’, but the idea 
that they performed as securitising actors for the full duration of May 2010 to June 2016 would not be 
satisfactory. More fitting is a framework that allows a securitising actor to depart the stage and return to a 
seat amongst the audience, whilst retaining their right to ascend to the stage. In essence, one’s position as a 
securitising actor should not exclude a genuine capacity to serve a dual purpose as an audience member. 
Furthermore, the ‘cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat’ construct could remain intact even if the stage were 
empty; rather than passively offer a binary ‘affirmative’ or ‘negative’ to a proffered securitisation, members 
of the audience are able to repeat and echo the discursive construct. When a backbench MP ‘echoes’ a 
securitisation in this fashion in the Commons Chamber, they are not simply affirming their agreement with 
the securitisation, but they are actively trying to persuade other members of the audience (not simply their 
colleagues present in the Chamber but also viewers of the televised feed from the Chamber, and readers of 
Hansard) of the necessity for extraordinary measures to be enacted against an exceptional threat. Whilst 
audience members may not have the legitimacy to create a securitisation, they nevertheless possess the 
capacity to renew it and perhaps even alter it. Accordingly, Chapter Four maps the discursive ‘securitising 
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moments’ identified from the corpus that engaged with the notion of cyberterrorism as a ‘Tier One’ or severe 
threat. 
 It is argued in Chapter Four that the securitisation of cyberterrorism was not necessarily first and 
foremost concerned with eradicating the perceived threat of terrorists conducting significant cyber attacks 
against the UK. Instead, it is proposed, the securitisation of the threat of cyberterrorism served as a tacit 
endorsement of the UK’s own cyber weapons program. By categorising cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat, 
the Government created a partially-fixed nodal point that labelled cyber mediated violence by non-state 
actors as illegitimate. By default, the creation and maintenance of this partially-fixed nodal point endorsed a 
socially-constructed reality in which legitimate cyber mediated violence could exist. This notion – that the 
British securitisation of cyberterrorism makes possible particular assumptions about the role of the British 
state in cyber security – feeds into the analysis in the fifth and sixth chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter Five maps further components from the corpus of the official British construction of the 
threat of cyberterrorism, specifically those which adhere to the notion the securitisation of cyberterrorism is 
‘temporally’ unique. These components from the official discourse align with one of two sub-strands; the 
first is the idea that cyberterrorism befitted a ‘New Terrorism’ hypothesis, and the second was a fear that 
cyberterrorism was a threat deemed to be escalating over time. It is argued that the ‘New Terrorism’-esque 
aspects of the cyberterrorism-as-threat discourse acted as an entrenchment of the discursive social-
construction of an illegitimate violent identity in cyberspace. Ministers, MPs and Lords elaborated on the 
narration of the perceived threat of cyberterrorism, and it is suggested that their ‘chanting’ endorsed and 
evolved the discursive existence of a threatening cyberterrorist identity. The second sub-strand – the notion 
that cyberterrorism was a threat that would escalate over time – was found to exist both in the initial 
securitising act and in the mediation of the securitisation by the audience. It is suggested that repeated 
narration of an increasing threat of cyberterrorism was a discursive process that sought to increase the 
lifespan of the securitisation in the absence of a cyberterrorist event that would have both legitimised and 
justified the discourse of cyberterrorism-as-threat. In effect, this process served as a discursive ‘insurance 
policy’ against the perennial discursive risk of ‘crying wolf’. 
Chapter Six, the final mapping and analysis chapter of the thesis, maps the remaining components 
from the corpus of the official British construction of the threat of cyberterrorism. This chapter is divided 
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into two distinct parts. The first section is a mapping and analysis of items from the corpus that related to the 
notion that cyberterrorism was a ‘spatially unique’ threat. According to the discursively-constructed identity, 
to be a cyberterrorist was to operate in a landscape deemed to be distinct from that utilised by ‘analogue’ or 
‘conventional’ terrorists. This spatial-uniqueness was divided into two distinct sub-strands. The first of these 
strands was the concept of the terrorist ‘Safe Haven’. It is found that the use of linguistics associated with 
narratives of terrorist ‘Safe Havens’ was a process of ‘Othering’ that served to distinguish between legitimate 
and illegitimate forms of being in cyberspace. The second sub-strand was the notion that ‘physical’ and 
‘cyber’ spaces were distinct. In the analysis of this sub-strand, it is argued that the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism revolved not around the technical space of the internet – which enabled cyberterrorism to 
exist as a possibility – but instead the identities of particular users of the internet. 
The second section of Chapter Six draws on the final mapped components of the corpus to elucidate 
the way in which popular fictional narratives can be used by securitising actors and members of the audience 
to ‘fill in’ an epistemic void in the cyberterrorism discourse. Cyberterrorism has not yet been experienced 
directly by anyone either in the UK or abroad, but cyberterrorism can still be vicariously experienced 
through the reading or viewing of popular fictional narratives. Specifically, the ‘cyberterrorist’ narratives 
depicted in the 2012 installation of the James Bond franchise, Skyfall, and William Forstchen’s (2009) One 
Second After are scrutinised, as these were referenced by some members who were included in the corpus.  
 Lastly, Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter of the thesis, summarises the findings of the thesis. 
This concluding chapter also considers the limitations of the approach that has been taken in conducting this 
research, suggests further research endeavours that would be fruitful for further engagement with this thesis’s 
research questions, and offers some final remarks. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has sought to establish several key points that will underpin the ensuing analysis and 
findings. The chapter detailed the thesis aims and research questions that drive the analysis; obviously these 
are integral, and adherence to these throughout the ensuing chapters has helped to develop a coherent 
argument. The second section of this chapter reviewed the subject of cyberterrorism, emphasising that the 
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term is a discursively-created threatening phenomenon and that there is, at present, no uniform acceptance of 
what cyberterrorism is, or indeed whether cyberterrorism warrants its own independent discourse separated 
from a monolithic 'terrorism' entity. The fluidity of the definition and meaning of cyberterrorism is a 
significant tenet that surrounds the official discourse of cyberterrorism, and is a matter that will be returned 
to in the analysis. A fluid definition could serve as a means to encourage misinformation amidst securitising 
acts, thereby denying the audience a sufficient toolkit to dispute the securitisation. Similarly, a fluid 
definition could also make the securitisation more permeable, particularly in the case of cyberterrorism, a 
threat that has yet to occur. If the securitisation of cyberterrorism is loosely defined, this would permit the 
securitisation to assimilate affiliated cyber threats to the UK as and when they arise.  
 The schools of Critical Terrorism Studies and Critical Security Studies were both introduced in this 
chapter, as they represent the approaches that are most concordant with the methods adopted in the thesis. 
Specifically, their position on the construction of meaning – that meanings are not fixed, but are instead in a 
state of constant flux – is useful in the analysis of a phenomenon that has been 'talked into existence'. 
 Lastly, this introduction detailed an overview of the chapters that follow in the thesis. The next 
chapter engages with the method that will be used to analyse the official British discourse surrounding the 
threat of cyberterrorism, detailing the efficacy of securitisation theory. The chapter will also outline the 
nuances that are entailed within this approach to Security Studies, with the intention of highlighting this 
thesis's contribution to theory.  
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Chapter Two: Theory 
 
Securitisation Theory 
 
 In the field of Security Studies, the 1980s embodied a 'return to theory', a process that had been 
influenced, in part, by the developing Critical Studies branch of International Relations. This ‘return to 
theory’ occurred in concurrence with a heightened awareness of the relationship between the study of 
security and normativity (Waever and Buzan, 2007). Within this evolution of the approach to Security 
Studies, the Copenhagen School emerged, which sought to move beyond the debate concerning 'true 
meanings' of security (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998:2). Instead of being implacably fixed in meaning, 
security is considered fluid and changeable; as Buzan writes, “security means survival in the face of 
existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same” (1997:27). As a case-in-point, an 
example that has been used elsewhere is that of a theoretical gargantuan asteroid striking the planet Earth, 
which represents a threat of potentially society-destroying magnitude, but is arguably a threat that has not 
been securitised (Buzan, 2010). In contrast, more mundane threats such as the consumption of illicit 
narcotics have been securitised. In their seminal book, A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan, Waever and 
Wilde defined the raison d’etra of the Copenhagen School, writing that: “based on a clear idea of the nature 
of security, securitisation studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitises, on 
what issues, for whom, why, with what results and, not least, under what conditions” (Buzan, Waever and 
Wilde, 1998:32).  
 Securitisation theory is an attractive framework that one can use to scrutinise how some security 
issues take a greater precedence over others, particularly in cases where an issue that is perceived to be more 
pressing is not, objectively speaking, the greatest threat to human life (Taureck, 2006). Securitisation theory 
allows scholars of security to pinpoint processional stages in the discursive handling of a given security 
issue, which mark its rise and decline in prominence and prioritisation. These processional labels can then be 
used to critique how shifts in perceived prioritisation of a security issue occur. In this regard, securitisation 
theory is an accessible but powerful tool.  
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 In the original incantation of process-driven securitisation theory Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998:6) 
identified three stages to a securitisation, which are, accordingly: 1) identification of existing threats; 2) 
emergency action; and 3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules. Scholars can, and do, 
disagree on whether these three stages are sufficient; indeed, it is my view that the audience(s) involved in a 
securitisation are given insufficient agency in the above three-step framework. Nevertheless, a framework 
that highlights processes whereby security issues are prioritised through discourse is an invaluable asset in 
the scrutinisation of cyberterrorism, a phenomenon that has essentially been spoken-into-existence.  
 In what Balzacq has termed the 'internalist approach', there are three units of analysis incorporated 
within the securitisation framework: 1) the referent object, 2) the securitising actor, and 3) functional actors 
(Balzacq, 2005; Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998). Such an internalist approach, Balzacq has argued, 
“overstates the intrinsic power of a rule-governed use of concepts … to move an audience’s attention toward 
an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitising actor need to resonate with 
the context within which his/her actions are collocated” (2005:182). In essence, Balzacq suggests that we can 
conceive of securitising acts as a contestation – or mediation – of the 'symbol' of security, which is an 
isomorphic frame shaped by a given context, and the influence of the speaker's discourse (2004, 2005). 
Buzan and Waever eluded to this phenomenon, admittedly in somewhat clouded terms, as an 'intellectual 
process'; wherein securitising actors and audiences construct a 'shared understanding' of the threat in question 
(Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998:26,41; Buzan and Hansen, 2009:34; Oren and Solomon, 2015:320-321). 
Greater detail will be paid to the matter of the audience later in this chapter. 
 Securitisation theory entails a relatively straightforward and accessible framework, but that does not 
necessitate that the approach to the study of securitisation is monolithic. Indeed, there are differing 
approaches to the study of securitisation, and securitisation theory represents a contested field. It is therefore 
important to place this thesis coherently within the ongoing development of securitisation theory. What could 
be termed 'traditional' securitisation studies typically focuses on the enunciation of an exceptional speech act, 
which, if accepted by a relevant audience, establishes a securitisation permitting radical (perhaps military) 
measures against a designated threat. An alternative approach is suggested by Didier Bigo (2004, 2006), who 
proposed that we can conceptualise 'professional managers of unease'. These 'managers of unease', assisted 
by their access to technology and statistical analysis, are able to prioritise threats and determine what 
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constitutes 'security' in a given context (Bigo, 2004; 2006). This approach to the study of securitisation has 
been termed the 'Paris School'. The key contribution of the Parisian School is this: rather than relying upon 
spectacular events and grand pronouncements, the 'management of unease' is instead said to operate as a 
'routine' form of securitisation. Here, 'routine' represents a cumulative development of everyday practices and 
often seemingly minor legislative changes over an extended period of time. Aradau and Munster (2007, see 
also Beck, 1992), drawing on Beck's elucidation of the 'risk society', argue that in the case of counter-
terrorism, this cumulative and 'routinised' process has effectively blurred the distinction between war and 
policing, as exhibited by a culture of precaution. This approach to the analysis of securitisation seems 
suitably apt, given that there has not yet been an incident that can be labelled cyberterrorism. In the absence 
of a bona fide case of cyberterrorism, professional managers of unease (for instance, British Ministers, the 
intelligence services or police spokespeople) are only able to speculate the potential scope of a future 
incident.  
 In his book, Securitising Islam, Croft (2012) sought to ‘loosen’ some of the constraints that were 
self-imposed by the Copenhagen School, so that he could apply securitisation theory in a context and 
purpose-specific setting. Similarly, I will draw on the Copenhagen School’s ubiquitous grammar of security 
and ‘loosen’ some of the constraints. Specifically, I reconfigure the relationship of securitisation theory with 
the role – and constitution – of the participatory audiences. I also loosen the temporal scale of securitisation 
theory. Cyberterrorism does not fit the model of a threat that is presented with immediacy and which can be 
solved with emergency measures before being returned to a status of a ‘politicised’ issue. Such a loosening of 
the constraints of the theory is not an attack on the mainstream – either Copenhagen or Parisian – blueprints 
of securitisation theory. Rather, what I offer here is a context-specific approach to securitisation theory that is 
suitable for analysing the construction of the threat of cyberterrorism. Certainly, what follows below could be 
applied as a blueprint in other contexts; however, I do not proclaim my reading of securitisation theory to be 
universally suitable, and indeed insist that in many cases it may be misaligned. In the context of a threat 
epitomised by a threatening identity (cyberterrorists), a successful securitisation effectively gives the 
securitising actor the right – in the Weberian sense (Chatterjee, 2005) – to enact a monopoly of legitimate 
violence.  
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 Different threats understandably may require different proscriptions; for instance, a securitisation of 
a threat emanating from our natural environment is likely to differ because the natural environment does not 
have human agency. The environment was considered by Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) to be one of the 
four ‘sectors’ that are securitisable, with the other sectors being military, economic and societal. The 
“environment itself rarely becomes a referent object”, and instead “it is in fact civilisation dependent upon 
the environment that is the referent object to be securitised” (Vogler, 2002:185). Climate change in particular 
is regarded as a threat multiplier, and the political attention provided to this matter has been highlighted by 
some as evidence of a securitisation (Schafer, Scheffran and Penniket, 2015:78; Brzoska and Oels, 2011; 
Oels, 2012; Methmann and Rothe, 2012).  Whilst there are some environmental issues that can be secured 
with violent means, such as anti-poaching measures in Kenya, broadly speaking the military and the use of 
force is unsuitable to the guaranteeing of environmental security as the natural environment (for instance, 
rising sea levels) will not react to a threat of violence. In fact, the military is often the antithesis to 
environmental security, with environmental issues surrounding phenomena such as nuclear weapons testing, 
the burning of oil fields, or the intentional demolition of forested and shrubbed areas, such as that committed 
by the Israeli forces on borderlands with Palestinian territories (see Lynfield, 2015). Conversely, in the sense 
of something to be securitised against, the environment cannot be considered a conscious actor, unless one 
assumes that the legal term “An Act of God” operates in a literal sense. This is not to conflate securitisation 
with militarisation. The key point here is that this thesis considers the labelling of acts of violence as either 
legitimate or illegitimate to be a central component of a securitisation framework that posits a process-driven 
perspective akin to that of the Parisian School. Because an ascribed identity can be feasibly be securitised, 
this allows security scholars to observe a securitisation even in the absence of a particular security-detracting 
event. The possibility of securitising identities on the basis of their possible future actions, in essence, 
permits preventative rather than reactive securitisation. In the case of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, 
what is securitised is not a tangible reality based on an explicit historical cyberterrorist event, but rather the 
possibility that individuals or groups may utilise computer systems as a direct means of sowing death and 
destruction. This is distinct from the framework of ‘riskification’, which will be detailed shortly. 
 There are, particularly within the discourse of climate change, some exhibited symptoms of 
securitisation that make a claim of 'the environment is securitised' tempting. The 21st Conference of the 
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Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris in 2015 demonstrated that 
– at least on a rhetorical basis – major industrialised states took the threat of climate change seriously 
(Harvey, 2015). In an example of media influence, the BBC Trust forced senior managers to stop inserting 
'false balance' in issues that are deemed to be non-contentious, such as the human causation of climate 
change (Knapton, 2014). This is resultant from the culture within the climatic scientific community. 
 ‘Cyberspace’, as has been detailed in the previous chapter, is an environment of sorts. However, as 
will be found in the analysis chapters of this thesis, the securitisation of cyberterrorism revolves not around 
the ‘technical’ environment of cyberspace, but instead the identities of particular actors who use it. 
 A more appropriate security framework to scrutinise the issue of 'security and the environment' could 
be that of 'riskification', which is aptly detailed by Olaf Corry (2012). A framework of riskification posits that 
risks – differentiated from 'existential threats' – cannot be eradicated, simply managed. The projected time-
frame involved with a 'risk-ified' threat is therefore a long term, generational one, rather than a threat that can 
be temporarily securitised, reduced to an inconsequential significance through emergency measures, and then 
returned to the realm of normal politics. In a 'riskified' discourse, the measures and policies targeted against a 
threat seek to reduce vulnerability and the exposure to the implied risks. Given that issues pertaining to the 
environment are broad, complex, and inherently contextual, this framework is better suited to analysing 
efforts to manage human relations with the environment. There is, to an extent, a case to suggest that the 
riskification framework is a more suitable toolkit for the critique of counterterrorism discourse than the 
framework offered by securitisation theory. Given that political violence – whether perpetrated through 
digital or analogue means – is an avenue of political activism that is unlikely to cease in the foreseeable 
future, a framework that permits one to see a discourse of security as long-term rather than immediate and 
temporary appears more apt. 
 As was discussed in the first chapter, cyberspace can be considered the 'fifth sphere' of power 
projection, an environment reliant on computers, servers, cables and exchanges posited in the physical 
environments of land, sea and space, but nevertheless constitutive of a new sphere in its own right. In an 
article, Adam Kingsmith has referred to 'digital macrosecuritisations', noting that “the object to be secured is 
a borderless world of free-flowing information, a single seamless environment where ideas can be shared 
fluidly within a cyberspace that is not controlled by spatial and temporal conceptualisations of security” 
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(2013:4). This thesis takes critical infrastructure as the object to be secured. The internet is a revealing entity 
because its origins date back to a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) programme, 
instigated as a means of ensuring that American military communications as a whole would remain 
functional if one part of the network was attacked. However, whilst the internet began its life as a response to 
a securitisation (in this case the Soviet Union as an existential threat to American military operability), there 
is now a cogent and widespread belief that the internet should remain 'neutral' (no web traffic is given 
priority over any other), free (as in freedom, not 'free beer') and uncensored. Undoubtedly, some states have 
sought to explicitly link even banal internet usage with matters of national security, for instance China and 
Saudi Arabia, but these restrictions do not represent a desirable state of affairs. The infringements on privacy, 
security and liberty that are detailed in the Freedom House “Freedom on the Net” reports make for sobering 
reading (Kelly et al, 2016). 
 To reiterate, this thesis takes the critical infrastructure of computer systems as the referent object of 
securitisation most implicated in the securitisation of cyberterrorism. Examples of such infrastructure could 
be water utility control systems, or integrated navigation for a particular brand of electric car. These physical 
spaces are distinct from, say, the ‘virtual environment’ of a webpage. Ultimately, the implication that the 
environment – whether land, sea or cyberspace – could be securitised would contribute to a process of a 
seemingly ever-expansive parameter of security. This is absolutely not to detract from the security issues 
surrounding environmental degradation, but securitisation cannot be a limitless concept, and effort should be 
made to restrict analysis. Indeed, whilst this thesis is concerned with securitisation theory and its alignment 
with the securitisation of a ‘risk’ (the risk that proscribed terrorist entities may conduct a cyber attack), it is 
possible that a ‘riskification’ model would better elucidate threats emanating from, within and against targets 
in the virtual environment of cyberspace.  
 This chapter will now consider an elementary component of the securitisation framework: the 
audience. The audiences have the capacity to accept or reject a call for a securitisation, and it is therefore of 
central importance to capture a logic through which appropriate agency can be ascribed to the audience 
participants. 
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The Securitisation of Cyberterrorism in Relation to the ‘Traditional’ Framework of Securitisation 
  
 The mapped discursive construction of the threat of cyberterrorism that follows in Chapters Four, 
Five and Six – that terrorist application of computer systems for the purposes of wrecking death and/or 
destruction represents a severe threat – befits the ‘traditional’ model of securitisation theory. This framework 
is articulated in the seminal book, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 
1998:35-39). This framework is a speech-act based model, which distinguishes between referent objects, 
securitising actors, and functional actors. The referent object is the ‘thing’ that is deemed to be existentially 
threatened. In the case of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, this referent object is, chiefly, the critical 
national infrastructure underpinning key utilities in the UK. This infrastructure is ascribed a preferential 
status because of its role in the functioning of the British state, as well as the reliance that everyday British 
society places on its continued and uninterrupted operation. To contextualise this point, one could consider 
the unprecedented ‘brute force’ attack5 conducted against British Parliamentarians in June 2017, in which up 
to 90 parliamentary staff email accounts were compromised, leading to the temporary suspension of off-site 
access (Maidment, 2017). Andrew Bridgen, the Conservative MP for North-West Leicester, was perhaps 
astute when he told the Press Association that the breach could usher in blackmail attempts (see The 
Guardian, 2017), given that Parliamentarian’s inboxes are likely to contain confidential information from 
both colleagues and constituents. However, even if this attack were conducted by terrorists – although at the 
time of writing, Russia appears to be regarded as the most likely culprit (MacAskill and Syal, 2017) – this 
would not be an instance of cyberterrorism, given that death and destruction has not been caused, nor is there 
an existential threat at a societal level. 
 In the case of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, the ‘securitising agent’ is, most expressly, the 
Cabinet Office, which was responsible for the publishing of the National Security Strategies and for directing 
Government policy relating to the prioritisation of security threats. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998:40) 
allowed for a relatively flexible remit in terms of who could, or could not be, a securitising agent; 
acknowledging that, conceptually, deciding who represents the securitising actor is more challenging than 
                                                          
5 A ‘brute force’ attack spams a password database with password guesses for a given user entry. This is a crude form 
of attack that is effective on vulnerable databases (particularly those which have not been ‘salted’), or for individual 
users who have inadequate password protection (for instance, those who have set their password as ‘password’ or 
their constituency name). 
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isolating the referent object. However, given that the attempted move to securitise cyberterrorism in the UK 
first appeared in the 2010 version of the National Security Strategy, and the ability to publish this document 
was restricted to the Cabinet Office, it is not without basis to suggest that the Cabinet Office is the primary 
legitimate securitising agent in this instance. 
 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde defined the ‘functional actors’ as those actors “who affect the dynamics 
of a sector” (1998:36). This definition purposefully permits a broad remit of who can be considered a 
functional actor, and, I would suggest, effectively designates this third category of actor as a ‘stakeholder’ in 
a given securitisation. These ‘stakeholders’ are ascribed some agency to influence a given securitisation, 
whether directly or indirectly. The staff of Cabinet members, the civil service, employees of the Houses of 
Parliament estate, Select Committees, not to mention MPs themselves and members of the public are 
amongst what is, effectively, a complex network of actors who could be included in a framework of 
securitisation. In the case of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, significant non-governmental organisation 
stakeholders might be: internet infrastructure providers; computer hardware manufacturers; social 
networking, internet search and advertising firms; or critical national infrastructure providers. Indeed, given 
that a significant and sustained attack against critical national infrastructure would feasibly have the capacity 
to harm security at a ‘societal’ level, everyone who is aware of the threat of cyberterrorism could be 
considered a stakeholder. However, by mapping and analysing the discourse offered by the Cabinet Office, 
MPs and Lords, this thesis limits the categories of possible stakeholders. This serves two functions. Firstly, 
mapping and analysing an entirety of the British discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism would not be 
feasible within the limitations of a PhD thesis. Secondly, to isolate a ‘Whitehall’ securitisation of 
cyberterrorism is to map and analyse the UK’s highest tier of discursive environment in which policies 
relating to mitigating cyberterrorism can be debated, challenged, and re-affirmed. 
 Of particular interest for the novel contributions to theory offered by this thesis is the notion of the 
‘audience’. In the next section of this chapter I will introduce a framework for a ‘Pantomime’ model of 
securitisation. Audience members included in the corpus and conceptualised as part of this framework are 
Ministers, MPs and Lords. The political figures are regarded as having engaged with the securitisation 
through Hansard contributions, public speeches and interviews with the media. This reduction of engagement 
to recorded ‘moments’ in which an individual or collective have expressed their views or their intentions, 
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misses that which is not recorded, and indeed, that which has not been said, but may have still been felt or 
experienced. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Three, this thesis takes recorded statements at face value. It is 
not my place to ‘project’ meaning onto the discourse, but rather, to infer meaning from the recorded 
‘moments’ in the corpus. Consequently, when I state that this thesis is the first comprehensive overview of 
the official securitisation of cyberterrorism in the UK, it is, more accurately, a mapping of the recorded – and 
open-source – ‘moments’ in which a distinct and exclusive section of the British population have engaged 
with this particular articulation of threat. 
 
The ‘Pantomime’ Model of Securitisation 
 
 The 'audience' is the site at which an issue can acquire the status of securitisation. The 'security 
utterance' enunciated by the securitising actor is, first and foremost, directed at the audience; Balzacq 
(2005:183) has labelled these utterances 'linguistic marks', which direct the attention of an audience to a 
given being or object that relates to their security. The concept of the audience, however, is not without 
controversy. For instance, McDonald has suggested “that dynamics such as the role of 'facilitating conditions' 
and the 'audience' are so under-theorised as to ultimately remain outside the framework itself” (2008:564). It 
is crucial to elaborate on the issue of the 'audience' in securitisation theory and resist the urge to leave it in a 
state of cultivated ambiguity.  
 Johnson-Laird referred to security discourse as “a blueprint for a state of affairs: it relies on the 
[audience] to flesh out the missing details” (1983:471). It would thus not be inaccurate to say that 
securitisations are audience-centric phenomena, in which the audience is given the capacity to either enable 
or render ineffective a securitising utterance (Balzacq, 2005:184; Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka, 2016:499). 
Granted, agreement between the securitising actor and the audience is not likely to be on the basis of power 
parity; as Roe highlights, “actors often possess, and indeed employ, the resources to cajole and bully 
audiences into acquiescing to their depiction of events”, although of course it is important to note that “some 
kind of agreement is nevertheless required” (2012:255). 
 The audience and the securitising actor operate within embedded power structures in which some 
members of the audience are – for reasons of national security, wilful deceit, or in some cases simple 
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ignorance – deprived of knowledge. This deprivation of knowledge bequests the securitising actor with “a 
privileged position in signalling important developments and in establishing the meaning of those 
developments” (Watson, 2012:286). Hagmann and Cavelty (2012:87) have convincingly argued that – in the 
case of the documents pertaining to the British National Security Strategy and National Risk Register – the 
Cabinet Office expresses the enclosed information in a 'scientific', technical manner. This tendency has a 
depoliticising effect, as otherwise non-invested members of the public are denied the ability to effectively 
engage in informed debate in support of, or against, a given securitisation.  
 The speaker does have to convey an alarmist message of an existential threat with at least some 
efficacy to the public. In order to achieve a successful perlocutionary effect, the securitising actor must tune 
his or her language to the pre-existing experiences and perceptions of the audience (Balzacq, 2005:184; 
Edelman, 1988). In essence, the securitising actor represents the threat “by other things, which are then 
'packaged' and 'sold' as containing threats or promoting security” (Schouten, 2014:28; Salter, 2008a:258). To 
cite an example, it is, to a venerable extent, to the aforementioned phenomenon that one can attribute the 
then-Prime Minister David Cameron's reference to criminals plotting to do 'bad things' on the internet, when 
he was interviewed on a popular morning television programme in November 2015 (Deacon, 2015). 
 To refer simply to 'an audience' is an insalubrious move. In reality, it is instead sound to discuss the 
existence of “not one single audience but rather several possible audiences” (Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka, 
2016:499). Indeed, it is entirely feasible that the primary audience is not the general public, and it is instead 
the political, military and intelligence elites who require convincing, even if they are close (professionally 
and/or personally) to the securitising actor (Taureck, 2006:20). This author agrees with Williams's (2011a) 
contention, that the receptive audience can be seen to be created by a securitisation. Specifically, I suggest 
this means that the securitising actor is able to actively pursue the audience whom they believe they need to 
convince; simply trying to rally 'everyone' around a securitisation would be a waste of time and resources. 
The audience that is 'created' for any given securitisation would also be influenced by structural factors, such 
as the level of accountability and transparency within national or local government, the role of invested 
NGOs, and the general public/media interest in an issue or policy. Consequently, the 'audience' could be as 
small as a crisis response committee in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), or indeed as large as a 
national or multinational public. Clearly, context is key here; the 'created audience' will often depend on the 
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level of legitimacy that the securitising agent perceives they will require in order to enact the policies they 
believe will counter an identified threat. 
 This is, however, not to imply that the 'general public' would be redundant in the theorisation of a 
securitisation, if the securitising moves were, for instance, confined to COBR meetings and Select 
Committees. In the event of an existential threat, one would expect at least some level of public engagement, 
or awareness. A securitisation is likely to have several audiences (Stritzel, 2007:363), and, in the case of an 
'elitist' securitisation, we could therefore discern the public as a separate tier of an audience. The status of 
being ‘lower tier’ would entail some influence over a securitisation, but one would presume that policies 
could still be enacted through a securitised discourse without the full assent of the secondary audience. It is 
foreseeable that, particularly over an extended period of time, a secondary audience could have a direct 
influence not necessarily over the securitising actor, but of the 'primary audience'. For instance, a 
securitisation might require Members of Parliament to comprise part of a higher audience tier, and these 
figures will be accountable to their constituents, who would form a lower tier of the audience. If a prominent 
piece of legislation that had been implicated in a securitisation became controversial in the public sphere, it 
is understandable that an MP might seek to withdraw their support for the legislation, particularly towards 
the end of an election cycle. Given this phenomenon, it would be foolhardy to consider a given securitisation 
to be a fixed entity. Rather, securitisations are contested, fluid and mercurial; the audience that engages with 
an initial securitising move may be substantively different to audiences that become involved with re-
securitising or counter-securitising moves at a later stage.  
 In the case of this thesis, which scrutinises official discourse between 12th May 2010 and 24th June 
2016, no major changes were identified in the constitution of the audience. The 2015 election ousted the 
Liberal Democrats from the Coalition Government and reshuffled Parliament, but the discursive handling of 
the threat of cyberterrorism was not altered. However, were this research to be retrospectively updated to 
account for new discourse in, say, 2025 or 2030, it is possible that trends and substantive shifts in the agency 
composition of the discourse could be identified.  
 It is the view of this author that the role of a lower tiered audience extends beyond simply 
influencing the higher tiered audiences, however. All tiers of the audience can play a subtle, certainly not 
always overt, role in (re)securitising a perceived threat. This is achieved in a process that has been termed by 
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Oren and Solomon (2015) as 'ritualised chanting'. In essence, there is no implicit need for an audience to be 
genuinely convinced by a securitising move. Instead, in order for a securitisation to be successful, there 
simply needs to be a repetition of the requisite phrasing (for example, 'radicalisation' or 'Islamic extremism'). 
This chanting forms a performance, and this performance acts as an implicit – whether intentional or 
unintentional – endorsement for a securitisation. The ingenuity of the 'ritualised chanting' approach to 
audience participation is that it allows for the incorporation of sceptical or dissenting voices amongst the 
respective audiences without having to resort to labelling these voices as counter-securitising, when this label 
would be misrepresentative. As Oren and Solomon note, observing “that a significant number of people 
express doubts or even oppose these policies is perfectly compatible with securitisation so long as the 
doubters/opponents join in the ritualistic uttering of the securitising phrase” (2015:327). To illustrate this 
point, one could use the example of the securitisation of Islamic terrorism in the UK; whilst labels such as 
'Islamic terror', or 'radical cleric' may be prejudice, ignorant and lazy identifiers that are used to endorse or 
enhance particular policies, legislation and security cultures, the act of even the dissenters repeating the 
phrases is a performance that serves to endorse the meanings of the terms, and this, by implication, is an 
endorsement of the securitisation. Simply by repeating these securitised terms here, in a professional 
capacity as a Doctoral Researcher and Lecturer, or a personal capacity amongst friends, I myself am an actor 
in this ritualised performance.  
 Understandably, such inadvertent chanting has implications for the British discourse of the threat of 
cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism, like many words adorned with the 'cyber' prefix, is a buzzword that both 
implies risks to security, and also encapsulates a sense of modernity; of forward-thinking. This thesis will 
argue that cyberterrorism – possessing no pre-existing case study – exhibits a reduced, or even non-existent, 
common definitional grounding in British discourse. The malleable nature of the term therefore makes the 
recourse-to-ritualised-chanting more pervasive, because speakers are able to draw on the alluring, alarmist 
language of cyberterrorism irrespective of whether or not they are objectively speaking of cyberterrorism. 
Reference to the term 'cyberterrorism', without a consistent understanding of what speakers believe this term 
represents, will have at least some impact on the degree of ambiguity regarding how a cyberterrorist incident 
would be performed and experienced. 
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A securitisation, created and sustained through discourse, is a fluid and potentially changeable 
phenomenon, rather than a fixed ‘fact’. This is where this thesis breaks away from the ‘traditional’ approach 
to securitisation, as established by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), and instead advocates a Post-
Structural perspective. As will be demonstrated in Chapters Four, Five and Six, this thesis has consulted the 
full official corpus of cyberterrorism in the UK between 12th May 2010 to 24th June 2016 to be able to map 
and understand how cyberterrorism came to be established as a severe threat to the UK. In this regard, this 
thesis is empathetic to Snetkov’s suggestion, “that Critical Security Studies would benefit from a greater use 
of longitudinal methods of analysis” (2017:270). Simply scrutinising a singular ‘moment’, or ‘snapshot’ of 
the process implicated in the securitisation of cyberterrorism would, by default, inhibit the analysis of the 
evolutionary dynamics underpinning this discursive and relational construct. 
 When a securitising actor attempts a securitisation, the ‘thing’ that they are attempting to create is not 
just the new (or pre-existing but perhaps overlooked) conception that something existentially threatens 
something else. The moment at which the actor makes their securitising attempt is also the moment at which 
the audience(s), who can either consent to the securitisation or can reject it, are formed. Not everyone will be 
interested in partaking in the discourse of a securitisation. Perhaps more importantly, not all voices amongst 
an audience are equal. 
 Here, Wilhelmsen is instructive: 
 
“what Buzan et al (1998:27) talk about as ‘acceptance of that designation by a significant audience’ is, then, in the sense 
of Laclau and Mouffe, a situation when a particular securitising discourse has become hegemonic by naturalising this 
particular intervention and overpowering others in the broader public (Torfing, 1999:103). Empirically, this is the 
situation when the description of the threat as ‘existential’ and of ‘the point of no return’ and the ‘way out’ given in a 
securitising move has gained enough resonance and response in the representations of the audience for emergency 
action to be undertaken legitimately” (2017:177, original emphasis). 
  
In the context of the UK, the Parliament is the body with the capacity to draft and legitimise new 
legislation and to amend existing legislation. Where extraordinary measures must be incorporated within 
legislation, it is clear that, within the context of securitisation, the Members of the Parliament represent a 
more powerful audience body than those who do not have parliamentary authority.  
Analytically, the success (or not) of an attempted securitisation has always depended upon a given 
audience’s consent; however, the underlying conception of the audience as offered by the traditional 
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framework of securitisation theory has been labelled as ‘radically underdeveloped’ (Williams, 2011a:212), 
‘negated’ (Balzacq, 2005:179), and a “normative concept in disguise” (Floyd, 2010:50). This under-
development has meant that there is an insufficient framework to understand the way in which a securitising 
act or a series of acts perform in different ways to alternative audiences. For Floyd (2010:51), the original 
audience was an expression of what security politics ought to be, instead of what is. This does not, however, 
mean that the notion of the audience is redundant. To do away with the audience altogether would be 
unsatisfactory, but so too would be allowing the audience to remain in a state of cultivated ambiguity. There 
is a pressing need to develop a framework of the audience that arrests this ambiguity, which is nevertheless 
sufficiently flexible to maintain utility across differing security issues, legal territories, scales and 
timeframes. 
 With respect to the audience, this thesis is positioned within the field of literature that advocates a 
‘capabilities’-based understanding of the audience. Vouri, for instance, has proposed that audiences are 
comprehensible by their “ability to provide the securitising actor with whatever s/he is seeking to accomplish 
with the securitisation” (2008:72). The key characteristic of an audience, therefore, is that they themselves 
perform a central function in the success or failure of an offered securitisation. Similarly, Balzacq, Léonard 
and Ruzicka talk of an ‘enabling’ audience that ‘empowers’ a given securitising actor (2016:499). In other 
words, without the active discursive consent of members of the audience, a securitisation may be regarded as 
either partial or as having failed. The alternative to this conception of an ‘enabling’ audience, would, in 
effect, be that which advocates that the audience(s) are what Côte has aptly called ‘agents without agency’ 
(2016:543). An audience without agency would not be able to significantly influence a given securitisation 
process. In effect, the audience’s significance within the securitisation framework would be reduced to a 
symbolic or decorative level. This would question the utility of securitisation theory; if a securitising agent 
does not meaningfully need to acquire the assent of an audience, their efforts to ‘persuade’ an audience 
through securitising moves would be irrelevant to the success or failure of a securitisation. 
 One of the novel contributions to theory that this thesis offers is the delineation between primary, 
secondary and tertiary ‘tiers’ of the securitising audience. Traditional securitisation theory as upheld by the 
Copenhagen School takes ‘the audience’ as a monolithic construct. But this lens is too narrow and limits the 
explanatory power of the theory. In reality, not only do different audience members have differing capacities 
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to engage with a securitisation, but a securitising actor – if they intend their securitisation to be successful – 
will be obligated to tailor their message to the specific audience that they are talking to. Certain messages, 
for instance, the concept of cyberterrorism existing as a Tier One threat to the UK, is a soundbite that could 
conceivably be successfully assimilated across several if not all audiences. Conversely, a technical paper 
detailing partnership between public and private bodies in relation to cyber security may be of interest to a 
smaller or more exclusive audience. 
 For the purpose of this thesis, I divide the audience(s) involved in the securitisation of cyberterrorism 
into three distinct ‘tiers’. The first tier is the most exclusive, and is comprised of individuals who can also 
perform as securitising actors. This tier is formed of senior members of the Cabinet Office. The second tier 
incorporates MPs and Lords, including the opposition Frontbench, and Junior Ministers. Lastly, the third tier, 
which is theorised but not analysed in this thesis, incorporates the audiences outside of Whitehall who may 
still be interested in understanding and speaking about the threat of cyberterrorism. Professional figures such 
as journalists could be considered members of this third tier, as could the public at large. Certainly, I could 
create further divisions in the audience. Adopting the framework for another securitisation – say, the 
macrosecuritisation of the Global War on Terrorism during the tenure of the 2001-2008 George W. Bush 
administrations – could perhaps only be rendered meaningful with a double-digit level of tiers. The Global 
War on Terrorism engaged a vast array of government and non-government bodies in many nation-states 
which will have experienced this trans-national endeavour differently and will have been speaking to 
differing audiences. Theorising the Congress of the USA as an entity that is directly relatable to the German 
Bundestag would not adequately capture the organisational context in which these two political bodies 
operate. There would be a risk that nuances in the speech acts exhibited in the respective legislative bodies 
could be overlooked.  
Furthermore, this thesis only handles audience tiers in a ‘vertical’ fashion, wherein each tier is 
differentiated by its capacity to influence a securitisation. The top, or first tier, incorporates those who, as a 
result of their position and authority, are able to engage also as securitising agents. Each subsequent tier has a 
correspondingly lower degree of authority to directly influence the British securitisation of cyberterrorism. 
However, it is within reason that one could also map tiers on a ‘horizontal’ basis in addition to the vertical. In 
the case of the international Global War on Terrorism, for example, the acting governments of France and 
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Germany could be differentiated as separate ‘horizontal’ tiers. By drawing tiers on a horizontal basis, one 
could actively account for the relatively similar capacity of each government to influence a securitisation on 
an international and domestic level, whilst acknowledging that each of the two horizontal tiers may be 
speaking to some shared, and some distinct, other audience tiers (for instance, the European Commission, the 
French public and the German public). 
 In this thesis, the vertical three tiers are differentiated by their capacity to engage with the 
securitisation of cyberterrorism in the UK. These tiers are not fixed, and it is entirely possible to conceive of 
an individual crossing two or more tiers. For instance, an individual may be able to listen, speak and/or write 
professionally as a vested actor in a security-relevant field and do so as a member of a higher tier of the 
audience than they would if, say, they were speaking informally in summer attire and sandals at a barbeque 
party. Accordingly, these three tiers are as follows.  
 The first tier incorporates the securitising actors themselves; when they are not speaking directly on 
the matter of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, it is reasonable to assume that a securitising actor can 
themselves return to membership of the audience. The first tier of the audience is also distinguishable by the 
degree to which they are privy to classified or restricted information. In order for a securitising call to 
feasibly be heard by all tiers of the audience, the call has to be declassified and at an open-source, non-
technical level. Realistically, it would be possible to incorporate within securitisation theory the possibility to 
securitise behind closed doors; even if we cannot empirically analyse these securitising calls until the 
relevant information is disclosed either through successful freedom of information requests or the expiration 
of confidentiality. For instance, were a COBR meeting convened amidst a significant cyber breach in the 
UK, this meeting would, in and of itself, be a symbolic securitising gesture capable of rippling across all tiers 
of the audience, assuming that the meeting were publicly disclosed. Whilst this thesis analyses spoken and 
written discourse and does not pay great attention to the function of symbolism and gesture, the potential for 
gestures to play a role in securitisation and security politics more broadly should not be overlooked (Jarvis, 
2015; Jarvis and Legrand, 2017). A discursive moment that is relevant to a securitisation does not exist in a 
vacuum, but is instead inscribed with meaning through the paraphernalia surrounding the performance. The 
act of a Minister appearing in the Commons chamber, standing before the dispatch box is, potentially, a 
substantively different performance to them standing before a conference audience to deliver a similar 
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statement. On paper, the words of these two theoretical addresses may be much the same, but the context of 
the respective performances would matter. For instance, the intended direct and indirect audiences may differ 
and the tone of the speaker may be more relaxed in a congenial conference hall than in the adversarial 
Commons chamber.  
Whilst the discussions within the briefing room would only be privy to a select and vested group of 
actors, this discussion could have a paramount significance for the course and nature of the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism. By creating ‘tiers’ in the audience, one is able to accommodate within the securitisation 
framework the exclusionary ‘spaces’ in which an overarching securitisation can be heard and mediated. 
Granted, it is somewhat unsatisfactory to incorporate into analysis that which one is excluded from and 
cannot access (although this analysis could be ‘filled in’ in subsequent publications when, or if, classified 
documents, minutes, telephone conversations or instant messaging communications are released), but simply 
eschewing outright the existence of these spaces would detract from the accuracy of securitisation theories’ 
explanatory power. Acknowledging that securitisations can be mediated in exclusionary spaces and that the 
government itself can be an audience participant would also ease the legitimate criticism of securitisation 
theory relating to its perceived Western democratic centricism (Roe, 2008; Salter, 2008b; Vouri, 2008). In the 
context of an authoritarian state with limited democratic accountability, for example, insisting that the 
broader populace must be an element of the empowering audience would theoretically enfranchise people 
who may not possess meaningful means to engage with a securitisation. In this case, the securitisation 
theorist would be imposing a normative preference for liberal democracy onto structures of meaning-making 
security discourse. The delineation between ‘securitised’ and ‘politicised’ would be blurred, given that wider 
aspects of societal life in a non-democratic society may not offer a general population avenues for civic 
engagement and critique.  
 The second tier of the audience is the one on which this thesis places greatest emphasis, given this 
thesis’s focus on the official (as opposed to, say, ‘general’) narrative of the securitisation of cyberterrorism in 
the UK. For the purpose of this thesis, this second tier of the audience is comprised of MPs and Lords. This 
second tier is distinguished from the next tier – the third – because these figures are able, potentially, to 
directly influence legislation, and certainly to voice their views on a given issue in both a privileged and on-
record environment. For many Members of the Parliament, particularly those beholden to party whips who 
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are not on the front benches nor significantly involved in committees, the ability to stand up during a debate, 
catch the Speaker’s attention and speak on record is a key outlet for them to advocate on behalf of their 
constituents on the central matters of the day.  
 The mechanisms of process and debate within Parliament are mechanisms of ritual, even, as Jarvis 
(2015) has noted, during the pre-determined debates regarding intended additions to the list of proscribed 
terrorist groups in the UK6. As noted earlier in this chapter, this thesis is in part informed by Oren and 
Solomon’s “WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitisation through Ritualised Incantation of Ambiguous Phrases”, in 
which they propose with respect to the ‘WMD’ discourse surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq: 
 
“that the acceptance of this oft-repeated utterance by an audience consists not in becoming ‘convinced’ or ‘persuaded’ 
so much as in the audience echoing the phrase, joining in a chorus-like fashion with the securitising actor to produce a 
repetitive, ritualised chant … the audience is not being performed to – it is not akin to theatre spectators who sit inertly 
in their seats during the play before applauding the stage performers at the end of the evening. The audience rather 
partakes in the production of the ‘political spectacle’” (2015:315-316, original emphasis). 
  
The crux of the matter is this; even if the members of the audience do not have a firm grasp of what 
cyberterrorism is, nor the technical specifics entailed within a hypothetic cyberterrorist attack, they are still 
capable of reinvigorating the securitisation of cyberterrorism by repeating the term ‘cyberterrorism’. This is 
especially so when they make this repetition in the same breath as the term ‘Tier One’ or a similar sentiment 
expressing severe risk. For Oren and Solomon (2015:317), the idea that the securitisation framework should 
be underpinned by a ‘marketplace of ideas’ essentially casts back to a bygone era; today, and indeed, during 
the period May 2010 to June 2016 under scrutiny in this thesis, commercial marketing revolves less around 
detailed descriptions of a product, but instead more around aggressive marketing of brands through 
repetition, catch-phrasing and sloganeering. Securitisation, as a discursive political process that seeks to 
capture attention and assert the immediacy of a given threat, adheres to a similar tenet. Phrases such as 
‘WMD’ and ‘cyberterrorism’ cultivate an ambiguity through multiple instances of repetition, driven by two 
common properties of ritual symbolism: condensation and multi-vocality (Oren and Solomon, 2015:326; 
Kertzer, 1988:11). Condensation refers to the way in which a particular symbolic entity can possess a variety 
                                                          
6 British law proscribes terrorist organisations as per Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The Home Secretary lays 
an order before Parliament, which must be debated (but cannot be amended) by both Houses. A proscription order 
has yet to be rejected. See Home Office (2017) for a list of proscribed terrorist groups in the UK. Notably, 
‘hacking’, or ‘cyber’ specific entities such as ‘LulzSec’, ‘Anonymous’ or ‘Fancy Bear’ are absent from this list.  
46 
of ideas, and multi-vocality refers to the way in which a given entity can be understood by different actors in 
different ways (Kertzer, 1988:11). As will be identified in the ensuing analysis chapters of this thesis, the 
agents that comprise the qualitative corpus of the British securitisation of cyberterrorism demonstrated both 
condensation and multi-vocality in their utterances.  
 The third and final tier of the audience that I have conceptualised for the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism in the UK is the largest and least exclusive. This third tier incorporates the myriad of 
members of the public who have elected to express a view on the threat of cyberterrorism, either by 
providing responses to a poll, by expressing sentiment on social media, writing to a national or local 
newspaper, or by authoring articles. Given the feasibly almost indefinite size of this third tier, and the vast 
plethora of spaces and forums in which members of this tier can discuss cyberterrorism (as opposed to, say, 
the exclusive space of the Commons Chamber), this is potentially the largest of the tiers. Analysis has 
already been conducted with respect to the cyberterrorism discourse exhibited in the global news media (see 
Jarvis, MacDonald and Whiting, 2016a; 2016b). Unless intrigue in the field of cyberterrorism diminishes, it 
is likely that future research will examine data from sources such as popular technology forums, Twitter, 
polling, psychological studies and other empirical material, to compile a better comprehension of public 
awareness of this threat. The Cyberterrorism Project, based at Swansea University, and the Global Cyber 
Security Capacity Centre, based at Oxford University, would both be excellent launchpads from which to 
invigorate such research. However, due to the time and word-count constraints of thesis research, this thesis 
under-analyses this third, but nevertheless potentially significant, tier. Given that the members of this third 
tier are likely to be constituents of the MPs and Ministers who comprise the second and first tiers of the 
audience – and, in some cases, those who can act as securitising agents – this third tier of the audience 
possesses agency in their capacity to influence the ‘official’ securitisation of cyberterrorism. This influence 
could be exerted in the vast ether of communicative spaces in online social media, blogging, newsletters and 
awareness campaigns; although these spaces can be unwieldy for the analysis of securitising ‘moments’. 
Influence over the ‘official’ securitisation of cyberterrorism could also come in the form of frequenting 
constituency clinics, writing to an MP or Lord, attending local party committees, protesting, signing a 
petition and offering statements to a parliamentary committee. Were cyberterrorism to become a contested 
electoral issue, voters could conceivably vocalise an expression in the symbolic act of casting their ballot. 
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For the securitisation analyst, in cases where confidentiality issues do not apply, these spaces in which the 
public can engage with British political process could provide more accessible securitisation ‘moments’ vis-
a-vis the more ethereal landscape of general public discourse. Just as with the first and second tiers of the 
audience, this third tier engages with the securitisation of cyberterrorism through the process of ritualistic 
chanting, wherein they are able to ‘speak back’ or ‘speak to’ fellow members of their tier, as well as members 
of the other tiers and the securitising agents themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has detailed the core components of the ‘securitisation theory’ framework that emerged 
from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies during the 1990s (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998). Whilst 
this thesis moulds securitisation theory beyond the ‘vanilla’ 1998 version 1.0 to appropriately make sense of 
the socially-constructed threat of cyberterrorism in the UK, the fundamental logic of the original framework 
remains. Given that cyberterrorism has been ‘spoken’ into existence by British policymakers (Conway, 
2005), the threat has not yet occurred, and there is an absence of proscribed terrorist organisations actively 
championing their desire to attack the UK with internet-mediated weaponry, the framework offered by 
securitisation theory offers marked utility for the breaking down of the official discourse and the examination 
of its constituent components.  
 This thesis does not view the speech-acts that underpin a securitisation as necessarily relying on 
singular or infrequent grand speeches articulating a threat and the requirement to implement extraordinary 
measures against it. Instead, inspiration is drawn from Bigo (2006) and Oren and Solomon (2015) to propose 
a novel relationship between securitising actor and audience. Accordingly, it is suggested that a securitisation 
is maintained through an ongoing mediation between the vested securitising actors and a ‘tiered’ audience in 
an auditorium of a theoretical pantomime performance. This framework offers those who engage in the 
scrutinisation of securitisations a framework that can take a more comprehensive account of the inter-
relationship between securitising actors and audiences, moving beyond the binary response of ‘yes, we 
accept your securitising motion’ or ‘no, we do not accept your securitising motion’ that the vanilla 
framework ascribed to the audience. By ascribing an audience greater flexibility within a ‘tiered’ model, the 
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framework can take account of varying levels of exclusivity amongst the audiences that are inclined to 
actively partake in the securitisation-making process. For instance, the shadow Home Secretary of the British 
Government is likely to have a greater scope than a trainee police constable for direct critical engagement 
with a securitisation ordained by the Prime Minister and Cabinet, but the trainee police constable would still 
retain some capacity to influence a given securitisation, even if this is mostly confined to ‘ritualistic 
chanting’ which may be directed at other audience members as opposed to the securitising actor directly.  
 The next chapter outlines the methodology that has been used to acquire and map documents for the 
corpus of the official British discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism, and the ‘interpretive’ method that has 
been used to analyse these sources.  
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Chapter Three: Method 
 
Interpretive Approaches 
 
 The approach taken in this thesis is broadly situated within an ‘interpretive’ movement that has 
developed within International Relations and Security Studies respectfully. This interpretive movement 
shares common features with Constructivism and Post-Structuralism, particularly with regards to the 
operational power of ideas and norms in the shaping of policy, whether foreign, domestic or security (Bevir, 
Daddow and Hall, 2013:166). Importantly, these approaches also reject the positivism that underpins 
traditional approaches to Security Studies, such as Realism and its variants, because it is believed that this 
positivism “rests on the erroneous philosophical idea that knowledge of the world can come from pure 
reason or pure experience” (Bevir, Daddow and Hall, 2013:166). Interpretive approaches differ in several 
substantive ways. For instance, unlike Structural Realism, the interpretive movement does not consider the 
structures of an a priori international system to impose limits on the actions and behaviours of agents. 
Instead, agents (for instance, the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, or a police spokesperson) are able to 
adapt and alter norms directly or indirectly, either through conscious or unconscious action. The actions of 
agents are not conducted in an isolated vacuum; rather, actions are taken in a cumulative, layered history, 
where each action could be seen to have been influenced by previous actions before it (Daddow, 2011; 
Lynch, 2014:2). In order to engage with this model of cumulative actions, interpretivists conceive of 
‘traditions’ and ‘dilemmas’. Accordingly, “a tradition captures the historical inheritance against the 
background of which individuals act. A dilemma captures the way people are capable of modifying this 
inheritance to incorporate novel experiences or ideas” (Bevir, Daddow and Hall, 2013:167). 
 The interpretive approach offers a dynamic roadmap through which one might resist an urge for 
flagrant positivism, which, if treated as an object of faith in Social Science, can support or spur potentially 
misaligned or even disastrous policy decisions. This approach is particularly pertinent in the context of 
Critical Terrorism Studies, in which the comprehension of terrorism not as a criminal matter but instead as a 
concern of politically-motivated pseudo-warfare has encouraged a self-fulfilling prophecy where 
manufactured fear of ‘terrorism’ in British society feeds a demand for such attacks to be carried out, because 
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of the disproportionate reporting and reciprocity that such an attack would receive. To an interpretivist, facts 
are not established on a neutral, vacuumed playing field in which all vested commentators have dutifully 
purged themselves of their pre-existing biases, experiences and knowledge before entering. Even if one 
ardently sought to purge oneself of pre-existing bias and subjective experience that might interfere with an 
objective identification, this would be a fruitless endeavour. Knowledge is acquired when human beings 
interpret new experiences through a continually fluid prism that is unconsciously tempered by what we have 
already experienced and learned (Hay, 2011:168). To point this out is absolutely not to undermine the facility 
of human knowledge, but rather to emphasise the inherently intersubjective nature of our processes of 
understanding and to introduce measures that we may take in order to assuage the potential net harms that 
can arise from drawing conclusions of knowledge. Indeed, whilst all knowledge is tainted with subjectivity, 
not all knowledge is tainted equally. 
 Bevir and Rhodes (2005), whose co-authored publications on British politics and interpretivism have 
been integral to the formation of the interpretive approach, have sought to justify to the linking of the 
concept of ‘belief’ with the concept of ‘practice’. This linkage is elucidated by the following excerpt: 
“whenever we act, we commit ourselves to certain concepts. For example, if we use a pen to fill in our tax 
form, take it to the tax office, and pay by cheque, we commit ourselves to beliefs about the existence of 
certain objects” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2005:179). In conducting an activity such as paying taxes, one also 
engages with one’s own identity role; for instance, one would have to assess whether one is implicated in the 
obligation to pay tax. Alternatively, if there was an opportunity to avoid taxation, one would not only make a 
rational cost-benefit analysis of the benefits of supplemented income versus the risk of penalty (with this 
rational calculation itself a form of belief influenced by other beliefs), but also whether one would self-
identify as a criminal or not. 
 Some people choose to avoid paying their full, bona fide tax, whilst others do not. To an extent, 
structure will play a significant role in the decision to pay or not pay tax; some individuals will have practical 
access to the means of tax avoidance whilst others face a barrier to entry. However, two people in the exact 
same circumstances may elect to act differently. As Bevir and Rhodes note, whilst we cannot know a priori 
how people may respond to a specific circumstance, we can make conjectures “that seek to explain practices 
and actions by pointing to the conditional connections, beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas” (Bevir and Rhodes, 
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2005:181). In this context, practice is “a move or thrust into an only partly known and knowable world”; in 
acting, an individual extends their “intentions and understandings into this indeterminate world without 
being able to predict how its agency will effectuate itself and impact us” (Wagenaar, 2012:92). Beliefs 
inform an actor of the likely ‘feedback’ that they will receive from a particular practice, allowing for some 
degree of conjecture towards a desired outcome, and indeed, that given practice may lead to other agents 
altering or reinforcing their beliefs. 
 Drawing data and findings from such inferences of the inter-connection between belief and practice 
has not been without contention within the field of Social Science. Whilst practices can be observed and 
recorded, beliefs are decidedly less tangible. Colin Hay voiced perhaps a widely-felt concern when, in a 
published symposium, he noted that it is “not clear why those wedded to a foundational epistemology should 
have any confidence in the inferences drawn by interpretivists” (2004:145). Indeed, to voice this bluntly, to 
some figures in Social Science, the interpretive approach – which in essence involves interpreting others’ 
interpretations – may appear as a form of social commentary with little objective merit; a pithy endeavour in 
re-publication. It is easy to empathise with this concern. Issues for the purposes of peer-review are also 
obvious; if one follows the logic of the interpretive approach, scholars themselves are not immune from the 
scourge of pre-existing bias and knowledge, and two scholars can disagree on their respective interpretations 
of an interpretation. 
 Bevir and Rhodes acknowledge this concern (2005:183-184), but they maintain that there is likely to 
be at least some form of bedrock of socially determined facts that a given community (scholarly or 
otherwise) would accept as true in a given time and space. Furthermore, in order for interpretive research to 
have merit, Bevir and Rhodes proposed ‘rules of thumb’ that aim to encourage intellectual honesty; 
consequently, scholars engaging with an interpretive approach should take criticism seriously, prefer standard 
rules of evidence and reason, and align with positive, speculative responses rather than those that attempt to 
merely block or distort criticism (Bevir and Rhodes, 2005:184). In essence, a model interpretive account 
should be accurate, comprehensive and consistent. Bevir and Rhodes (2004:159) maintain that to view belief 
and tradition as independent of one another would be to tread the path of a ‘mysterious’ concept of scientific 
rigour that is inappropriate for human action. 
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 The research approach of this thesis draws upon the interpretive school because it offers 
opportunities that cannot be afforded with more dogmatic schools of thought. Cyberterrorism, at least in the 
British state’s understanding of the term has not, at the time of writing, occurred; indeed ‘kosher’ 
cyberterrorism can be considered a belief. This is the belief that there are, presently and in the foreseeable 
future, terrorist groups operating inside or outside of the UK who actively wish to attack British critical 
national infrastructure with cyber weapons and who may possess the capacity to develop or to acquire such 
weapons. As Converse noted in the 1960s, “belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study 
… indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot 
be measured and what which can be measured is not important study” (1964:205). Applying an interpretive 
approach allows one to critique how agents engage with their perceptions of cyberterrorism. These 
perceptions are, to a certain extent, elucidated in the narratives that vested actors provide in public-facing 
spaces. Such public-facing narratives can be scrutinised through securitisation theory, in order to assess their 
interplay with security politics in practice. 
 The next section provides some elaboration on the respective notions of ‘discourse’ and ‘identity’. 
These are central concepts that underpin the ensuing analysis in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
 
Discourse and Identity: Some Basics 
 
 Discourse, and the scrutiny of discourse, is a central component of this thesis. In this section, I will 
explain what is involved in a discourse analysis approach to social scientific enquiry, as well as why this 
approach is well-suited to the study of the socially-constructed cyberterrorist threat to the UK. I will outline 
the sources that will be drawn upon in the analysis chapters that follow, and I will also specify how these 
documents are handled in order to arrive at meaningful findings.  
 What is a discourse? The Oxford English Dictionary defines discourse as “written or spoken 
communication or debate” (2016a); in essence, ‘discourse’ is the term applied to the material that human 
beings write or say about a given issue. Laclau and Mouffe note that it is only through meaning-making that 
real world phenomena can become real to ourselves as social beings, and it is this articulation of the social 
world that is characterised as discourse (2001:105). Discourse is said to be “coterminous with the social” 
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(Torfing, 2005:8), and it is upheld as the central system of social interaction (Phillips and Jorgensen, 
2002:35).  
 It is important to note that discourses are not fixed, a priori perceptible objects ‘out there’ and 
categorisable in the agreeable fashion that one might see, touch, smell and categorise flora and fauna. A 
fitting analogy might be that discourses are a sort of Play Doh forged and moulded collectively by a given 
group of human beings; discourses are malleable, transferable, duplicable and also vulnerable. Many 
discourses surround the same issue simultaneously, often overlapping, complementing and contesting. For 
instance, if one took the discourse(s) surrounding the consumption of tobacco in the UK, one would likely 
find an ‘official’ discourse from the Government that endorses high tobacco duties and prohibitive 
legislation, a complementary discourse from NGOs such as ASH, and competing discourses from smoking 
advocacy groups such as Forest, along with the public relations departments of multinational tobacco firms. 
Furthermore, the public would nurture a plethora of varying discourses in pubs, on web forums and at the 
water cooler. Because discourses are not a priori entities to be seen and discovered, we can say that 
discourses are actualised in their usage by people in ‘discursively ordered’ relationships (Shapiro, 1989:11). 
What is meant by this is that people communicate on a given issue or topic using pre-constructed or pre-
ordained language practices (such as terms, adjectives, or any signifying means of expression). Words such 
as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘terrifying’, ‘illegal’ all serve to shape the communication between human beings, 
identifying phenomena in mutually agreeable packages that reside in human languages. As Baker-Beall 
writes, discourse refers to “systems of thought composed of ideas, beliefs and practices … that structure how 
we think about a particular subject” (2016:31). Applied in sufficient volume (either absolute or relative), 
language practices acquire traction and acceptability, potentially to the extent that one could identify a 
discourse as being hegemonic. Discourse analysis approaches the study of discourse not as a Fox Mulder-
esque endeavour to discover hitherto concealed ‘truths’ behind such hegemonic discourses, but instead seeks 
to scrutinise the rhetorical bases underpinning the efficacy of particular discourses (Zulaika and Douglass, 
1996:xi). 
 In her excellent defence of discourse analysis as a method of social enquiry, Milliken (1999) stresses 
some ‘commitments’ that are held by those who utilise this approach. The first of these, she wrote, was to the 
“concept of discourse as structures of signification which construct social realities” (Milliken, 1999:229). 
54 
This construction is achieved through the establishment of ‘common sense’ (Ashley and Walker, 1990). An 
example of such a common sense could be thus: the inhalation of tobacco smoke is carcinogenic and public 
policy should aim to decrease smoking behaviour as part of an endeavour to maximise the longevity of 
human lifespan and wellbeing in elderly life. To place oneself in a counter position to this discourse is, 
increasingly, to ostracise oneself, to appear as irrational or even encroaching instability in its Foucauldian 
sense, as the language of cigarettes-as-health-concern is upheld beyond controversy (Foucault, 2006; 
Holzscheiter, 2005:733). In essence, a discourse formation can be said to place limits on the epistemic, 
subjective and ethical bases within which a range of possible statements is possible (McKenna, 2004:14). 
This is important; discourse analysts do not deny that structures of human relations exist. Rather, any 
structures that do exist are partially instead of permanently fixed, rely on discursive construction and 
mediation, and could be subject to cessation if participants will it so.  
 Remaining on this analogy, the aforementioned common sense did not always exist. Although anti-
tobacco sentiment is recorded as early as the beginning of the 17th Century, with King James I’s A 
Counterblaste to Tobacco (1604), it was arguably not until the US Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and 
Health (1964) that expert and official discourses spurred the wheels of international policy making into the 
task of reducing tobacco consumption. The 1931 image of a otolaryngologist (or at least a male model 
dressed as a stereotypical doctor) recommending the smoking of a ‘fresh’ Camel cigarette to give one’s 
“throat a vacation” (see Stanford School of Medicine, 2016) today appears absurd, but it is indicative of the 
substantial changes that can occur within a discourse – whether scientific, governmental, or cultural – and 
the impact that undulations within discourse can have on real-term policy. This is a universal quality of 
discourse; the discourse of the threat posed by cyberterrorism to the UK is no exception. Discourses, 
including discourses of security, are not fixed phenomena (Doty, 1998:92); they are man-made and 
susceptible to change either because agents within the discourse alter them (internal), or factors outside of 
the discourse force a structural change, such as a scientific revelation or an otherwise significant incident 
(external).  
 That being said, discourse has to have at least some temporarily fixed meaning in order to exert 
influence on policy and human action. A completely ethereal and ever-mercurial discourse would not be able 
to exert such an influence because the agents engaging with that discourse would be unable to find mutually 
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agreeable definitions and ‘nodal’ points of discussion. As Baker-Beall has noted, the “partial fixing within 
discourse is important in the sense that it allows us to ‘know’ and act upon what we ‘know’” (2016:32). 
Identifying this partial fixing can be described as locating the ‘momentary essence’; “the aspect of its 
structure by which it is able to have an effect at some specified moment” (Banta, 2012:391). 
 By definition, the condition of ‘knowing’ something relies upon a knowledge of what it ‘is not’. The 
tenet of identity and the process of identification are both key here. As Aradau has written, “all signification 
is based on differentiation … no identity can be self-identical and no alterity is pure – both are enmeshed and 
identities are dependent upon the traces of other identities” (2010:108). Consequently, we can describe 
discourse as a process that categorises and packages phenomena through binary classifications, so that 
human language can interpret and redistribute knowledge, much like a computer’s CPU relies upon the 
conversion of signals into binary code. Influenced by Derrida’s (1981) philosophical writing, this is 
Milliken’s (1999:229) second commitment of discourse studies. Importantly, this binary opposition 
engenders a power relation; one element of the binary opposition is said to be privileged against the other. In 
the case of a securitisation, a thing to be securitised, such as an IBM Bank Communication System7, is 
identified as a referent object and placed in a privileged position in a binary formation against threatening 
hackers. Under certain circumstances, the characteristics by which the threatening hackers can be identified 
could be categorised as sufficiently risk-worthy to justify potentially extraordinary measures. As Edkins and 
Pin-Fat note (1999), a point of significance is that identities (and identifications) are inherently fluid; 
identities cannot be considered ‘settled’, nor can an identity ever be ‘complete’ or finalised, because 
identities are inherently harassed by the phenomena that must be excluded in order for the identities to exist 
in the first place. 
 I refer to the IBM Bank Communications System as an example of IT architecture because in this 
thesis, the identified thing-to-be-secured is critical infrastructure and information systems, wherein a 
compromising of these systems could endanger lives or cause significant disruption and/or panic. An 
inanimate piece of critical infrastructure acquires this significance (and indeed, is assigned its ‘critical’ 
identifier) because of real-term ramifications to human life that could arise from its compromising or 
                                                          
7 A modular system supporting financial transactions including SWIFT, CHIPS, DTC, FEDWIRE, NBES and 
TELEX. 
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malfunction. Infrastructure cannot ‘talk back’, nor can it form or articulate its own identity. Nevertheless, 
identities can be said to be attributed to the infrastructure because human actors assign them and 
(re)articulate them so that the otherwise inanimate architecture acquires conveyable meaning. Consequently, 
this thesis is not concerned with the threat that cyberterrorism poses to other internet users, but rather the 
epicentre is an overarching ‘common sense’ British security entity, concentrated on critical national 
infrastructure. 
 From the early 1990s onwards, there has been a significant degree of literature produced that 
discusses the potential for a disconnect between ‘virtual’ and ‘real’ activities, experiences and communities. 
These discussions, pertaining to the usage of computers, were reminiscent of similar debates that had 
occurred a few years earlier, concerning the (un)reality of television viewing (Heeter, 1992; Reeves, 
Detenber and Steuer, 1993; Reeves, Lombard and Melwani, 1992; Sheridan and Furness, 1992; Zeltzer, 
1992). Whilst contention can certainly surround a binary divide between what can be determined ‘real’ and 
‘virtual’, it remains that the then newly-acquired ability of individuals and communities around the world to 
communicate inexpensively and instantaneously – with people whom they may never physically meet – 
presented a distinct environment that had not existed beforehand in such an inclusive format. Reactions to 
the ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ juxtaposition were mixed; Bingham, Valentine and Holloway (1999; see also Valentine 
and Holloway, 2002) distinguish between what they call ‘boosters’, who were those who saw the emergence 
of the virtual as a positive development (for instance, see Heim, 1991; Kollock and Smith, 1996; Thu-
Nguyen and Alexander, 1996; Wellman and Gulia, 1999), and ‘debunkers’, who regarded virtual phenomena 
as inauthentic (for instance, see McLaughlin, Osbourne and Smith, 1995; Stoll, 1995:24). 
 Some users of internet-mediated communication and services will not report a disjoint between ‘real’ 
and ‘virtual’ experience, and such a distinction between analogue and digitally mediated experiences may 
appear counter-intuitive. For these users, the twinned experiences are one and the same. In the mid-1990s, 
committed “researchers at the MIT Media Lab carried computers and radio transmitters in their backpacks, 
keyboards in their pockets, and digital displays embedded in their eyeglass frames” (Turkle, 2008:121). 
These researchers persevered with their ‘cyborg’ endeavour, despite physical wounds caused by the weight 
of the equipment and the perturbed reactions from their university peers in an image-conscious age group. 
Given that a significant majority of British citizens carry internet-enabled smartphones with them almost at 
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all times (Ofcom, 2015), broad populations in the UK today are not unlike the mid-1990s MIT pioneers. 
Turkle (2008) referred to smartphones and laptops as ‘always-on/always-on-us’ communications devices, 
which converted their users to tethered selves. The term ‘tethered self’ refers to the manner in which the user 
occupies a liminal space between their immediate physical surroundings, and their lives exhibited within the 
glass screen. Indeed, for avid users of internet-enabled communication, these devices connect them not to a 
secondary or diminished ‘virtual’ environment, but to what they perceive as ‘real’ and of greatest priority; the 
family and friends whom they call and text, the push-activated workplace email account, and their various 
social media feeds. 
 Cooley’s (1902) concept of the ‘looking-glass self’ could prove illuminating here, particularly 
regarding the identity formation of heavy social media users. According to Cooley, the looking-glass self 
forms through the “imagination of our appearance to the other person, the imagination of his judgement of 
that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification” (1902:104). Robinson (2007) 
draws on Cooley’s ‘looking-glass self’ to suggest that, in the context of text-based roleplaying, online 
interaction creates a ‘cyberme’ identity. For the purposes of roleplaying online in the text-based multi-user 
domains that Robinson refers to, or indeed more contemporary online game platforms such as a World of 
Warcraft server (Bainbridge, 2010; Bessiere, Seay and Kiesler, 2007), this is an interesting and effective 
label. However, I would be uncomfortable with a strict distinction between ‘actual’ identities of individuals 
and the identities that might be attributed to their online personas. For some users of social media, the touch-
screen glass on their Apple or Android smartphones could be superimposed as the looking-glass medium 
through which they both articulate and receive the identity which to them may appear entirely real. An 
undergraduate raiding their current account overdraft who exclusively posts extravagant photographs of 
restaurant dinners and holidays onto the service Instagram might be offering an artificial inflation of a given 
reality, but to them and to their audience the webpage is nevertheless a reflection of their real selves. As 
Wertheim notes when she refers to online role playing, “’I’ - that is, my ‘self’ - can play any number of 
different personae online and off, but that does not mean I become fragmented … I am still me, unless I 
become a true split personality like Sybil” (1999:250). 
 For the purposes of this thesis, I do not pro-actively impose a conceptualised divide between virtual 
and real spheres, although there is some analysis of such a divide through the interpretation of the British 
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discourse that constructed the threat of cyberterrorism. The securitisation of cyberterrorism in the UK is not 
the sole preserve of those individuals who use the internet directly or on a frequent or habitual basis; in the 
event of a theoretical catastrophic cyberterrorist incident, death and destruction would not discriminate 
between those who were connected to the internet at that time and those who were not; thereby making a 
distinction between ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ potentially superfluous. That being said, the ‘cyber’ element of 
cyberterrorism does present peculiarities both on a practice and a theoretical level, because entering 
cyberspace involves a partial transcending of physical space and bodily boundaries (Papacharissi, 2002:21; 
see also Donath 1999). The ability to convey and receive information over long distances without the aid of 
horse, boat or train did, of course, exist with the invention and installation of the telegraph, telephone and 
terrestrial broadcasting, but the economies of scale offered by internet-enabled services substantively 
democratised communicative capabilities. One understated identity alteration that internet-enabled 
communication forces upon users by default is that of the user-as-a-consumer; as “every instance of 
participation involves a transfer of data which has been economised” (Goldberg, 2010:707); ISPs and 
cellular carriers act as commercial gateways for connections to internet services, paywalls restrict access to 
content, and seemingly ‘free’ services such as those offered by Google are intuitive advertising platforms that 
convert the user base into the product to be sold and sold-to. Because internet infrastructure relies upon a 
physical electrical and fibre-optical network and the information it carries directly interplays with human 
interaction, cyberspace should not be considered a strict ‘virtual’ sphere. Nor should cyberspace be 
considered a traditional ‘public’ space or commons, given the commercialised nature of the infrastructure 
and standards upon which it resides and operates.  
 Identity is a recurrent theme underpinning the process of meaning-making in the discourse that is 
mapped and analysed in the subsequent chapters, as identity is a central component of the articulations that 
permit securitisation processes to exist and have meaning. Indeed, the intersubjective perception of 
“insecurity becomes the product of processes of identity construction in which the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, or 
multiple ‘others’ are constituted” (Shepherd and Weldes, 2007:532). The binaries of threatening or protective 
identities become cemented in legislation, thereby enforcing a rigid delineation between acceptable, legal 
activity/behaviour and unacceptable, illegal activity/behaviour. In the case of terror and counter-terror, a 
securitised discourse would act to delineate between permissible violence and illegitimate violence.  
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 In principle, a change in the acceptability of a discourse is required in order for its related legislation 
to be debated, mediated, passed and applied. For instance, in 1986, Robert Schifreen and Stephen Gold 
became the first British nationals convicted for the illegal breaching of a computer system when they 
accessed the Duke of Edinburgh’s Telecom Gold8 account. They were convicted under the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981, and the conviction was repealed on appeal because hacking was not within the legal 
remit of forgery. The actions committed by Schifreen and Gold, which were normatively illegal in official 
discourse were not, at the time, explicitly illegal in the written, legislated discourse of British law. To address 
this legislative deficit, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA) made any unauthorised accessing of a program 
or data a criminal offence, punishable with a maximum penalty of a five year incarceration term 
(Legislation.gov, 1990). As mentioned in the introduction, a computer program or data offence could also be 
prosecuted through the Terrorism Act 2000 under certain circumstances. Whilst the British intelligence 
services have wide-ranging exemption from such legislation through the Intelligence Services Act, it is 
nevertheless of interest that the 2015 revision of the CMA included a clause that explicitly exempted the 
intelligence services from prosecution through the CMA. Some cynical commentators attributed this to a 
panicked attempt to assuage a then-ongoing legal challenge brought by Privacy International and seven ISPs 
against GCHQ computer hacking operations (Connett, Barber and Griffin, 2015.  
 This section has outline the significance of ‘discourse’ and ‘identity’ in the social construction of the 
threat of cyberterrorism to the UK. In later chapters, the ‘threatening’ cyberterrorist identity is found to be a 
partially-fixed discursive nodal point that is placed in juxtaposition to a security ‘guaranteeing’ cyber actor, 
epitomised by the British state. The next section outlines tools of discursive persuasion; metaphor and 
descriptive language. 
 
Metaphor and Descriptive Language as Tools of Persuasion in Securitisation 
 
 The significance of seeing in our material experience of human reality is embedded in the English 
language; the phrases, “great, I’ll see you soon”, “I watched Reading FC play last night”, and “I saw a great 
business opportunity” are revealing precisely in this regard. To say that, as human beings we are 
                                                          
8 An early email service, launched by BT in 1982.  
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fundamentally visual creatures is almost an indisputable assertion. As Nicholas Mirzoeff noted in his An 
Introduction to Visual Culture, there is “a growing tendency to visualise things that are not in themselves 
visual”, a culture that “does not depend on pictures themselves but the modern tendency to picture or 
visualise existence (1999:5-6). The approaches to the study of social science that rely on discourse analysis 
have been criticised for largely ignoring the visual, and the field would benefit from ceasing to overlook this 
element of human communication (Wang, 2014:265). Nevertheless, David Campbell was succinct when he 
stated that “the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of 
interpretation” (1998a:6), and there is “no way of bringing into being and comprehending non-linguistic 
phenomena except through discursive practices” (1998b:25). The meaning of imagery is related to a 
linguistic message, through an inter-relative process that Roland Barthes (1977a:39) called ‘anchorage’. 
 Through the process of condensation and anchorage, parts of the original entity expires and ceases to 
exist. A perennial problem with linguistic identification and characterisation is, therefore, that no single 
concept could be sufficient to adequately define a phenomenon and all the intersubjective human experiences 
that have existed or may exist in correspondence with it (Bleiker and Chou, 2010:16). Lacan refers to a very 
similar concept when he suggests that crucial aspects of being (that is, human experience) are lost when such 
experiences are reduced to the format of linguistic words or another easily interpretable signifier (Lacan, 
2007). This is not to say that such an expiration is a bad thing; indeed it is essential in order for human 
beings to successfully communicate inter-subjectively meaningful information. But it is a phenomenon that 
must be acknowledged and is useful in the context of cyberterrorism, which, for the time being, was 
conceived in, and exists entirely through, discourse. 
 El Refaie’s (2003) article, “Understanding Visual Metaphor: The Example of Newspaper Cartoons” 
is particularly useful here. Referring to the concept of the visual metaphor, Refaie writes that “an abstract 
entity cannot be depicted at all without the mediation of symbols or metaphors” (2003:85). Along with their 
ability to engage with the emotions of a target audience, metaphors serve to provide such anchorage for 
discursive entities, whether they are clear and accessible, or murky and ambiguous. This anchorage is 
achieved through a process of ‘condensation’, where polysemous visual concepts are reduced to a linguistic 
entity that can be easily disseminated and communicated (Morris, 1993). Let us briefly take the example of 
the American and Israeli sanctioned Stuxnet attack against Iranian nuclear centrifuges in 2009 and 2010. In 
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this example, a wide plethora of images are implicated, for instance individuals using desktop computers to 
code a virus specifically designed to disrupt a SCADA system, the Iranian Siemans SCADA system itself, 
not to mention panicked nuclear scientists at the Bushehr site once they noticed the issue (the Stuxnet virus 
was designed to ‘trick’ control panels into falsely displaying the centrifuge’s status as operating under normal 
conditions). Of course, these are just a few images of feasibly infinite examples that were implicated in this 
attack. Communicating such an ethereal concept is challenging, and it is for this reason that condensation is 
applied. When news stories on the Stuxnet attack carried images relating to the Stuxnet attack, most stories 
were typically accompanied by images of the infrastructure of the Bashehr site, either the outside of the 
building, or the inside; with personnel, or without (for instance, see Dehghan, 2011; Shubert, 2011; Williams, 
2011b). These images were themselves a condensation of other images and the carriers of those images 
through a form of superimposition (see Bataille, 1985; Kress, 1994), but without the anchorage provided by 
the text, they would simply have been images of large infrastructure and men in white overalls or security 
fatigues. Images can be condensed into other images ad infinitum for as long as a viewer is capable of 
interpreting what they see and imagining further images in their own mind, but it is only with the application 
of linguistics that the image finds an anchor that can be distributed as a partially-fixed entity within a 
discourse. As Nietzsche astutely noted, “we believe that when we speak of trees, colours, snow, and flowers, 
we have knowledge of the things themselves, and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way 
correspond to the original entities (1999:144-145)”. Nietzsche understood truth to represent “a mobile army 
of metaphors, metonyms and anthropomorphisms … a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, 
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and 
obligatory to a people” (1982:46-47). 
 This thesis does not offer an analysis of the aesthetic representation of cyberterrorism, although it 
does draw on the popular fictional narrations depicted in film 2012 James Bond film, Skyfall. A direct, 
concerted analysis of imagery would require a greater pool of ‘cyberterrorism imagery’ than currently exists. 
There are dozens of news stories concerning cyberterrorism reported by the British press (Chen, Jarvis and 
MacDonald, 2014), and these stories tend to be accompanied by stock imagery of hands behind a keyboard, 
or shady masculine figures against a background of bright binary code (for instance, see Hammond, 2015; 
MacAskill, 2010; McTague, 2014), but such news stories from the broadcasting and newspaper outlets do 
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not represent ‘official’ discourse, at least not in the sense of being ordained and published by the British 
Government.  
 In contrast, official security documents produced by the British Government tend not to be 
accompanied by imagery. This does not necessitate that representations of what the cyberterrorist threat 
looked and felt like was absent from the corpus. Indeed, it is entirely possible for securitising actors, and 
their intended audiences, to draw upon textual discourse that directly influences the interpretation of what a 
threat looks and feels like. 
 Particularly in cases where the visual characteristics of a phenomenon may be indistinct, the 
conveyance of such characteristics through text-based communication can be accomplished through the use 
of metaphor. The Oxford English Dictionary defines metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a word or 
phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable”, or “a thing regarded as 
representative or symbolic of something else” (2016b). With analysis of discourse – and, in particular, 
discourses of securitisation – it is of fundamental significance to adequately accommodate not only the 
articulation of a speech/text act, but also to account for the interpretation (the listening or reading) of that 
item (Weldes, 1999). A plethora of metaphors, adjectives and projected narration were identified in the 
corpus that is mapped and analysed in the subsequent chapters. For instance, cyberterrorism has been 
described variously as a ‘Tier One’ threat (Cabinet Office, 2010b:47), a threat of potentially ‘catastrophic’ 
consequence (Osborne, 2015), an ‘evil’ akin to the threat posed by the Third Reich (Jarvis, 2015), ‘depraved’ 
(Hayes, 2016), and an ‘unknown menace’ (Soames, 2015). Whilst in several respects cyber weaponry is 
unique vis-a-vis pre-existing weapons systems, its characteristics have been likened to chemical and nuclear 
weapons (Patten, 2010; Hannay, 2010). 
  Spencer has written an excellent article on the role of metaphors in the social construction of 
terrorism (2012). Spencer notes that there are two ways of understanding metaphors. The first of these is 
‘rhetorical’, which is where metaphors are ‘convenient labels’ (Chilton and Lakoff, 1999:56) that replace one 
word with another; in essence, these metaphors serve to make speech easier and more eloquent (Charteris-
Black, 2004:25; Chilton, 1996a:359). Such metaphors ‘decorate’ discourse without affecting its original 
intended meaning (Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004b:5). The second understanding of metaphor usage is 
described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:5); whereupon metaphors are used to understand and experience one 
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kind of thing ‘in terms of another’. It is stated that metaphors “are devices for simplifying and giving 
meaning to complex and bewildering sets of observations that evoke concern” (Edelman, 1971:65). As 
Spencer notes, these metaphors “thereby make humans understand one conceptual domain of experience in 
terms of another by projecting knowledge about the first (familiar) domain onto the second (more abstract) 
domain” (2012:396).  
 In the context of a securitising move being heard or read by the target audience, metaphors function 
in this recourse-to-metaphor because they are capable of activating pre-existing knowledge in the target 
audience that pertains to a threatening Other. This pre-existing perception of an enemy Other can operate 
without the enemy Other being physically present, because this imagined entity is created by the Self 
(Kinvall, 2004). Irrespective of whether or not a member of a target audience has personally met an 
individual who could be objectively labelled a ‘cyberterrorist’, they nevertheless harbour a perception of 
what a cyberterrorist is and what cyberterrorist activities may look like, which they have gleaned from 
engagement with print and broadcast media, personal conversations, personal use of internet services, and a 
thought-process that internalises new information through these filters. As Hulsse and Spencer have 
suggested, the projection of metaphors onto an ‘unknown’ serves to ‘create’ a reality (2008:578). 
Acknowledging that metaphors possess this discursive capability raises the analytical capacity of discourse 
analysis with regards to the securitisation of cyberterrorism; a threat that, at the time of writing, is based on 
conjecture.  
 Importantly, metaphors do not entail a clear set of policies; they are not an agenda nor an explicit 
plan. Instead, they can be said to “open up space for policy possibilities”, offering “a discursive construct 
that frames the situation in a certain way” (Spencer, 2012:399). To put it another way, metaphors are “more 
likely to influence policy indirectly through their impact on the decision maker’s general approach to an 
issue; they will be part of the conceptual foundation, not a detailed policy map” (Shimko, 1994:665). 
Linguists have called metaphors with (potential) policy ramifications ‘figures of thought’, a term that can be 
applied to metaphors that consist not simply in representing phenomena, but in depicting them (De 
Leonardis, 2008:34). By establishing a similarity between two concepts when, previously, there was not one, 
such metaphors actively create a reality. As Schwarz (2015:67) has noted on the usage of the term ‘surgical 
strike’ to describe contemporary air-to-ground military strategy, this is a metaphor that actively serves to 
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make a messy, inevitably bloody attack appear cleaner than it actually is. One result of this particular 
metaphor could be to mitigate popular discontentment with Western air-to-ground involvement in locations 
such as Syria, Yemen and Pakistan. 
 One does, however, heed Hall’s warning that one should not take a complete and uncritical 
acceptance of the prowess of metaphor (1993:48). Hall argued that an analysis that is over-reliant on 
metaphors would take for granted the social order that already exists. Accordingly, one views metaphors as 
part of a repertoire of tools that securitising actors may seek to apply when they develop their securitising 
moves. As a tool, metaphors accept and draw upon at least some degree of pre-existing ‘common’ or ‘open-
source’ knowledge. Metaphors, along with all discursive practices, are inherently allowed to exist because a 
system of state, government and societal sovereignty imposes limitations on action within space and time 
(Walker, 1993:176).  
 Furthermore, in drawing upon metaphors and descriptive narration in the analysis throughout this 
thesis, it is important to clarify that this thesis does not – indeed, cannot – make assumptions regarding the 
intentions of securitising actors whenever they draw upon a metaphor for the purpose of illustrating threat or 
otherwise. As Paris (2002:433) has noted, when scrutinising the invocation of metaphors by political and 
security actors, one does not have the access to the private and unguarded communications between central 
figures that would provide the necessary evidence to make cogent, non-speculative assumptions regarding 
the actual intentions of actors. Even if one were to have access to a grand cache of emails between Cabinet 
Ministers and their aides through a Wikileaks dump, this would still only provide signals towards the 
intentions of securitising actors, rather than sufficient material to provide a comprehensive qualitative 
assessment. The mindset of a securitising actor is their own domain. Again, whilst I vicariously enjoyed 
Mulder and Scully’s heroic, melodramatic adventures to uncover American government and extra-terrestrial 
conspiracies and de-securitise details of a grand plot to prepare the Earth for colonisation by aliens (Soukup, 
2002), I am not seeking in this thesis to uncover collusion or malpractice behind the British Government’s 
securitisation of cyberterrorism. Here, metaphors and descriptive narration are considered tools – irrespective 
of whether or not the securitising actor genuinely believes in the objective reality of that metaphor – that are 
used to coerce target audiences. Whilst I do not engage in research naively, there is an extent to which 
discourse(s) must be taken at face value. 
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 The usefulness of metaphors, and the tenet that makes them distinct as linguistic tools, is in the 
power of persuasion and illustration that is entailed by their ability to engage the emotions of an audience. 
Paris details this succinctly when he writes that to:  
 
“suggest that a foreign leader is behaving ‘like Hitler’ … is apt to produce a more emotional response among listeners 
than the suggestion that the foreign leader is behaving ‘like the head of an oppressive, authoritarian regime’, because 
strong emotions are associated with the evocations of Hitler’s name” (2002:428). 
  
Referring to an entity as ‘Hitler-esque’ is an overt means of portraying it in a denigrating light, but a 
further powerful tenet of metaphors is that they need not be so explicit as to rely on actual usage of, say, the 
H-word. Metaphors can be ‘summoned’ through subtle means with ‘trigger phrases’ or ‘oblique references’ 
that evoke a metaphor without explicit enunciation of the metaphor itself (Paris, 2002). It is feasible, 
therefore, that an array of threatening notions could be ascribed to a socially-constructed ‘cyberterrorist’ 
identity through the evoking of subtle metaphors.  
 The following section of this chapter details how sources have been gathered for the purposes of 
analysing the discourse of the securitisation of cyberterrorism. 
 
Source Acquisition 
 
 Hansen’s Security as Practice (2006:59-64) has been instructive with respect to the approach that 
this thesis takes to source acquisition. Accordingly, Hansen (2006) proposes four routes to the study of 
securitisation: 1) the official discourse of the government, 2) political opposition and the media, 3) cultural 
representations and popular culture, and lastly 4) marginal political discourses emanating from non-
government organisations and academia. Like Croft (2012:99-100), I believe that there are significant 
rewards for both one’s analysis and findings by addressing all four of these pools of sources. However, due 
to the space constraints of a thesis, the corpus that has been mapped and analysed in the subsequent chapters 
includes the official discourse of the Government and the discourse exhibited by backbench MPs and Peers. 
The Ministerial contributions are the foremost focus of analysis, given that those speaking on behalf of the 
Government and the security agencies are the actors who are capable of signalling and making calls for 
securitisation. It is from these sources, which include resources such as Security Strategies, officially 
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sanctioned reports and interviews with Ministerial figures, that one may locate the language and metaphors 
raising the spectre of securitisation. Accordingly, official Governmental sources are the overriding 
occupation of in particular, Chapter Four, which traces the emergence of cyberterrorism as a significant 
threat by the Government. Chapter Six will also consider Hansen’s third pool of sources. Paying tribute to 
the role of popular culture is not frivolous, particularly in the case of cyberterrorism; indeed, cyberterrorism 
emerged from fictional authorship in the 1980s and was nurtured by popular culture until arguably the late 
1990s or even the terrorist attacks in New York and Virginia in September 2001.  
 Sources were selected from the time period 12th May 2010 to 24th June 2016. This time period, 
spanning six years, was selected because it represents the tenure of David Cameron’s premiership as Prime 
Minister leading a Coalition Government from May 2010 to May 2015, to his premiership of a majority 
Conservative Government until his resignation announcement following the June 2016 European 
Referendum result. This is not to say that David Cameron is the chief author of the UK’s cyberterrorist-as-
threat narrative, nor is it to imply that considering events before May 2010 and after June 2016 would be 
superfluous. Rather, Cameron’s six year tenure as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom provides a 
contemporary duration from which I was able to draw sources. Disallowing material outside of the 
premiership of David Cameron reduced the variable factor that would be present had one included the tenure 
of another Prime Minister. Indeed, a comparison of the securitisation of cyberterrorism between eras of 
British politics is not the overriding focus of this thesis. Whilst one recognises that a Major-Blair-Brown-
Cameron-May genealogical study would be an interesting approach, such a comprehensive endeavour would 
necessitate a thesis of its own. Furthermore, the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK was not publicly detailed 
by the Government as a ‘Tier One’ threat until the publication of the Coalition’s National Security Strategy 
(Cabinet Office, 2010a:11). Whilst the strands that are mapped in the subsequent chapters could be traced 
further back in time beyond May 2010, the central strand upon which the securitisation of cyberterrorism 
rested – that cyberterrorism represented a severe or ‘Tier One’ threat to the UK – was only formally 
established in 2010. 
 The years 2010 to 2016 represent a timespan during which the UK was more connected to, and 
reliant on, internet-mediated communications than in any six years previously in British history. This time 
period also saw significant developments that had at least some form of impact on the security narratives, 
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such as the Snowden revelations in 2013, and the UK’s first mature political debates about surveillance 
legislation in the internet age. May 2010 to June 2016 also represents a duration during which the 
classification of the threat from international terrorism fluctuated between ‘substantial’ and ‘severe’ (MI5, 
2015). Finally, June 2016, roughly mid-way through my tenure as a scholarship PhD student at Nottingham 
Trent University, felt a fitting cut-off point at which I decided I would no longer draw new sources and 
would concentrate on writing up the thesis.  
 There are some exceptions; that is, under particular circumstances, I have consciously selected some 
sources that were published prior to May 2010. In such cases, I have deemed the source to be a living 
document that is still active within British discourse, whether official, public, or legislative. For instance, the 
Terrorism Act 2000 is still a highly relevant, living document that operationalises efforts to define what 
terrorism and cyberterrorism are, and establishes the parameters under which these individuals identified as 
credibly epitomising these threats can be punished through the judicial system. 
 Throughout my analysis, priority was given to a select number of primary texts that I considered 
representative of the construction of a common roadmap for the securitisation of cyberterrorism in the UK. 
These sources were constituted by 110 unique items. These included official documents written and 
published by the British Government and their agencies, speeches by Ministers and Hansard contributions by 
Members and Peers, and three public polls. These discursive items provided stable ‘nodal points’ where 
officially-sanctioned partial fixings of discourse could be identified. For the purpose of interpretive analysis, 
this items of discourse were assumed to represent the dominant ‘official’ narrative, carrying agency as a 
series of respective ‘securitising moments’. The subsequent chapters which map the 110 unique sources 
constitutes the first comprehensive mapping of the official British discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism.  
 These 110 unique sources were, mostly, acquired by running searches for ‘cyber-terrorism’, 
‘cyberterror’, ‘cyberterrorism’, ‘cyber-terrorist’ and ‘cyberterrorist’ against the gov.uk website and the 
Hansard search engine within the timeframe parameters of 12th May 2010 to 24th June 2016. These searches 
elicited contributions within the Commons and Lords chambers, public-facing Government documents, 
press-releases, external Ministerial speeches and third-party documents published in co-authorship with 
Government departments. A limited selection of sources, for instance, David Blunkett’s (2015) interview 
with the Yorkshire Post, or the polls that are referenced, were acquired by running targeted searches against 
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the Google search engine or emerged from pre-existing knowledge about the discourse of cyberterrorism. 
Results from the gov.uk and Hansard searches included those which may not have expressly stated 
‘cyberterror/cyberterrorism/cyberterrorist’, but did make references to both ‘cyber’ and ‘terrorism’ (or a 
derivative of terror) within the space of a few sentences. When I encountered a relevant source in these 
targeted searches, I saved the excerpt (for instance, paragraph) that surrounded the relevant quote into a 
document, in which I also included relevant metadata. This metadata, which was applied to all collected 
Hansard contributions and external Ministerial speeches, included a Parliamentarian’s political party, their 
constituency, their Governmental or shadow Governmental roles, their membership of committees at the time 
of the reference (and date of them leaving such posts, if this occurred before 24th June 2016), any relevant 
special interests and the title of the debate in which the Speaker had solicited their contribution. Running the 
variations of the queries against the search engines typically elicited numerous identical hits, and multiple 
hits of the same source were discounted after the first record of the source had been made. Furthermore, 
some Parliamentarians, particularly Conservative backbenchers, had a penchant for parroting lists of threats 
to the UK in their contributions in the Chamber, in which they would include ‘cyber’ and ‘terror’ 
respectively, without a concerted linkage between these two threats (for instance, see Beith, 2010; Hodgson, 
2016; Burnham, 2016; Hammond, 2016). Where a sufficiently direct inference could not be made to 
‘cyberterrorism’ (as opposed to, say, ‘cyber and flooding and health epidemics and terror and climate 
change’) from such lists of threat, these sources were saved in the corpus but excluded from the mapped 
discourse included in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. This is not to say that such contributions are 
entirely irrelevant to the analysis of the official social-construction of the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK; 
indeed, parroting a list from a brief that you have been given by a party whip is entirely consummate with the 
notion of securitising ‘ritualistic chanting’. Chanting is chanting, whether or not it is coerced or scripted by a 
superior. However, such parroted listing of threat did not closely align with the strands that could be elicited 
from more substantive and novel excerpts gleaned from Hansard contributions and the other sources upon 
which the mapped discourse has been built.  
 The next section outlines the interpretive method that was applied to map and analyse the 110 unique 
sources. 
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Interpretive Method 
 
 In the opening section of this chapter, it was noted that one of the predominant criticisms that can be 
made of interpretive approaches to the study of social science is that interpretivism relies upon intellectual 
honesty. In this section, I hope to outline an approach to the study of the construction of the threat of 
cyberterrorism in the UK that meets the requirement – indeed, duty – of ensuring transparency in one’s 
research approach. Some approaches are better suited for this task than others. For instance, Ashley’s (1988) 
‘double reading’ approach to interpretivism was tempting; when ‘double reading’ sources, a researcher first 
reads a source ‘as is’, in its literal and unadulterated form, and will follow this with a second reading that 
incorporates a holistic perspective (for example, the manner in which a source may be interpreted by varying 
audiences, via which distortion and evolution of the original meaning may occur). Ashley’s case for double 
reading is convincing, however, it is my preference to make the treatment of the sources more explicit. As 
much as feasibly possible, I have sought to reduce the extent to which readers of this thesis need to place 
their trust in my research integrity, and instead rely on the transparency of the research methods. 
 My approach to the analysis of these resources is inspired by, and similar to, that which is applied by 
Baker-Beall (2016) in his The European Union’s Fight Against Terrorism. I have approached the sources in a 
two-step process, which I will detail here. 
 The first of these steps is to map the discourse, by identifying the components of each of the sources 
that serve to make them work. Each source was held under the scrutinising lamp of three analytical 
questions. Firstly, in order to ascertain the most prominent language in the ‘cyberterrorism-as-threat’ 
discourse, I asked the question: “What are the key words, terms, phrases, labels, metaphors and beliefs in 
each source?”. Once the language characterising the sources was identified, I asked the question “What are 
the main strands of the discourse?”. ‘Strands’ was the term that I applied to themes located in the sources. 
These strands concurrently served to construct the ‘cyberterrorism-as-threat’ discourse. In asking this 
question of the sources, I directly acknowledged the intertextual nature of discourse; that is, sources are not 
observed to be operating in their own vacuum, but instead they are in a flux of agreement, competition and 
negation.  
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 The final element of this discourse ‘mapping’ was implemented to extract the identity construction 
from the sources. I asked the question: “How does the discourse construct a threatening cyberterrorist Other 
that warrants combating?”. 
 The next stage of analysis sought a detailed understanding of the functioning of the discourse. In 
order to achieve this, I funnelled sources through a further three questions. As described previously in this 
chapter, in discourse analysis, discourse is considered to be performative, and it gains this performative 
traction when there is a partial fixation of meaning; both of the concepts and of the identities of the actors. In 
order to explicitly draw out sites of partial fixation, I asked the question: “How does the discourse partially 
fix the meaning of the identities and events that it implicates”? 
 The second question that I used to orchestrate my understanding of the functioning of the discourse 
was: “What knowledge and/or practices does the discourse legitimise, and what knowledge and/or practices 
does it serve to exclude?”. The endeavour to assess what is legitimised and excluded by discourse(s) is a 
means through which one determines the very essence of discursive power. As Foucault (1977; 1980; 2003) 
convincingly suggested, discourse operates by rules of exclusion; delineating between what can and cannot 
be said, who can and cannot speak, who is correct and who is not. Of course, such power is not simply 
symbolic; distinguishing these binaries serves to permit or even encourage some actions whilst constraining 
others, determining which actors can or cannot act in a certain way. 
 The third and final question to illuminate the functioning of the discourse was: “To what extent can 
the construction of the threat of ‘cyberterrorism’ be considered novel?”. Asking this question sought to draw 
out the aspects of the discursive construction of the threat of cyberterrorism that drew inferences from 
existing discourse – such as the generic post-9/11 discourse of counter-terrorism in the UK – and those 
aspects which could be said to be new. 
 
Discursive Strands 
  
Having asked these questions of the 110 unique sources, I arrived at a set of ‘strands’ and ‘sub-
strands’ to which, in aggregate, all items in the corpus (exempting parroted lists) related to at least one. These 
strands were ‘Cyberterrorism as a Tier One Threat to the UK’, ‘Cyberterrorism as Unique Temporally’, 
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‘Cyberterrorism as Unique Spatially’, and ‘From Fiction to Reality’. The temporal and spatial strands were 
more meaningful when divided into distinct sub-strands that could be identified from the corpus. 
Accordingly, the sub-strands for the ‘temporal’ uniqueness of cyberterrorism were ‘New Terrorism’ and 
‘Escalation of Threat’. The sub-strands for the ‘spatial’ uniqueness of cyberterrorism were ‘Physical versus 
Cyber’ and ‘Safe Havens’. The following chapters detail the mapping and analysis of these strands. Chapter 
Four concerns the notion of cyberterrorism as a ‘Tier One’ threat; the most threatening category in the 
taxonomy of threat offered by the Coalition Government in 2010. This is the strand that is regarded as having 
operated as the central pillar for the securitisation of cyberterrorism in the UK. Chapter Five details the 
‘temporally’ unique strand, which is the notion that cyberterrorism is a threat that has escalated over time and 
will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Lastly, Chapter Six details the ‘spatially’ unique strand, 
which, at its core, is the idea that cyberterrorism operates in two spatial environments; one that is based on 
human identity, and the other which is purely technical. Chapter Six also includes the ‘fiction’ strand, which 
is the proposition that due to the void in the epistemology of cyberterrorism that results from the absence of a 
cyberterrorist incident to-date, select fictional narratives have, in part, filled this dearth in the narration of the 
experiencing of cyberterrorism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has introduced the ‘interpretive’ approach to Security Studies, and has elucidated on the 
roles of ‘discourse’ and ‘identity’ in this field. This chapter has also noted the utility of particular forms of 
discursive articulation, which can appear in the form of descriptive narration and in metaphors. From the 
outset, cyberterrorism is a novel case study because it is an event that is securitised before it has ever 
occurred. Consequently, in order for the securitising actors and members of the audience to meaningfully 
communicate with one another about cyberterrorism, they must resort to linguistic tools that allow them to 
express their views on cyberterrorism in relation to other phenomena that are more fixed in meaning. This 
chapter has detailed the means by which sources have been acquired and handled, in order to undertake the 
mapping and analysis that forms the basis of the next chapter. This chapter has also outlined the three 
question that I asked the sources in order to map them, the three questions that directed the analysis, and the 
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strands and sub-strands that were identified from the corpus. Lastly, this chapter has introduced the four 
strands and four sub-strands that the mapping discerned from the 110 unique sources that have been handled 
from the corpus.  
 The next chapter details the central pillar of the construction of the threat of cyberterrorism to the 
UK via the ‘official’ political British discourse. In this fourth chapter, I map and analyse the first of the four 
‘strands’ that I have found through my mapping and analysis of the sources. This strand is the notion, 
seminally introduced by the Coalition Government of 2010, that cyberterrorism represented a ‘Tier One’ 
threat to the UK. Chapter Four also applies the novel ‘Pantomime’ framework to the British securitisation of 
the threat of cyberterrorism, a framework that could be used to substantiate the relationship between (and 
within) the securitising actors and the audience. 
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Chapter Four: The Discursive Construction of the Threat of Cyberterrorism to the United Kingdom 
 
 This chapter serves three functions. Firstly, this chapter maps the discourse of Whitehall that 
established cyberterrorism as a ‘Tier One’ threat to the UK. The effect of this mapped discourse was that the 
threat of cyberterrorism was removed from a ‘politicised’ status, in which it was largely not discussed and 
had not been categorised as a national security risk, and was instead ‘securitised’. Using the approach 
outlined in the preceding chapter, this fourth chapter applies an interpretive discourse analysis against the 
mapped discourse to unpack how the threat of cyberterrorism came to be regarded as a ‘Tier One’ level risk, 
the highest threat category presently used by the British Government. Lastly, this chapter proposes that one 
core consequence of the securitisation of cyberterrorism was that cyber weaponry was not implicated in this 
securitisation; the nefarious identities who may wish to use such weapons were. As a result, the securitisation 
of cyberterrorism did not exempt the possibility of positive applications for cyber weapons. On the basis of a 
socially-constructed representation of a cyberterrorist identity, the securitisation articulated a particular 
illegitimate form of cyber violence. Given that this socially-constructed representation tacitly not did exclude 
the possibility of legitimate forms of cyber violence, it is suggested that the securitisation of cyberterrorism 
did not merely serve to justify extraordinary measures against perceived cyberterrorists, but it also tacitly 
endorsed the UK’s cyber weaponry program. Whilst the subsequent chapters diverge from the traditional 
Copenhagen School framework of securitisation and unpack the process-driven production of meaning in the 
securitisation of cyberterrorism, this chapter scrutinises the speech acts through the lens of the traditional 
framework. Before unpicking the nuance of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, it is first important to 
establish what this securitisation is, and what it has served to do. 
 This chapter therefore serves as an analytical foundation for the subsequent two analysis chapters. 
Each chapter is divided into two core sections: a mapping of the pertinent discourse from the corpus, and a 
critical analysis of this discourse. The critical analyses will address the impact of the discourse on the 
security practice(s) of the threat of cyberterrorism and the novel contributions that are offered by the 
cyberterrorist case study for the framework of securitisation theory. Having fleshed-out the process through 
which cyberterrorism came to be articulated as a ‘Tier One’ threat to the UK, Chapters Five and Six will map 
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and analyse additional elements of the discourse that served to emphasise cyberterrorism’s uniqueness in 
temporal and spatial terms respectively. 
 
Cyberterrorism as a ‘Tier One’ Threat to the UK: The National Security Documents 
 
 In 2010, the newly-formed Coalition Government published two policy documents that would 
underpin the prioritisation and categorisation of security concerns for the subsequent five-year period. The 
first of these was the Strategic Defence and Security Review (Cabinet Office, 2010b), an overarching review 
of the funding and structure of the British armed forces. This was the second version of the review; the first 
having been introduced by the then-Labour Government in 1998 (House of Commons Library, 1998). The 
impetus for the publication of the 2010 version of this document was twofold (Mulholland, 2010). Firstly, the 
joint Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government was keen to invigorate its own brand of security policy. 
Secondly, the Government wished to stem the then-£38 billion overspend in the Ministry of Defence’s 
procurement budget. By explicitly listing the most notable threats facing the UK, and ranking these 
according to their likelihood and their scale of harm, this document, in conjunction with the National 
Security Strategy 2010 (Cabinet Office, 2010a) sought to be the public-face of UK security priorities for the 
duration of the Coalition Government. The 2010 National Security Strategy, entitled A Strong Britain in an 
Age of Uncertainty was the third version of this document. The first, entitled Security in an Interdependent 
World (Cabinet Office, 2008), had been published by the then-Labour Government in 2008, and revised with 
a 2009 Paper entitled Security for the Next Generation (Cabinet Office, 2009). Whilst the publication of a 
national security strategy is a relatively new phenomenon in the UK, the practice has a longer precedent in 
the USA, where administrations have regularly developed strategies after the Reagan administration 
introduced the seminal edition in 1987 (White House). The British documents published in 2010 established 
– on a formal basis – the stature of cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat to the UK. ‘Tier One’ is the 
classification that the British Government used to distinguish the threats to British national security that – 
taking account of both likelihood and impact – were the highest priority (Cabinet Office, 2010a:27). 
 The National Security Strategy of 2010 was the first British security strategy to specifically cite 
cyberterrorism as a serious threat to the UK. It detailed “cyber attack, including by other states, and by 
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organised crime and terrorists” (Cabinet Office, 2010a:11), alongside ‘international terrorism’, ‘international 
military crises’, and ‘major accidents or natural disasters’ as a Tier One threat to British national security. 
The strategy warned that: 
 
“attacks in cyberspace can have a potentially devastating real-world effect. Government, military, industrial and 
economic targets, including critical services, could feasibly be disrupted by a capable adversary. ‘Stuxnet’ … was 
seemingly designed to target industrial control equipment. Although no damage to the UK has been done as a result, it 
is an example of the realities of the danger of our inter-connected world” (Cabinet Office, 2010a:30).  
  
Regarding the severity of the threat posed to the UK by cyberterrorism, the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review was unambiguous in its emphasis that this threat was operating on an unprecedented scale. 
The document stated that “over the last decade the threat to national security and prosperity from cyber 
attacks has increased exponentially. Over the decades this trend is likely to continue to increase in scale and 
sophistication, with enormous implications for the nature of modern conflict” (Cabinet Office, 2010b:4). 
According to this document, there were four central responses to the highest priority risks over the 
subsequent five years, including the development of “a transformative programme for cyber security, which 
addresses threats from states, criminals and terrorists” (Cabinet Office, 2010b:11). In order to counter 
“physical and electronic threats from state and non-state sources”, the Review called for “investment in new 
and flexible capabilities such as cyber to meet emerging risks and threats” (Cabinet Office, 2010b:13). The 
Review implored that “the risks emanating from cyber space (including the internet, wider 
telecommunications and computer systems) are one of the four Tier One risks to national security. These 
risks include … the actions of cyberterrorists” (Cabinet Office, 2010b:47). This key document surmised that 
“these threats … are likely to increase significantly over the next five to ten years, as our dependence on 
cyber space deepens” (Cabinet Office, 2010b:47). This notion, that cyberterrorism was articulated as a threat 
that would increase over time, is scrutinised in detail in the fifth chapter. 
 The Cyber Security Strategy of 2011 was similarly clear in its construction of cyberterrorism in a 
particular way; as a Tier One threat to British national security. Under the subheading of Changing Threats, 
this document recognised that “the Government’s 2010 National Security Strategy identified cyber attacks on 
the UK as a ‘Tier One’ threat – that is, one of our highest priorities for action” (Cabinet Office, 2011:15). The 
document further noted that: 
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“cyberspace is already used by terrorists to spread propaganda, radicalise potential supporters, raise funds, communicate 
and plan. While terrorists can be expected to continue to favour high-profile attacks, the threat that they might also use 
cyberspace to facilitate or to mount attacks against the UK is growing. We judge that it will continue to do so, especially 
if terrorists believe that our national infrastructure may be vulnerable” (Cabinet Office, 2011:15). 
  
The concern that terrorists might elect to use cyberspace to conduct an attack against British critical 
infrastructure and computing systems did not recede across the period under scrutiny. A policy paper 
published in May 2015, entitled 2010 to 2015 Government Policy: Cyber Security, noted in its opening 
sentences that “with greater openness, interconnection and dependency comes greater vulnerability. The 
National Security Strategy categorised cyber attacks as a Tier One threat to our national security, alongside 
international terrorism”, continuing by imploring that “the threat to our national security is real and growing. 
Terrorists, hostile states and cyber criminals are among those targeting computer systems in the UK” 
(Cabinet Office, 2015b). 
 The 2015 version of the National Security Strategy maintained the status of ‘cyber’ as a realm of Tier 
One threat to the UK. This document noted that “the range of cyber actors threatening the UK has grown. 
The threat is increasingly asymmetric and global … non-state actors, including terrorists and cyber criminals 
can use easily available cyber tools and technology for destructive purposes” (Cabinet Office, 2015a:19). 
The cyber threats to the UK were upheld as ‘significant and varied’, including “cyberterrorism … and 
disruption of CNI as it becomes more networked and dependent on technology, including networks and data 
held overseas” (Cabinet Office, 2015a:85). 
 This term, ‘Tier One’, established a formal classification of cyberterrorism as one of the most 
significant threats facing the UK. The term also provided a theme that could be repeated, and its repetition, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, engaged in the (re)securitisation of the threat of cyberterrorism. In 
effect, the ‘Tier One’ label emerged as a politically-charged theme that Ministers and MPs ‘ritualistically 
chanted’ (Oren and Solomon, 2015) in the Chamber, in on-record interviews and at external events. On 
record, no Ministers, MPs or Lords sought to detract from the Tier One classification, thereby leaving the 
label entirely uncontested and establishing – on a political elite level – an unchallenged securitisation. The 
next section maps and analyses the ritualistic chanting that endorsed the Tier One threat classification. 
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Beyond the National Security Documents: The Construction of Cyberterrorism as Tier One Threat 
 
 This chapter will now detail the instances in which the ‘Tier One’ and ‘severe threat’ themes entered 
the discourse of Ministers, MPs and Lords. In November 2011, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
delivered a Cyberspace speech at Downing Street in which he stated that “Britain has prioritised cyber 
attacks as a Tier One threat … we cannot leave cyberspace wide open to the criminals and terrorists that 
threaten our security and prosperity” (2011). 
 Francis Maude, the then-Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General, spoke relatively 
frequently on cyber security and cyberterrorism. In a speech at the International Centre for Defence Studies 
in Estonia in May 2012, Maude noted that “we need to protect the internet from hostile actors – the 
criminals, the hackers, the terrorists – who want to exploit it for less positive ends … in the UK we have 
rated cyber attacks as a Tier One threat to our national security” (2012a). Maude repeated the ‘Tier One’ 
theme in a speech at an Information Assurance Conference seven months later, stressing that the Tier One 
cyber threats were taken ‘extremely seriously’ by the Government (2012b). The same sentiment was repeated 
at a Govnet Cyber Security Summit in 2014 (2014a). 
 In 2016, Matt Hancock, then serving his 13-month role as Minister for the Cabinet Office and 
Paymaster General, reporting to the Chamber on the final annual report of the Cyber Security Strategy, 
paraphrased both the 2010 and 2015 versions of the National Security Strategy, to note that both had 
classified ‘cyber’ as a Tier One threat to the UK, although he did not express any particular cyber actors as 
representing this threat (2016). 
 James Brokenshire, at the time a Parliamentary under-Secretary at the Home Office also publicly 
invoked the idea of cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat. At a Securing Asia conference in June 2012, 
Brokenshire noted that “cybersecurity has been identified as a ‘Tier One’ risk in our national security 
strategy”, and warned his audience that “terrorist groups use technology to progress attack planning, 
communicate and spread their ideology, evade protective security measures and increase the effectiveness of 
attacks” (2012). These particular comments, from Brokenshire, would appear to align with the concern that 
the utility of the internet for terrorists is the role that it can play in making conventional – as opposed to 
cyber – attacks more efficient and accessible. As previously discussed, this thesis does not consider general 
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terrorist usage of the internet for the purposes of administration or planning to represent an instance of 
cyberterrorism per se. However, it is worth including Brokenshire’s comments here because it highlights a 
divergence, even amongst Cabinet Ministers, about whether the securitisation of cyberterrorism, when 
articulated, explicitly does or does not include a threat of terrorists using the internet as a direct means of 
conducting attacks. Further clarity on Brokenshire’s position was highlighted when he delivered a keynote 
speech at the Internet Service Providers’ Association annual conference in November 2013, where he 
restated that “the National Security Strategy published in 2010 identifies the risk of hostile attacks on UK 
cyberspace by other states and large scale cyber crime as a ‘Tier One’ priority for UK national security” 
(2013, emphasis added). Of course, terrorist application of cyber offense is explicitly included in the 2010 
version of the National Security Strategy, and terrorism is a crime. But ‘terrorism’ as a discursive entity is 
generally invoked through use of the word itself; individuals convicted of terrorism offences are typically 
referred to as terrorists rather than criminals (for instance, see Chulov and Grierson, 2017 and Parveen, 
2017). Whilst Brokenshire did not use his speeches to publicly dismiss the cyber threat from terrorist entities, 
it is of note that he explicitly referenced states as the predominant actors threatening British cyberspace. 
 Conservative Ministers were not alone in engaging with the Tier One theme. For instance, some 
opposition MPs also raised the Tier One theme in the Commons Chamber. Ian McKenzie, Labour Member 
for Inverclyde, noted in a Defence and Cyber Security debate that:  
 
“cyber attacks have been categorised as a Tier One threat to the UK’s national security … terrorists, rogue states and 
cyber criminals are among those who are targeting computer systems in the UK … performing an attack need not be 
expensive. With minimal equipment in the right hands, a lot of damage can be done” (2014).  
  
Martin Horwood (2014), Liberal Democrat MP for Cheltenham – notable as the locale of GCHQ’s 
headquarters – also highlighted the Tier One classification in the same debate, and expressed his view that 
the Government was right to prioritise cyber security funding.  
 There were no instances in which the securitisation of cyberterrorism was challenged by a Member 
of Parliament. More explicitly, throughout all of the sources that I have identified, mapped and analysed, 
there were no dissenting voices to be found, wherein an actor could be said to be critiquing, dismissing or 
challenging the securitisation of cyberterrorism. This tenet is quite remarkable, especially given that a 
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cyberterrorist – or indeed, any major cyber attack – had not occurred in the UK during the period under 
analysis or indeed at the time of writing9.  
Interestingly, however, there were two instances – both of which occurred in the same debate – 
where MPs drew on the securitisation of cyberterrorism to juxtapose its perceived prioritisation against the 
securitisation of flood-risk. Kerry McCarthy, the Labour MP for Bristol East and the shadow Secretary of 
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs argued that, in reference to a then-recent Cabinet Office 
Briefing Room A (COBRA) meeting on flooding, Ministers had not prioritised “flood prevention, despite the 
national security risk assessment citing flood risk as a Tier One priority”, further adding that “we would not 
ignore experts’ warnings on terrorism and cyber attacks, so why have the Government repeatedly disregarded 
expert advice on flooding?” (2016). More tentatively, Mary Creagh, the Labour MP for Wakefield and 
member of the Select Committee for Environmental Audit raised a similar point, noting that “the 2015 
national security risk assessment says that flood risk is a Tier One priority risk alongside terrorism and cyber 
attacks, so I want to look at the Government’s record on flood defence spending” (2016). Luciana Berger, the 
Labour Co-op MP for Liverpool Wavertree, had made a similar argument in 2013 in a Climate Change 
debate, arguing that “I think we need to deal with some of the risks … the Foreign Secretary’s climate 
adviser has described the security threat alone as being as grave as the threat from terrorism and cyber 
attacks” (2013).  
By not challenging the securitisation of cyberterrorism and cyber and (or) terrorism, and yet 
invoking it in relation to flood-risk and climate change, these MPs were implicitly endorsing the securitised 
status (and its implicated extraordinary measures) as a legitimate partially-fixed discursive nodal point. 
Certainly, three MPs cannot be said to represent the House. But the absolute absence of a recorded challenge 
to the securitisation of cyberterrorism, and the invocation of it as an example of a legitimate securitisation in 
debates on flood-risk and climate change highlights the entrenched nature of this particular securitisation. 
                                                          
9  Claims that cyberterrorism has already occurred in or against the UK do exist, although these claims prompt a 
debate as to what does and does not constitute cyberterrorism. For example, in May 2017, Samata Ullah, an autistic 
man from Cardiff, was sentenced to an eight year term for distributing sensitive materials in USB cufflinks and 
advising suspected terrorist figures interested in deploying anthrax in Kenya about online anonymity. The Times 
(Simpson and Gardham, 2017) and the Evening Standard (Mitchell, 2017) labelled him a ‘new and dangerous breed 
of terrorist’, a ‘cyberterrorist’; the Sun (Lake, 2017) labelled him a ‘James Bond Jihadi’. However, Ullah did not 
conduct any cyber-attacks per se, and therefore this thesis does not consider him to be a bona fide cyberterrorist. 
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Were the securitisation subject to concerted contestation, it is unlikely that the MPs would have elected to 
invoke it in the respective debates. 
 A similar point was raised during a Trident debate in the Commons Chamber in November 2015. 
Critiquing the necessity of the Trident submarine programme, Brendan O’Hara, SNP Member for Argyll and 
Bute, noted that “we are increasingly engaged in an ideological war with terrorism … cyber attacks will be 
among our enemies’ main weapons. Indeed, the Prime Minister himself said that Daesh was an existential 
threat to the UK” (2015). Steven Paterson, SNP Member for Stirling expressed a similar outlook when he 
stated that “the replacement of Trident fails to address the threats outlined in the SDSR and the National 
Security Strategy. Instead, we should invest in … combating cyberterrorism, as well as actual terrorism on 
our streets” (2015). Here, the two SNP Members were actively drawing on the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism to critique the exceptional measures that result from the securitisation of nuclear conflict; 
Britain’s continually operative, independent nuclear deterrent. Again, commandeering a securitisation for the 
purposes of critiquing another securitisation re-affirms the legitimacy of one securitisation in order to seek to 
destabilise the other as part of a counter-securitising move. Here, it is cyberterrorism that is being invoked as 
the legitimate securitisation. 
 David Blunkett, the then-MP for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough added an alternative 
addition to the cyberterrorism-as-threat discourse when he spoke in the Chamber during a UK Extradition 
Arrangement debate in December 2011. Here, Blunkett appeared to converge rogue state and non-state actors 
as potentially wishing to engage in cyberterrorism. Accordingly, Blunkett stated that: 
 
“there are rogue and emerging states in terms of cyber attack and cyberterrorism … and as such attacks are trans-border 
and affect installations throughout the world, we need to sit down and work out how we deal with that entirely new 
eventuality, which affects people across the globe. If we do not, we will rue the day” (2011).  
 
 This perspective – that states could, at least in principle, engage in explicitly termed acts of 
cyberterrorism – did not appear elsewhere in the corpus; however, it is of note that a former Home Secretary 
found this connection worthy of parliamentary record. David Blunkett also stands apart from other Members 
because he was the only non-Ministerial parliamentary figure to have discussed cyberterrorism with the 
press. Having been asked by the Yorkshire Post’s political editor, Adrian Pearson, about the 2015 threat 
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landscape vis-a-vis the threat landscape in the aftermath of 9/11, Blunkett replied that the UK was situated in 
a ‘technology arms race’ with terrorists, malicious actors and criminals in cyberspace, and that:  
 
“I think there has been a transformation in terms of the nature of the threat. The physical threat is much less … now the 
threat is cyber, I strongly believe that the attack from cyber, and the dislocation that that could cause to all kinds of 
essential parts of our well-being, our utilities, our infrastructure, our economy, this is greater than the physical threat, 
and we really need to take this more seriously in the future” (2015). 
  
Refraining from openly criticising Government policy, Blunkett signalled his perception of the 
priority risks facing the UK, and drew on his Ministerial experience in the aftermath of 9/11 as an experience 
of crisis whilst in senior office to legitimise his concerns. Whilst Ministerial figures had spoken openly about 
the seriousness of the cyber threat from actors such as terrorists, they did not appear to overtly share 
Blunkett’s stance that these threats actually exceeded those of non-cyber threats. It is notable that Blunkett, 
speaking in the final years of his tenure as an MP and as a former Home Secretary, elected not to critique the 
securitisation of cyberterrorism, but instead chose to endorse it in separate instances both inside and outside 
of the Chamber. 
 Peers also adopted the ‘Tier One’ terminology to describe the threat of cyberterrorism. In the Lords’ 
Chamber, Baroness Neville-Jones, Conservative Peer, member of the National Security Strategy Joint 
Committee and serving as the Special Representative to Business on Cyber Security, stated that “we 
identified terrorism, cyberattack … as major threats to the stability and security of this country. Terrorism 
and cyberattack were classed as Tier One risks … those risks are not going away; they are remaining” 
(2014). Three times in the space of four sentences during a debate on the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review, the Liberal Democrat Peer Baroness Smith of Newham invoked the Tier One theme in relation to the 
threats of “cyber, terrorism and international conflict” (2015). Lord Alderdice, a Liberal Democrat Peer who 
at the time was a member of the Lords’ House Committee, the Liaison Committee and the Intelligence and 
Security annual report Committee stated that he was “gratified to note the recognition of cybersecurity as a 
Tier One risk”, adding, for emphasis, that:  
 
“it is important to understand that this is not simply a question of traditional terrorists, whether domestic or international 
… using the modality of cyber to arrange traditional-style terrorism … there are new ways of engaging in attacks that 
are mediated entirely through the internet – for example, the damaging of Government infrastructure and the necessary 
national utilities” (2011). 
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 Lord Taylor of Holbeach, at the time a Parliamentary under-Secretary to the Home Office, also raised 
the Tier One theme – although in the form of cyber and terrorism – warning that “it is now possible that a 
major cyberattack on essential systems – for example those controlling power supply, communications or 
food distribution – could result in loss of life, serious illness or injury, serious damage to the economy … 
national security or severe social disruption” (2014).  
 Lord Reid, the Labour Peer, phrasing a question to Baroness Neville-Jones in the chamber in 
November 2010, stated that the Minister and the Government were “correct in identifying cyber as a major 
new priority in the strategic security review”, but asked whether she accepted: 
 
“that if we are to counter the use of malware, industrial espionage, or, God forbid, cyberattacks from terrorists, possibly 
in our emergency systems or in the financial sector, we will require above all a new cadre of well-developed, trained 
and selected young people who are at the very frontiers of thinking in this direction?” (2010). 
  
Baroness Neville-Jones replied that the noble Lord had put “his finger on a very important issue” 
(2010). 
 Whilst he did not expressly use the term ‘Tier One’, Lord Jopling, the Conservative Peer and 
member of EU-related committees, spoke in reference to “terrorists, criminals and hostile states”, stating in a 
debate on his committee’s report on cyberattacks that “anyone who doubts the havoc that successful 
cyberattacks can cause, and so the importance of protection against these attacks, needs to look no further 
than the opening pages of our report to see how in May 2007 Estonia virtually ground to a halt” (2010). 
 Speaking with regards to a different security-policy document, Baroness Jolly, then the Liberal 
Democrat’s defence spokesperson welcomed the SDSR’s ‘realisation’ “that cyber is a real and daily threat”, 
noting that cyber threats “could come from someone’s bedroom – that of a terrorist or a bored student. Cyber 
is real and poses a serious threat to the workings of our machinery and to civil society” (2015).  
 Lord Touhig, in a debate on the Queen’s Speech, referenced the 2015 SDSR’s classification of 
cybersecurity to ask the Ministry of Defence Minister, Earl Howe, for updates on the progress of the UK’s 
offensive cyber program for the purposes of countering “the work of people such as ISIL and other terrorist 
organisations around the world” (2016).  
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 From my review and mapping of the sources, I have determined that the ‘Tier One’ threat strand is 
the central underpinning theme that provided the continuity of the cyberterrorism-as-threat construct. 
Articulated explicitly in three national security strategies published across 2010 to 2015, this theme was 
repeated or re-chanted (Oren and Solomon, 2015) by Ministers, MPs and Lords. Whilst some limited 
ambiguity was exhibited with regards to ‘cyberterrorism as threat’ or ‘generic use of the internet by 
terrorists’, most notably with Matt Hancock’s (2016) public speech, overall the re-chanting and lack of 
contestation of this strand indicates that cyberterrorism was successfully securitised and thus removed from 
the ‘political’ realm. The securitised status of the threat of cyberterrorism was further substantiated by the 
references that were made to cyberterrorism as a bona fide threatening entity in unrelated debates on climate 
change, flood-risk (McCarthy, 2016; Creagh, 2016; Berger, 2013) and nuclear weapons (O’Hara, 2015; 
Paterson, 2015).  
 Whilst the ‘Tier One’ strand provided the official voice of continuity that underpinned the 
securitisation of cyberterrorism, other strands also existed – strands which provided key nuance that would 
discursively assemble cyberterrorism into an entity both sharing characteristics with other threats and also 
possessing unique distinctions. Chapters Five and Six will detail these respective strands; ‘Cyberterrorism as 
Unique’ (temporarily and spatially) and ‘From Fiction to Reality’.  
 
Public Perception of the Threat of Cyberterrorism 
 
 As noted earlier in this chapter, this thesis is primarily concerned with the ‘official’ construction of 
the threat of cyberterrorism in the UK. Accordingly, great weight and attention has been paid to the relevant 
‘moments’ offered by Ministers, MPs and Lords. Neither this chapter, nor the thesis at large, offers a 
discourse analysis of the ‘third tier’ of the audience implicated in the securitisation of cyberterrorism; the 
public at large. However, this section will briefly detail the findings of publicly-available polls in relation to 
the prioritisation of threats offered by the British public when consulted. During the period under scrutiny – 
May 2010 to June 2016 – there were no publicly-available polls explicitly seeking the views of the general 
public on cyberterrorism. Nevertheless, there are two polls that could be instructive. This section will also 
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note a third poll that was targeted at researchers internationally, who were interested in the matter of 
cyberterrorism. 
 In a Yougov poll conducted in September 2014, in which respondents were offered a ‘tick all that 
apply’ question on serious threats to national security, 69% listed “terror attacks from current or former UK 
citizens”, 68% listed “terror attacks from foreign citizens”, and 43% listed “online/cyber attacks that disrupt 
life in the UK” (Rogers, 2014). This placed cyber attacks below immigration, at 55%, yet above alternative 
responses such as “resource competition” and “climate change or extreme weather”, which were at 30% and 
28% respectively. The nature of the options offered in response to the poll effectively means that they are 
open to interpretation, and, realistically, a perceived threat of cyberterrorism could align with both the 
categories of domestic/foreign terrorism, and cyber attacks. In the same poll, when respondents were urged 
to select just one response, 30% of respondents listed “terror attacks from current or former UK citizens”, 
15% listed “terror attacks from foreign citizens”, and 3% listed “online/cyber attacks that disrupt life in the 
UK” (Rogers, 2014). The limited response to the latter option is interesting, and one would suggest that this 
is perhaps symptomatic of the lack of a case study of a cyberattack significantly disrupting critical national 
infrastructure – at least in the UK – at the time of the poll being conducted.  
 In a ‘tick all that apply’ poll conducted in July 2015, 66% of British respondents were very 
concerned about the threat of Islamic State, and 34% were very concerned about cyber attacks on 
governments, banks, or corporations (Pew Research Center, 2015). Whereas the previous poll offered a 
forward suggestion regarding the severity of the hypothetical cyber attack in question, this poll did not do so; 
which could perhaps account for some of the percentage disparity between the Pew and Yougov polls.  
 In 2012, the Cyberterrorism Project, based at Swansea University, conducted a survey by distributing 
a questionnaire to over 600 researchers, authors and experts who were involved in research linked to 
cyberterrorism. Respondents were identified by conducting targeted literature reviews, standing in relevant 
academic communities and the application of two mailing lists, eliciting 118 responses from 24 states and six 
continents (MacDonald et al, 2013). There were 32 respondents who reported themselves as employed in the 
UK, representing 27% of total respondents. The greatest proportion of the response was from those 
employed in the USA, with 41 people, or 35% of the total response. Consequently, the Cyberterrorism 
Project’s survey cannot be said to be representative of a ‘British’ perspective on the securitisation of 
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cyberterrorism. However, I note the survey here because it is the largest poll that has been conducted 
explicitly on the matter of cyberterrorism10. Some elements of this poll are of particular note. Of 110 
respondents who replied to the question “In your view, does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat?”, 
58% responded ‘yes’, 20% ‘no’, 12% ‘possibly/potentially’, and 6% were unsure (MacDonald et al, 
2013:14). When asked “do you consider that a cyberterrorist attack has ever taken place?”, 49% responded 
‘yes’ and 49% responded ‘no’ (MacDonald et al, 2013:15). In concluding remarks on this survey, Jarvis and 
MacDonald noted that “it is highly significant, then, that several national legislatures (including the UK) 
have adopted … [the view that] treats cyberterrorism as a subset of the broader category of terrorism, but 
simultaneously recognises that there are qualitative differences between the two” (2015:675). They claim 
that part of this significance was the scope for the conceptual debate surrounding cyberterrorism to infiltrate 
and influence that which is implicated by terrorism more broadly. 
From the polls, it is apparent that members of the public are concerned about both the threat of 
terrorism and the threat of cyber attacks. Whilst this cannot by default be read as ‘the public fear 
cyberterrorism’, it is not a great leap to suggest that the public may consider terrorists as actors potentially 
interested in conducting a cyber attack against critical national infrastructure. However, given that these polls 
only offer insight into two of the six years under scrutiny, and they did not explicitly invite respondents to 
include ‘cyberterrorism’ as part of the box-ticking exercise, the inferences that can be made are limited. 
Some of the respondents ticking the respective ‘cyber attack’ options may have done so on the basis of the 
perceived threat of inter-state cyberwarfare, rather than attacks launched by non-state actors. Whilst I do not 
wish to under-represent the voices of the public – or the ‘third tier’ of the audience in my ‘Pantomime’ model 
of securitisation – I would reiterate that this thesis is concerned with the ‘official’ securitisation of 
cyberterrorism as articulated at Whitehall. Perhaps the greatest insight that can be gleaned from this section 
is that there is a pressing need for more research to be conducted on public knowledge and awareness of the 
threat posed by terrorist application of the internet to conduct attacks against critical national infrastructure. 
Survey research that offers comparisons of awareness and prioritisation of this threat amongst the populace 
in the UK, with that expressed in other states, would be of particular value.  
                                                          
10 A ‘five years later’ poll is currently being conducted by the Cyberterrorism Project team, to which this author has 
responded.  
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 The penultimate sections of this chapter draw on the discourse that has been mapped here. These 
sections will further the analysis by detailing the inter-relationship between the strategic documents, the 
Cabinet Office and MPs and Lords. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. Firstly, this analysis builds on 
our understanding of how the ‘Tier One’ securitising speech act performed security and made certain actions 
possible. Secondly, this analysis illustrates one utility of the audience framework of securitisation theory 
through the case study of the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK. 
 
Lessons from the Construction of Cyberterrorism as a Tier One Threat: Anticipatory Security 
 
 This section and the subsequent section detail some of the key lessons that can be ascertained from 
the official British securitisation of cyberterrorism, pertaining to our knowledge of what this securitisation 
has made possible. In this endeavour, these sections will also demonstrate part of the novelty of the case 
study of the British construction of the threat of cyberterrorism for ‘securitisation theory’. In this section, it is 
suggested that by securitising the threat of cyberterrorism in 2010, the Government’s speech act was a 
performance of ‘anticipatory’ security. 
 The decision to identify a corpus of 110 unique sources from the period 12th May 2010 to 24th June 
2016 was a conscious one, and the rationale of this choice has been detailed in Chapter Three. It is worth 
noting, however, that the 12th May 2010 date from which sources were collected missed some elements of 
the discourse that would have helped to inform the discursive construction of the threat of cyberterrorism and 
the logic behind the Cabinet Office’s decision to declare it a Tier One threat in 2010.  
 Of particular note is an excerpt from the 2009-2010 Annual Report of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee, which stated that: 
 
“GCHQ informed the Committee that it is not known whether terrorist groups intend, or have the capacity, to launch 
significant attacks over the internet but this, along with extremist use of the internet, remains an area of considerable 
concern. Nevertheless, we have been told by GCHQ that the greatest threat of electronic attack to the UK comes from 
State Actors, with Russia and China continuing to pose the greatest threat” (Intelligence and Security Committee, 
2010:22).  
 
It is interesting that the securitisation of cyberterrorism was established by the Cabinet Office – for 
the first time in official British discourse – after GCHQ had informed the Intelligence and Security 
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Committee that as far as the intelligence service was concerned, there was no substantive evidence that 
terrorists were particularly eager to develop, or were capable of developing, cyber weapons which could 
endanger British national security. This logic of securitisation befits the ‘anticipatory’ model of security 
provision, which will be scrutinised in greater detail in the next chapter. 
The establishment of the securitisation of cyberterrorism in the security strategies (Cabinet Office, 
2010a; 2011; 2015a) indicates two possibilities. The first possibility is that the Government possessed 
classified, credible information on the capacity of contemporary terrorist organisations to develop and 
orchestrate substantial cyber attacks against British critical national infrastructure. The second possibility is 
that the Government wanted to pre-empt the possibility of terrorists conducting cyber attacks against British 
critical national infrastructure. These possibilities are not exclusionary; the Government may have both 
possessed classified information pertaining to the eagerness of terrorist groups to conduct cyber attacks 
against the UK, and been simultaneously concerned that this was a precedent that would increase in 
frequency or intensity over time. This latter point – that cyberterrorism was a threat deemed to be increasing 
over time – is analysed in greater detail with further mapping and analysis in the next chapter. 
Whether one, or both, of these possibilities motivated the Government to classify cyberterrorism as a 
Tier One threat to the UK (Cabinet Office, 2010a:11), it is of note that the Government sought fit to even 
speak of ‘cyberterrorism’. The alternative would have been to incorporate terrorist application of 
cyberattacks within the pre-existing terrorism-as-threat discourse, rather than develop a new subset of this 
discourse. To speak of ‘cyberterrorism’ rather than ‘terrorism’ is to suggest that this is a form of terror that 
can be distinguished from a monolithic category of ‘terror’. This notion befits the ‘New Terrorism’ thesis, 
which is explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
 There is a growing field of literature in Security Studies that discusses the notion of ‘anticipatory’ or 
‘precautionary’ security, governance and justice (for instance, see Anderson, 2007a; 2007b; Adey, 2009; 
Lackoff, 2007; Massumi, 2005; Goede and Graaf, 2013; Chesney, 2005; 2007; Sarat, Douglas and Umphrey, 
2007; Woude, 2010; Zedner, 2007; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Kessler, 2008; Opitz, 2011). Marieke de 
Goede is instructive in distinguishing the difference between ‘preventative’ and ‘precautionary’ measures of 
managing risk. Accordingly, prevention “addresses itself to risks that are … statistically knowable and 
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calculable according to cycles of regularity … precaution, on the other hand, addresses threats and dangers 
that are irregular, incalculable, and, in important ways, unpredictable” (Goede, 2011:9).  
 An example of a preventative management of risk in the UK is the way in which the risk of HIV 
proliferation amongst intravenous consumers of drugs (IDUs) is handled by British authorities. Reflecting on 
drugs-policy discourse in the UK, Eva Bertram et al suggested that, following the 1980s HIV epidemic, the 
British authorities operated within a ‘public-health paradigm’, with a focus on “strategies for harm 
minimisation for the individual and society” (1996:215-216). This paradigm essentially works to empower 
IDUs “to change their behaviour by providing them with information, promoting motivation to change, and 
providing the means to make those changes” (Bertram et al, 1996:216). Others have described this is as a 
“consumer-oriented style of service delivery”, as the direction of provision is dictated by the requirements of 
IDUs themselves (Stimson and Lart, 1991). Peter McDermott, one of the pioneers of harm-reduction efforts 
in Liverpool stated retrospectively that “giving clean needles to strangers didn’t automatically mean they 
wouldn’t share, but if you didn’t do it they had no access to the right choices … people understood the risks 
they were running. They actively wanted to minimise their risk”. This British health initiative, Bertram et al 
argued, acted to significantly reduce the proliferation of HIV by the early 1990s, particularly in the urban 
centres of Scotland (Bertram et al, 1996:216). Philip Bean has suggested that whilst the British model is “a 
jumble of inconsistencies”, it is beneficial to the addict and broader society, because “the drug world is too 
complicated for one approach to dominate” (2010:133-134). It is notable that the prevalence of HIV in the 
UK remains relatively high, with 6,095 new diagnoses in 2015, reflecting an infection rate of 11.3 per 
100,000 people, compared to the Western European average of 6.3 per 100,000 people; however, only 2% of 
these new diagnoses were from the IDU population (Chau et al, 2016:4; Avert, 2017). Notwithstanding 
localised spikes, the HIV risk to the British IDU population is calculable, relatively predictable, and is 
monitored through the Needle Exchange Monitoring System, established in 2007. 
 This preventative public health policy does not fit the model of securitisation. This is not to say that 
health risks cannot be securitised, but one would expect the policies and strategies implicated in a 
securitisation to be state-focused, whereas clean needle programs are operated by pharmacies and charities 
and monitored by local authorities and the NHS. However, the securitisation of cyberterrorism, a threat 
which has not yet become tragedy to-date, and for which there exists little or no publicly-available details 
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pertaining to the objective likelihood of a terrorist organisation engaging in this kind of activity, fits the 
‘anticipatory’ or ‘precautionary’ frame of risk management. The threats of terrorism, cyberterrorism and 
piracy – amongst myriad others –  “exceed rational calculation and statistical risk assessment”, because the 
threats “are by their nature dispersed, infrequent, and insufficiently historically documented to enable 
meaningful predictions” (Goede, 2011:9). It is possible that the securitising agents and members of the 
audience included in the above mapped discourse who were members of the Privy Council or were senior 
members of Government departments may have had access to sensitive confidential data tracking the 
propensity for cyberterrorism to strike the UK. However, until such data reaches the National Archives, 
agency should not be given to speculation, and taking the securitisation as a whole, the knowledge of the 
threat that was available across the audience spectrum was limited to the notion espoused in the strategy and 
review documents (Cabinet Office, 2010a:11; Cabinet Office, 2011:15; Cabinet Office, 2015a:19). This was 
the notion that cyberterrorism was a possibility and that it could cause significant harm to the interests of 
British society and economy. Adopting an anticipatory response to a securitisation – as opposed to 
reactionary – alters the proscriptive logic; operating in a state of ‘not knowing’ is not cause for inaction. One 
of the key components to the anticipatory or precautionary logics of risk management is that a dearth of 
knowledge cannot be “regarded as an excuse for inaction in the face of a potentially catastrophic threat” 
(Goede, 2011:9). US Secretrary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld captured this logic succinctly during the same 
infamous June 2002 NATO press conference in which he noted the existence of ‘known unknowns’ and 
‘unknown unknowns’, when he stated that “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (2002). The 
notion that one can (or should) imagine threats in order to act upon them before they actualise themselves 
will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Six.  
 It is reasonable to suggest that cyberterrorism fits within the remit of anticipatory risk governance. 
The fear of an anticipated but ill-known future event is a central function of terrorism itself. As Michael 
Frank has suggested, fear is future-facing and “terrorism systematically exploits this anticipatory nature of 
fear” (2015:92). Ultimately, to “achieve its defining effect – collective fear of more violence to come – 
terrorism relies on the belief that the next attack is impending, and that it could happen anywhere, anytime” 
(Frank, 2015:92). Whilst the UK’s experience of the securitisation of cyberterrorism aligns with anticipatory 
risk governance, there is another significant function of the ‘cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat’ discourse. 
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This function, which is analysed in the following section, has served to delineate between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of violence in cyberspace. By establishing in 2010 that cyberterrorism exists as a bona fide 
threat to British national security, the Government simultaneously created a conceptual space in which 
‘legitimate’ forms of cyber violence could exist. 
 
Lessons from the Construction of Cyberterrorism as a Tier One Threat: Legitimising the UK’s Cyber 
Weaponry Program 
 
In this section, it is argued that from the perspective of the British Government, the core utility of 
securitising the threat of cyberterrorism is that it has tacitly endorsed the UK’s own cyber weapons program. 
By categorising cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat, the Government – acting as a securitising agent – 
created a partially-fixed nodal point that labelled cyber mediated violence by non-state actors as illegitimate. 
By default, the creation and maintenance of this partially-fixed nodal point endorsed a socially-constructed 
reality in which legitimate cyber mediated violence could exist. 
A consistent theme in the mapped discourse included in this chapter is the infrequency of technical 
discussion of the threat of cyberterrorism. If cyberterrorism is indeed novel, it may have been reasonable to 
expect that one symptom would have been for the discourse to cogently express why this novelty can be said 
to exist. However, during the period of May 2010 to June 2016, instances where an MP, Minister or Lord 
expressly spoke in explicit detail about the nature of a hypothetical terrorist incident and the objective impact 
it could have on a given computer system were infrequent. Instead, where MPs, Ministers and Lords elected 
to discuss cyberterrorism, they typically did so in superficial, even glancing ways. For instance, as noted in 
this chapter, during a Trident debate, Steven Paterson, the SNP Member for Stirling noted that the UK should 
invest in “combating cyberterrorism, as well as actual terrorism on our streets” (2015). Here, the distinction 
between cyberterrorism and ‘actual’ terrorism was not articulated but assumed. Other Members present in the 
debate, and post-event readers of Hansard, are left to infer what this distinction is. Similarly, in the next 
chapter, it is noted that during a debate on Cyber Bullying, Margaret Ritchie (2013) of the SDLP described 
cyber bullying as an insidious form of cyberterrorism. Here, Ritchie was not suggesting that cyber bullying is 
the only form of cyberterrorism, but rather, that it was a form of cyberterrorism. This thesis does not regard 
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cyber bullying to be a form of cyberterrorism, and Margaret Ritchie’s sentiment was not voiced elsewhere in 
the corpus. However, Ritchie’s comment, which was not admonished by the Speaker nor contested by other 
Members present in the chamber, is evidence of the multi-vocality of the ambiguous chanted phrase of 
‘cyberterrorism’. The role of multi-vocality in sustaining an ambivalent securitisation is considered in this 
section. 
Irrespective of how each Minister, MP or Lord chose to interpret the definition of cyberterrorism, 
there were no instances throughout the corpus where a member of the second tier elected to express a 
counter-securitising claim. The securitisation of cyberterrorism was not questioned, but instead accepted. It is 
useful to substantiate the utility of vocalised acceptances of the threat of cyberterrorism. 
Security is an inherently intersubjective phenomenon. Furthermore, ‘terrorism’ as a field, practice 
and discursive entity has not been categorically defined. There is an inherent ‘know it when you see it’ 
element to common comprehensions of what does and does not constitute terrorism (Gentry and Sjoberg, 
2014; Richards, 2014). However, whilst a database exists in which thousands of international incidents are 
categorised annually as ‘terrorist’ attacks (Global Terrorism Database, 2017), this database barely includes 
cogent cyber attacks, nor does an equivalent ‘cyberterrorist’ database exist11. The Ministers, MPs and Lords 
who constructed the discourse that has been mapped in this chapter could not refer to a bona fide historical 
account of a cyberterrorist incident. Instead, there is some evidence that their views on what a cyberterrorist 
would do has been informed by existing accounts in popular fiction. The role of fictional accounts in 
informing the British discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism is explored in greater detail in the sixth 
chapter. 
In the absence of a bona fide historical case study of cyberterrorism, there was some evidence that 
those who referenced cyberterrorism in the corpus did so in a way that nurtured rather than arrested the 
ambiguity. For example, as noted in this chapter, Ian McKenzie, the Labour MP for Inverclyde, reported that 
“terrorists, rogue states and cyber criminals are among those who are targeting computer systems in the UK 
… with minimal equipment in the right hands, a lot of damage can be done” (2014). This excerpt exhibited 
three ambiguities. Firstly, ‘terrorists’ are included amongst other actors who may wish to use the internet to 
                                                          
11  Searching the Global Terrorism Database for ‘cyber’ returns six hits, ranging between the years 2001 and 2013. 
Two of these incidents involved firearms, and three involved explosives. One incident, against an oil pipeline in 
2008 in Refahiye, Turkey, involved remote electronic interference that caused an explosion. No casualties were 
reported. 
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cause harm. Secondly, ‘minimal equipment’ is not defined. Thirdly, ‘a lot of damage’ is not clarified. From 
McKenzie’s assertion, we can infer that cyberterrorists exist, a cyberterrorist attack is possible, and that the 
scale of potential damage could be high. When the 2015 version of the National Security Strategy warned of 
‘significant and varied’ cyber threats to the UK, including ‘terrorists’ who could “use easily available cyber 
tools and technology for destructive purposes” (2015a:19,85), these tools are not detailed. 
In a similar fashion, when David Cameron, the Prime Minister, warned that “we cannot leave 
cyberspace wide open to the criminals and terrorists that threaten our security and prosperity” (2011), this 
articulated point of vulnerability – the openness and interoperability of internet communications – is not 
substantiated. The assumed inference might be that British cyberspace is an ‘open door’ that can be 
exploited. Likewise, when Francis Maude stated: “return to a paper world? Of course not. We’re not trying to 
protect ourselves from the internet … we need to protect the internet from hostile actors – the criminals, the 
hackers, the terrorists – who want to exploit it for less positive ends” (2012a), the scale, nature and potential 
of these ‘less positive’ ends were not elaborated. Maude’s statement shares a similarity with Ian McKenzie’s 
(2014; see also Blunkett, 2011,2015; Jopling, 2010; Jolly, 2015), detailed above, with ‘terrorists’ ‘packaged’ 
with criminals and other nefarious cyberspace-based actors. This is an important point, which indicates that 
the cyberterrorism-as-threat discourse is not standalone, but instead exists as part of a broader discourse of 
threatening actors in cyberspace. Packaging the identity of threatening cyberterrorists with rogue states, 
criminals and unspecified hackers highlights the potential pervasiveness of illegitimate violent cyber actors 
and bolsters the case for the British state to act as the guarantor of the UK’s cyber security (Mott, 2016).  
The ambiguous discourse of a category of terrorist threat that has not occurred and may not occur 
perhaps indicates that it was important for both the securitising actor and the audience to advocate the 
possibility of cyberterrorism taking place, without entering into in-depth narratives of the means by which a 
cyberterrorist incident could be accomplished. This is ‘ambiguous chanting’ in action. Without having access 
to any classified materials on the likelihood of contemporary terrorist organisations conduct major cyber 
attacks against UK infrastructure, one would suggest that the securitisation of cyberterrorism operated on a 
speculative rather than definitive basis. To return to the Cyber Security Strategy of 2011, this document 
warned that terrorists “might also use cyberspace to facilitate or to mount attacks against the UK … 
especially if terrorists believe that our national infrastructure may be vulnerable” (2011:15, emphasis added). 
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The inference from this excerpt is that because cyberterrorism is a genuine possibility, one of the means to 
pre-empt the threat is to ensure that the UK’s national infrastructure cannot be perceived as being vulnerable 
to cyber attack. 
It is argued here that the emergence of cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat broadly befits the 
Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory. Cyberterrorism shifted from a largely non-articulated national 
security threat to a securitised threat with immediate effect with the publication of the UK 2010 National 
Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2010a:11). Here, the collective Government was the securitising actor, 
which had proclaimed cyberterrorism to be a Tier One threat to British national security. Whilst few 
members of the public at large may feel motivated to pro-actively read the National Security Strategy, or 
access Government press releases surrounding the publication of such documents, ‘cyberterrorism as Tier 
One threat’ was established as a theme that could be re-articulated by members of the first and second 
audience ‘tiers’. With the securitising act accomplished, credibility and legitimacy was ascribed to the 
perception that cyberterrorism was possible and warranted serious concern. Members of the audience could 
speak of this fixed nodal point, with the credible backing of the Cabinet Office, and feel less at risk of being 
accused of conspiracy or hyperbole. Ministers, MPs and Lords who vocalised their agreement with the 
securitisation of cyberterrorism – expressed by using the term ‘cyberterrorism’ and uncritically highlighting 
its threatening nature – were active rather than passive actors. Repeated ‘chanting’ of a threatening 
cyberterrorist threat without articulating its definition, parameters or the means by which it could occur, does 
little to develop the discourse. However, there is a core utility to ambiguously chanting about the threat of 
cyberterrorism. ‘Terrorism’, when used as a label, is an ill-defined yet powerful discursive delineation 
between legitimate and illegitimate violent actors (Stampnitzky, 2013). The mere existence and reaffirming 
of the term cyberterrorism, therefore, serves to construct a discursive delineation between legitimate and 
illegitimate violent actors in cyberspace.  
Creating and maintaining this delineation – irrespective of whether cyberterrorism occurs – has a 
cogent policy significance. The development, possession and application of cyber weapons at the state level 
is not regulated. A policy vacuum exists, and the norms governing signalling and deterrence in cyberspace 
have yet to be developed (Dipert, 2010). If the experience of state-level adaptation in the years following the 
emergence of the atomic weapon in the 1940s is informative, standards and norms of cyber weaponry may 
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yet take decades to develop (Liff, 2012; Manson, 2011). The 2007 cyber attack against Estonia, the 2008 
attack against Georgia and the 2009-2010 attack against nuclear centrifuges in Iran all indicate that states are 
willing to cause disruption or damage against other state targets (Deibert, 2011). The articulation of 
cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat performs a tacit legitimisation of an unregulated and unspecified British 
cyber weapon arsenal. If the development of illegitimate cyber weapons operates in the domain of terrorists, 
criminals and rogue states, legitimate cyber weapons, or at least the concept of legitimate cyber weapons, 
must exist. The UK, which was an early state to publicly recognise its own cyber weapon program (Harvey, 
2011) has not had any substantive public-facing debates on the necessity for, or nature of, its cyber arsenal. 
Creating and maintaining the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence in cyberspace 
is a powerful element of the narrative that justifies the acquisition – and potentially use – of a novel weapon 
platform by a contemporary liberal democratic society. 
The securitising acts entailed in the national security documents (Cabinet Office, 2010a,2011,2015a) 
did not implicate cyber weapons as de facto threatening tools by their own right. Instead, the threatening 
identities who may be interested in using these novel weapons systems were implicated. This corpus-wide 
focus on identities – as opposed to technologies – is analysed in greater detail in the sixth chapter. Had the 
discourse focused more heavily on the threatening properties of the cyber weapons themselves rather than 
the malicious intentions of groups or individuals who may wish to use them, this could have been said to 
have a potentially deteriorating effect on the tacit endorsement of the British state’s cyber weapon program. 
According to the mapped discourse, cyber weapons were not inherently problematic; the nefarious actors 
who might use such weapons were. The discourse therefore does not by default exclude the possibility of 
positive applications for cyber weapons. Indeed, Lord Touhig (2016) and George Osborne (2015) – the then-
Chancellor, whose GCHQ speech is mapped in the next chapter – expressly linked the existence of 
cyberterrorists to the need for a British cyber offensive program. Osborne warned his audience that “we need 
not just to defend ourselves against attacks, but rather to dissuade people and states from targeting us in the 
first place … we reserve the right to respond to a cyber attack in any way that we choose” (2015). This 
linkage is an overt manifestation of this tacit delineation between violent identities in cyberspace. 
Illegitimate actors wish to use cyberspace against Britain’s national security; therefore it is not only 
reasonable but also necessary for the UK to develop and maintain an adequate cyber offensive strategy. 
95 
 The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of cyber violence would have been less 
cogent had the securitising act and associated discourse not been so categorical in classifying cyberterrorism 
as a Tier One threat. If the discourse had been reassuring – for instance, stating that whilst terrorists may 
wish to conduct significant cyber attacks, it is unlikely that they would be able to do so – the implied threat 
perception would have been less alarming. Whilst much of the discourse that has been mapped in this 
chapter, and indeed subsequent chapters, appears to exhibit ambiguity, the core notion that cyberterrorism is 
a ‘Tier One’ threat is a categorical speech act and a fixed discursive nodal point. According to this 
securitisation, cyberterrorists do possibly exist and they are trying to develop advanced cyber weapons. 
Whilst an array of policies are potentially legitimised as a result of this threat construction, such as 
surveillance of online communications, forcible seizure of encryption keys, state-to-individual hacking, and 
forced cooperation between large technology firms and the Government; the core function of creating a 
common knowledge that cyberterrorists exist is the tacit legitimisation of the British state’s own interests in 
offensive cyber technologies.  
Having mapped and analysed the British discourse that formed the ‘cyberterrorism as a Tier One 
threat’ theme, this chapter finishes with a concluding section that summarises its key content. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter sought to map the ‘official’ discourse in the UK that could be regarded as having 
established cyberterrorism as a threat to British critical national infrastructure warranting extraordinary 
responses. This chapter articulated this discourse broadly within the framework of the ‘traditional’ approach 
to securitisation theory (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998). It was found that the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism was a case of ‘anticipatory security’. However, this chapter has also emphasised that the 
utility of the securitisation framework is bolstered if the ‘audience’ is framed as having agency.  
 Given that cyberterrorism was regarded as a ‘Tier One’ threat in the 2010 National Security Strategy 
(Cabinet Office, 2010a), the 2011 Cyber Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2011) and the 2015 version of the 
National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2015a), the threat of ‘cyberterrorism’ could, reasonably, be 
considered ‘securitised’, even if the matter had not been discussed in either Chamber, nor at any external 
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events. However, from the mapped corpus of official discourse outlined above, it is apparent that this 
securitisation was entrenched by Ministers, MPs and Lords who chose, by their own volition, to repeat the 
‘Tier One’ and ‘severe threat’ (or similar) themes. Throughout May 2010 to June 2016, there were no debates 
held in either Chamber specifically regarding the threat posed by cyberterrorism, nor did Ministers attend 
events expressly concerning cyberterrorism. Each instance in which the threat of cyberterrorism was raised 
was an instance where a member of the either the first or second audience-tier implicated in this 
securitisation had elected to voice their views on the issue. Throughout the mapped discourse, there were no 
cases in which a member of either tier of the audience expressly sought to indicate their dissent against the 
core drive of this securitisation; that cyberterrorism represents a ‘Tier One’ threat to the critical national 
infrastructure of the UK.  
 The mapped references to cyberterrorism in the national security documents and from Ministers, 
MPs and Lords did not include specific technical details. In the analysis, this was deemed to be notable, 
given that the perceived existence cyberterrorism – and indeed any cyber threat – relies entirely upon a 
relatively recent man-made technology. The core theme in the mapped discourse included in this chapter was 
that the existence of a cyberterrorist identity was deemed to be credible and that this threatening identity 
represented a high-level risk to British national security. By ambiguously-chanting their tacit agreement with 
this theme, the audience members gave further credence to this partially-fixed discursive node. The existence 
of this partially-fixed node is evidence of a socially-constructed illegitimate form of violence in cyberspace. 
One consequence of the existence of this node is that by default, there must be a concept of legitimate 
violence in cyberspace. The securitising act exhibited in the national security documents had not sought to 
securitise all cyber weapons; instead, the securitisation was targeted against the identities of hypothesised 
actors potentially interested in using such weapons. 
 The next chapter will outline further aspects of the official securitisation of cyberterrorism beyond 
this core ‘Tier One’ theme. Specifically, this fifth chapter will detail how this particular securitisation is 
unique vis-a-vis other securitisations, such as that implicated by ‘traditional’ or ‘analogue’ terrorism. 
Outlining this uniqueness in spatial and temporal terms, with reference to further mapped discourse, this 
chapter draws on Post-Structural interpretations of securitisation theory to argue that cyberterrorism presents 
a novel case study. Whilst the fourth chapter of this thesis regarded the ‘Tier One’ strand as a relatively 
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singular and distinct thread, the ‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ strands which form the basis of the next chapter are 
divided into sub-strands to account for the greater diversity of description about the nature of the threat of 
cyberterrorism that had been articulated by members of the first and second audience-tiers. 
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Chapter Five: Cyberterrorism as Temporally Unique 
 
 The previous chapter mapped and analysed the official discourse surrounding the threat of 
cyberterrorism between 12th May 2010 and 24th June 2016  and established that this was a discourse 
exhibiting concerted and consistent characteristics of securitisation. However, whilst the securitisation 
framework exists precisely because there are some broad generalisations that can be gleaned from any given 
‘securitised’ phenomenon, not all securitised threats are the same. This fifth chapter seeks to further the 
mapping and analysis of the securitisation of the threat of cyberterrorism in the UK, to highlight how this 
threat is discursively constructed as unique. The mapped discursive content that is considered in this chapter 
is material from the corpus that has not yet been raised in the thesis. The distinctiveness of the threat of 
cyberterrorism is articulated in two key strands: ‘Cyberterrorism as a temporally unique threat’, and 
‘Cyberterrorism as a spatially unique threat’. These strands are further divided into distinct sub-strands. 
There are two sub-strands for the ‘temporal’ element, which are ‘New Terrorism’ and ‘Escalation of Threat’. 
Similarly, there are two sub-strands for the ‘spatial’ element. These are ‘Physical versus Cyber’, and ‘Safe 
Havens’.  
 I could have identified more strands from the corpus, such as ‘cyberterrorism as a hitherto ignored 
threat’, or ‘cyberterrorism as a financially costly threat’. However, due to the space constraints of the thesis, I 
have selected the most prevalent strands and sub-strands to articulate the unique nature of the threat of 
cyberterrorism, versus other threats to British security. The four strands and four sub-strands that I have used 
to structure the mapping and analysis of the corpus are comprised, in sum, of all of the corpus. Widening the 
strands further would have risked thinning  the scope of the analysis and could have rendered the thesis 
susceptible to ‘straw man’ strands. Some of the mapped content included in this chapter will not rigidly 
adhere to a single strand or sub-strand, but will instead crossover to two or more. Where this clash has 
occurred, I have placed the discursive item in the ‘best fit’ strand and sub-strand, and must stress that this is 
an exercise in coherence of structure, rather than an intention to rigidly compartmentalise the discourse. This 
chapter maps and analyses the aspects of the discourse relating to the ‘temporal’ strand, beginning with the 
sub-strand of ‘New Terrorism’. The sixth chapter of this thesis details and analyses the ‘Spatial’ sub-strands 
and introduces the final strand, ‘From Fiction to Reality’. 
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Cyberterrorism as a Temporally Unique Threat: ‘New Terrorism’ - Mapping 
 
 In the previous chapter, the key themes underpinning the strand were ‘Tier One’ and ‘severe/extreme 
threat’. The ‘New Terrorism’ sub-strand possesses key themes of its own. I have identified these themes 
because they are broadly in alignment with the characteristics of ‘New Terrorism’ that are advocated by 
academics endorsing the dichotomy between old and new forms of terror (Laqueur, 2000). Accordingly, 
these themes are: ‘evil’, ‘unknown/uncertain/complex’ and ‘WMDs/unconventional weapons’. This section 
maps the elements of the corpus which adhere to these themes. The ‘New Terrorism’ narrative and field is 
examined more closely in the subsequent section, which offers an analysis of this mapped discourse. 
 The demonisation of proscribed groups through language such as ‘evil’, or ‘barbaric’ is a component 
of the language surrounding contemporary counter-terror efforts. There was some evidence of the use of this 
language in the corpus. For instance, Dan Jarvis, the Labour MP for Barnsley Central and the shadow Justice 
Minister, discussed the ‘new threats’ that the UK faced, during a debate on Britain and International Security 
in July 2015. Jarvis, heralded by colleagues for his career in the Parachute Regiment of the British army, 
reported to the Chamber that the UK suffered more cyber attacks than any other European state, and that 
“terror and extremism are as formidable an enemy as any that our country has ever faced … it is every bit as 
fierce as the evil this country waged war on more than 70 years ago” (2015; emphasis added). Suggesting 
that there are similarities between today’s threat from terrorism and the devastation caused by the 
Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and Waffen-SS during the Second World War is perhaps an over-
statement; an estimated 27-28 million Soviet citizens lost their lives during the conflict, as did 350,000 
British citizens, representing 0.75% of the pre-war British population (Reynolds, 2002:223-224).  
 In 2015, leading a Commons debate on National Security and Defence, David Cameron informed the 
Chamber that “of course, the threats we face today go beyond that evil death cult [ISIL]. From the crisis in 
Ukraine to the risk of cyber attacks and pandemics, the world is more dangerous and uncertain today than 
even five years ago” (2015a). In a February 2016 speech, John Hayes, who was then serving as Minister for 
Security at the Home Office, expressed concern that “the essential change in terrorism is the increasing 
adaptability of terrorists, and of Daesh in particular. It uses new technology, new methods. It is adaptable. 
And it revels in its own depravity” (2016; emphasis added). This use of language suggests that terrorism, 
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particularly that epitomised by international Islamic extremism, terrorises not simply on the basis of a 
rational cost-benefit analysis of projected material gains from conducting political violence, but kills for the 
exercising of an ideology that is considered depraved by the British securitising agents and audiences. 
Similar sentiment to Hayes was expressed by George Osborne during a November 2015 speech delivered to 
GCHQ, in which he warned that “ISIL’s murderous brutality has a strong digital element … they are using 
[the internet] for evil … they have not been able to use it to kill people yet by attacking our infrastructure 
through cyber attack. They do not yet have that capability. But we know they want it, and are doing their best 
to build it” (2015).  
 For Sir Nicholas Soames, Conservative MP for Mid Sussex, contemporary terrorists were a 
‘menace’. Accordingly, during a NATO debate in the Chamber, Soames expressed concern that: 
 
“the emerging challenges of the 21st century that threaten us, our way of life and our prosperity are not so much 
Médecins sans Frontiéres, but Menace sans Frontiéres … the operating environment has shifted from one of near 
certainty, in the Cold War, to a period of uncertainty, in the war on terror, and it will move further left towards the 
unknown” (2015). 
 
 It is apparent from these excerpts that both Osborne and Soames highlighted that the terrorist threat 
environment was not static, but instead in flux, with both figures warning that the threat was likely to 
become increasingly intractable. Furthermore, it is of note that Soames elected to use the term ‘unknown’, 
and indeed, he was not the only figure in the corpus to have chosen this particular term. During a speech on 
CONTEST to the Cityforum in February 2011, at which Pauline Neville-Jones, at the time a Minister of State 
for the Home Office and Security, implored that the UK must “address any technical shortfalls in our ability 
to tackle cyberterrorism”, she also explained to her audience: 
 
“that the threat we face is changing. Al-Qaida is under pressure from the international community. But let us not be in 
any doubt that this group still aspires to launch attacks against the West. We now see new alliances between previously 
unconnected and indeed, unknown terrorist groups. We face an inherently unpredictable threat from self-starting 
individuals motivated by Al Qaida’s rhetoric of global jihad (2011a; emphasis added). 
  
The notion that cyberterrorism – and the actors behind this threat – represented a distinctly ‘complex’ 
phenomenon was also apparent from the corpus. ‘Complexity’ shares similarities with ‘unknowability’, but 
these terms are not directly interchangeable. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘unknown’ as “not 
known or familiar” (2017a), and defines ‘complex’ as “consisting of many different and connected parts”, or 
101 
“not easy to analyse or understand” (2017b). To describe something as ‘complex’ would infer a greater extent 
of knowledge of it vis-a-vis describing it as ‘unknown’. 
 In a September 2011 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Theresa May appeared to draw 
inspiration from the ‘New Terrorism’ thesis. May informed her audience that “the new terrorist threats are no 
less complex and difficult than the old. In some ways they are harder to deal with. They challenge our 
systems and structures. Terrorism now is more diverse, decentralised and perhaps also more agile than the 
landscape of 9/11” (2011a). May continued that: “we continue to see little evidence of systematic 
cyberterrorism. But this is now part of the language of Al-Qaida. As a tactic, and as a weapon, cyberterrorism 
is perfectly suited to the world of the lone terrorist, operating outside a hierarchy and without traditional 
command and control” (2011a).  
 Theresa May was not alone in espousing this concern. For instance, in October 2015, Lord Ahmad – 
then a Parliamentary under-Secretary for Countering Extremism under the Home Office whilst concurrently 
serving as under-Secretary for the Department of Transport, gave a speech on Aviation Security in an 
Increasingly Complex Environment. In this speech, Ahmad told the audience that whilst the three-day 
conference was debating many of the issues facing the aviation industry, none were more important than 
security “in an increasingly complex environment” and in particular, the need to protect “air passengers from 
the ever-evolving threat of terrorism” (2015). To Ahmad, it was clear “that as terrorists continue to innovate, 
our protective measures have to stay on their coat tails, and where possible get ahead” (2015).  
 An issue characterisable as being ‘complex’ is not, by necessity, intractable. To some figures in the 
corpus, the complexity of the threat of cyberterrorism – along with other cyber threats – represented an 
opportunity for the UK and British industry. For instance, Pauline Neville Jones spoke in October 2010 to 
inform the Lords Chamber that: 
 
“we will not succeed in defeating a cyber enabled terrorist enemy if our own communications are vulnerable. We need 
to be able to disrupt them, not them to disrupt us. This is the new national frontier. It offers very exciting, interesting 
and intellectually challenging opportunities for younger people and it is of great import to the nation” (2010). 
  
In a similar vein, raising a question the following month, Julian Brazier, the Conservative MP for 
Canterbury and at the time a member of the Defence Committee, asked the Prime Minister whether he 
agreed that the UK was “very well placed to lead the transition in Europe towards the era of the information-
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age terrorism, especially as we have GCHQ, and as his new National Security Council has made such a 
strong commitment to more spending against cyber warfare?” (2010). The Prime Minister responded that his 
honourable Friend made “a very good point”, and that there was an “opportunity to combat this new threat of 
cyberterror and cyber attacks” (2010).  
 As noted in the opening section of this chapter, part of the ‘New Terrorism’ thesis argues that the 
means of attack of ‘newer’ terrorism are more diverse than that of the ‘old’. For instance, whereas ‘old’ 
means of terror may have included the placement of a bomb in a public space, or the taking of hostages, 
‘newer’ terrorists were more interested in acquiring the means to kill greater numbers of people with 
techniques or devices one would normally associate with state-based entities. There was some evidence in 
the corpus that members of the second tier of the audience engaged with this notion on public record. For 
instance, Lord Alderdice, the Liberal Democrat Peer noted that there was now a “need to move beyond the 
conventional in terms of the issues we have to address – notably cyber and terrorism” (2015).  
 Wendy Morton, the Conservative MP for Aldridge-Brownhills, juxtaposed cyberterrorism with 
‘bullets and bombs’ when she raised a question with David Cameron, when he reported to the Chamber in 
November 2015 on the matter of the G20 and the then-recent attacks in Paris. Accordingly, she asked the 
Prime Minister whether he agreed “that the threat we face from terrorists today is not just about bullets and 
bombs, but about cyber attacks?” (2015). David Cameron responded that she was “absolutely right”, 
emphasising that “we face cyber attacks not just from states, but from radical groups and individuals” 
(2015b).   
 Lord Patten, a Conservative Peer, who lamented that “when in opposition, Members of this side of 
the House again and again pressed noble Lords … to tackle issues such as … the threat of cyberterrorism … 
to scant avail” (2010), warned his colleagues in a debate on the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Bill that “fast 
coming down the track … are various forms of cyberterrorism … cyber weapons are so much easier to 
procure – they are more like chemical weapons by comparison to other more general military hardware, let 
alone nuclear materials” (2010). Lord Hannay, the crossbench Peer, used his time in a debate on 
Cyberattacks in October 2010 to draw a conceptual linkage between nuclear weapons and cyber weapons. 
Accordingly, Hannay stated that “the target against which that threat is directed – our society’s increasing 
dependence on sophisticated forms of electronic communications – is continuing to grow at a frantic pace 
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which shows no sign of slacking … the target, as it grows, is likely to become softer unless effective 
countermeasures and increased resilience can be devised” (2010). Whilst he recognised that the analogy was 
not exact, if the cyber threat resembled any other threat, it was “perhaps closer to the one that we faced from 
nuclear weapons in the early years after their discovery, when we did not have a clear idea of what responses 
would work best and whether deterrence would be effective (2010). Hannay continued that, “the asymmetry 
of threats from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, which makes nonsense of earlier deterrence 
doctrines, is matched in some ways by the inherent asymmetry of threats from cyberattacks (2010). Not only 
is Hannay directly engaging with the notion that terrorists are seeking to diversify their means of attack, but 
his comments are an apt example of how speakers engaging with a securitisation are able to draw upon pre-
existing analogies and case studies to elucidate a point regarding a threat that is complex; or indeed, in the 
case of cyberterrorism, has not occurred. Furthermore, the securitisation of nuclear armaments is a largely 
fixed, entrenched securitisation in British discourse; by likening this securitisation to that of cyberterrorism, 
Hannay is expressly emphasising the significant scale of threat posed by terrorist use of cyberspace for the 
purpose of conducting attacks.  
 Another Lord, the crossbench Peer Viscount Waverley, also used analogy when speaking on the 
matter of cyberterrorism, suggesting that terrorists may elect to transition from suicide bombing to cyber 
enabled attacks, given the disruption that could be wrecked from the failure of a bank. Accordingly, in an EU 
Report debate in October 2010, he stated that:  
 
“a simple analogy to reinforce the case for global endeavours is to compare the threat of cyberterrorism to the threat of 
the banking sector. We know that one bank failing can have a catastrophic global impact. The same can apply to the 
world of cyberterrorism. I do not wish to appear alarmist, but I fear that, whereas suicide bombings have been the 
weapon of choice in certain quarters, carefully targeted cyberattacks will be the weapon in tomorrow’s world” 
(Andersen, 2010).  
  
Responding to a question during a Strategic Defence and Security Review debate that same month, 
Lord Strathclyde, the Conservative Peer who at the time was the Leader of the House of Lords, said that he 
was “delighted that the noble Lord [Lord Reid of Cardowan] welcomes the announcement on dealing with 
cyberterrorism. It is an important new threat that we take seriously” (Galbraith, 2010). 
 Lastly, whilst he did not explicitly discuss cyberterrorism, Kevan Jones, the Labour MP for North 
Durham, speaking in January 2013 as the shadow Minister for Defence, stated that “the security landscape 
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today is both uncertain and unpredictable. New threats such as cyber warfare and biological terrorism exist 
alongside conventional threats” (2013).  
 The next section draws on the academic ‘New Terrorism’ literature to critically analyse this aspect of 
the temporal distinctiveness of the securitised threat of cyberterrorism. It is argued that the linguistics of the 
‘New Terrorism’ thesis had been inserted into the securitisation of cyberterrorism. This served two functions. 
Firstly, ‘cyberterrorism’ was contextualised within a framework of new and novel forms of terrorist threat. 
Secondly, this aligning of the ‘cyberterrorism’ discourse with pre-existing narratives of terrorist threats 
served to entrench the securitisation.  
 
Cyberterrorism as a Temporally Unique Threat: ‘New Terrorism’ - Analysis 
 
 The phrase ‘New Terrorism’ is reflected in an approach to the study of terrorism and political 
violence that articulates a dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of terror. The ‘New Terrorism’ lens is 
generally regarded as having originated from the writings of Laqueur (for instance, see Laqueur, 2000). 
Academics and policymakers who advocated the viability of this dichotomy argued that the terrorist threat 
espoused by Al-Qaida and its affiliates was extraordinary and without precedent. The distinctive 
characteristics of ‘New Terrorism’ have been described as “increasingly networked, more diverse in terms of 
motivations, sponsorship and security consequences; more global in reach; and more lethal” (Lesser, 
1999:87). Unlike ‘old terrorism’, which might, for instance, have involved the taking of hostages or a 
telephone call that warns of a bomb placement before it detonates, ‘New Terrorism’ was deemed to represent 
“a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the more familiar ‘traditional’ terrorist groups” 
(Hoffman, 1998:2000; see also Laqueur, 2000 and Neumann, 2009). ‘New Terrorism’, was typically 
associated with ‘Radical Islamism’ and deemed to be driven by religious conviction or ethnic identification, 
as opposed to the ‘political’ interests exhibited by ‘old’ terror entities such as the ETA or IRA (Howard and 
Sawyer, 2004). ‘New Terrorists’ were regarded as seeking to solicit extensive civilian casualties (Lesser et al, 
2002). Of particular interest in relation to this thesis, fears were articulated regarding the new terrorists’ 
willingness to acquire weapons of mass destruction (Gurr and Cole, 2000). In an interview with the Time 
magazine in 1998, Osama bin Laden had stated that acquiring chemical and nuclear weapons was “a 
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religious duty”, and that it “would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent 
the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims” (see PBS, 2014); however, there is scant evidence to suggest 
that any non-state terrorist entity has acquired weapons of mass destruction. Opportunities for a well-
prepared non-state actor to surreptitiously acquire nuclear materials have existed, and, given the absence of 
publicly-available data on attempted dirty-bombing by terrorist organisations, not been taken advantage of. 
For instance, for a period of several weeks during 2011, at least 10,000 barrels of yellowcake uranium were 
left unsecured in warehouses in Libya (Spencer, 2011). A terrorist organisation with the wherewithal to safely 
remove and relocate the barrels – or organised criminals who could have sold them on the black market – 
could have taken advantage of this security lapse. 
 It is not the place of this thesis to directly engage with and critique the misplaced nature of the ‘New 
Terrorism’ hypothesis – indeed, other academics have produced excellent work demonstrating this already 
(for instance, see Croft, 2012; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Crenshaw, 2011). Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton 
have linked the pushing of what they term the ‘ideology’ of ‘New Terrorism’ on policymakers to the 
positioning of think tanks such as the RAND Corporation within the American ‘military-industrial complex’ 
(2009:376-380; see also Burnett and Whyte, 2005). Other notable literature has ascribed the ‘New Terrorism’ 
thesis as a form of ‘neo-Orientalism’, in which a ‘radical Muslim’ Other was positioned in the War on 
Terrorism in a binary opposition to the liberal United States and its allies (for instance, see Gentry, 2015; 
Tuastad, 2003:592; Nayak, 2006:44; Nayak and Malone, 2009:257; Puar and Rai, 2002; Hellmich, 2008; 
Solomon, 2012:910). ‘Islamic’ terrorists, through this Orientalist lens, were said to have been articulated as 
‘shadowy figures’, and, amidst a preventative rather than reactive security culture, their – potentially – 
threatening behaviour was anticipated as an ‘unspecifiable may-come-to-pass’ (Ahmed, 2004:79; see also 
Gentry, 2015:139). This befits the notion of ‘anticipatory’ security, which was explored in the preceding 
chapter. 
 However, even if the ‘New Terrorism’ lens could be said to inherit misguided premises, this does not 
negate its potential impact on official discourse and policy-making. Indeed, the ‘New Terrorism’ concept was 
assimilated by the American government in its review of the 11th September 2001 attack against the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon – notably, the second chapter of the 9/11 Report was entitled The 
Foundations of New Terrorism (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 2004:47) – 
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and, inevitably, the ‘New Terrorism’ discursive construct also shaped the official counter-terrorism discourse 
in the UK. That ‘New Terrorism’ is an objectively dubious premise does not negate its powerful stature in 
popular and official discourse and its continued legacy in British security practices (Mythen, Walklate and 
Khan, 2012; Jackson, 2005; Spencer, 2010). Furthermore, as Weimann (2005) recognised, ‘cyberterrorism’ 
could be linked with the ‘New Terrorism’ lens (see also, Ronfeldt and Arquilla; 2001; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
2001). Whilst a cyberterrorist incident has not occurred at the time of writing, the notion that terrorists may 
wish to use the internet as a means of wrecking death and destruction meshes with the anticipatory and 
anxiety-driven ‘what if?’ theme of the ‘New Terrorism’ field.  
 As discussed earlier in this section, the ‘New Terrorism’ thesis should be regarded as problematic. 
However, from my mapping of the discourse surrounding cyberterrorism, it is apparent that some members 
of the first and second tiers of the audience described the threat posed by cyberterrorists through means that 
befitted characteristics of ‘New Terrorism’. Excerpts from the corpus made judgements about the 
motivations and logic of cyberterrorism; cyberterrorists were deemed to be evil (Jarvis, 2015; Osborne, 
2015), depraved (Hayes, 2016), unknown (Neville-Jones, 2011a; Soames, 2015), and radical (Cameron, 
2015b). According to Theresa May (2011a), cyberterrorism was “perfectly suited” to a new era of terrorism 
in which terrorist behaviour had become “more diverse, decentralised … and agile”, in a shift towards non-
hierarchical lone-terrorism. In a rare case in the corpus, Lord Patten focused on the nature of cyber weapons 
– as opposed to the identities of those who may wish to use them – warning that cyber weapons were easily 
procured unconventional weapons sharing characteristics with chemical weapons (2010). For Lord Hannay 
(2010; see also Jones, 2013), however, the issue of a distinctively threatening cyber identity and weapons-
system were twinned; terrorists in possession of cyber weapons presented an asymmetrical threat not unlike 
that of terrorists armed with nuclear weapons.  
 That there was some evidence of usage of the linguistics of ‘New Terrorism’ in the corpus is perhaps 
not surprising. The capacity to use computer technology to directly cause damage or disruption only emerged 
in seminal form in the 1980s, making cyberterrorism a contemporary means of causing harm when compared 
to, say, the use of arms or bombs relying on incendiary technology originating from Ancient China (Lin, 
2010:316). Furthermore, a terrorist with the capability and the willingness to use computers and internet-
enabled means of delivery to cause harm will, by default, have access to the means of communication and 
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administration that facilitate the non-hierarchical, or ‘lone wolf’ forms of terror which could befit the ‘New 
Terrorism’ thesis. Consequently, there are grounds on which – as the corpus would suggest – cyberterrorists 
as agents, and cyberterrorism, as a means of attack, could both be considered ‘new’. It is revealing that, 
when pressed for analogies, Lord Patten (2010) and Lord Hannay (2010) chose to draw on chemical weapons 
and nuclear weapons. That they chose these analogies is indicative of a) cyber weaponry’s status as an 
unconventional weapon and b) the lack of a historical precedent for a significant and recorded attack 
involving terrorist application of a cyber arsenal. 
 The prominence of the ‘New Terrorism’ linguistics in the corpus is indicative of an entrenchment of 
the discursive social-construction of an illegitimate violent identity in cyberspace. By highlighting the ‘evil’, 
‘depraved’, and ‘menacing’ nature of this identity, the members of the first and second tiers of the audience 
were using their ‘ritualistic chants’ to add nuance to the securitisation. The securitisation could therefore be 
said to have evolved, as a result of this mediation through ritualistic chanting. By emphasising the evil and 
depraved identity of cyberterrorists – in alignment with a broad ‘New Terrorism’ thesis – the narratives of 
cyberterrorists, whether they exist or not, are silenced. This would suggest that the discursive treatment of 
hypothetical, spoken-into-existence cyberterrorists by MPs, Ministers and Lords befits the historical 
precedent in which existing, non-cyber, terrorist groups have had their narratives of retaliation against 
perceived injustice silenced through the use of ‘New Terrorist’ linguistics by British policymakers. For 
example, Tony Blair, responding to the bombing of the transport system in London in July 2005, sought to 
pacify the narrative of the perpetrators by describing both the actions and the identities as evil. In a speech 
delivered to the Labour Party conference, Blair stated, “senseless though any such horrible murder is, it was 
not without sense for its organisers. It had a purpose. It was done according to a plan. It was meant. What we 
are confronting here is an evil ideology” (2005). Silencing the narratives of the terrorists, whether cyber or 
conventional, real or hypothetical, serves to mitigate the window in which empathy towards the terrorist 
entity could form. According to the ‘New Terrorist’ element of the socially-constructed threat of 
cyberterrorism, understanding the narrative of the cyberterrorist is not necessary nor useful; it is sufficient to 
regard them as evil. Whilst this may not make the ‘illegitimate’ violence of cyberterrorism intractable, it 
serves to make the division between legitimate and illegitimate forms of cyber violence harder to critique. 
The ‘New Terrorism’ theme has made counter-terrorism policies and narratives less amenable to meaningful 
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debate. Those who have campaigned for the rights of suspected terrorists, critiqued counter-terrorism policy, 
or sympathised with some elements of the narratives of terrorists, have been labelled ‘terrorist sympathisers’ 
by British policymakers (Watt, 2015), and, in some cases, have been charged with terrorism offenses 
(MacAskill, 2017). The appearance of the ‘New Terrorism’ linguistics in the securitisation of cyberterrorism 
was not necessary to the survival of this discursive construct, but it may have served to extend its longevity 
in the absence of a bona fide cyberterrorist attack. 
 ‘New Terrorism’ was not the only aspect of the temporal uniqueness of the socially-constructed 
threat of cyberterrorism. My mapping of the corpus identified two distinct components of this temporal 
uniqueness. The next section of this chapter maps the discourse that relates to the second sub-strand of the 
‘temporal’ uniqueness of cyberterrorism; the notion that cyberterrorism is a threat that increased between 
May 2010 and June 2016, and was set to further escalate for the foreseeable future. 
 
Cyberterrorism as a Temporally Unique Threat: Escalation of Threat – Mapping 
 
 The key theme of this sub-strand that could be identified from the corpus was the notion that 
cyberterrorism was an accelerating threat over time. This acceleration was articulated in two forms; that the 
severity of a potential cyberterrorist attack was increasing, and that the windows of opportunity to conduct 
such attacks were also escalating. This was a common sub-strand in the discourse; securitising agents, as 
well as members of the first and second tiers of the audience engaged with this sub-strand both inside and 
outside of the Chamber. Excerpts from the corpus that relate to the notion of an escalating threat of 
cyberterrorism are mapped in this section. 
 David Cameron, speaking during a January 2015 press conference with US President Barack Obama 
at the White House, used the opportunity to emphasise that both states would have to: 
 
“keep pace with new threats, such as cyber attacks … if our forebears could join us here in the White House today, they 
might find the challenges that we’re facing from ISIL to ebola, from cyberterrorism to banking crises, they might find 
those hard to comprehend, but they would surely recognise the ties that bind us across the Atlantic and the values that 
our peoples hold so dear” (2015c).  
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Here, Cameron was juxtaposing shared ‘values’ of the UK and USA – which are based on a rich 
historical context – with the ‘new threats’, including cyberterrorism, which lacked the historical context that 
would render them immediately comprehendible to former leaders of both states.  
 David Cameron was not the only leading Cabinet figure to discuss the urgency of the new threat of 
cyberterrorism outside of the Chamber. A speech that George Osborne, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
delivered to GCHQ in November 2015 bears particular interest. Accordingly, Osborne told his assembled 
audience that: 
 
“earlier this year the Prime Minister asked me to chair the Government’s committee on cyber, and through that I see the 
huge collective effort required to keep our country safe from cyber attack; the great range of threats we face; and how 
this will be one of the great challenges of our lifetimes … the stakes could hardly be higher – if our electricity supply, or 
our air traffic control, or our hospitals were successfully attacked online, the impact could be measured not just in terms 
of economic damage but of lives lost … so when we talk about tackling ISIL, that means tackling their cyber threat as 
well as the threat of their guns, bombs and knives. It is one of the many cyber threats we are working to defeat … the 
truth is that we have to run simply to stand still. The pace of innovation of cyber attack is breathtakingly fast” (2015). 
  
This extract, delivered to a select and specialist audience, but disseminated publicly through the 
gov.uk website, is an example of a securitising actor (re)publicising a securitising call. The extract exhibits 
common and comprehendible language and phrasing, as opposed to the more specialist language that 
Osborne’s immediate audience would have been  accustomed to. Osborne used this speech to indicate 
spending priorities in the Spending Review, which was to be published the following week. In the above 
extract, Osborne is explicitly articulating a referent object, (British critical national infrastructure) and 
suggests that an attack against this object, which could be conducted by ISIL, could lead to the loss of life. 
Furthermore, this was not a static threat, but one that was escalating at a ‘breathtakingly fast’ pace (Osborne, 
2015). This warranted a policy environment in which the British Government and the state authorities (for 
instance, GCHQ, MI5 and the NCA) would need to develop their knowledge of the threat and their 
capabilities to deal with it. 
 Osborne continued his speech by highlighting that the asymmetry of threat was escalating, because: 
 
“in the past few years, an online marketplace has developed, which means all the elements of an attack can now be 
bought and assembled from the computer of anyone with the money to pay for it. The barriers to entry are coming right 
down, and so the task of the defenders is becoming harder … imagine the cumulative impact of repeated catastrophic 
breaches, eroding that basic faith in the internet that we need for our online economy and social life to function … if the 
lights go out, the banks stop working, the hospitals stop functioning or Government itself can no longer operate, the 
impact on society could be catastrophic” (2015). 
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Here, Osborne was emphasising that the increasing ease of conducting cyber attacks was effectively 
making the role of GCHQ – and, presumably, IT security specialists more broadly – more difficult. Osborne 
asks his audience to imagine the impact of successive cyber breaches; activating the emotive responses 
required for a securitisation to function. Furthermore, Osborne uses the term ‘catastrophic’ twice. 
‘Catastrophic’, a word denoting something that entails “sudden great damage or suffering” or “sudden and 
large-scale alteration in state” (OED, 2017c) is not a term that pulls punches when describing the nature of a 
threat. These extracts from Osborne’s November 2015 GCHQ speech are perhaps, defensibly, the most 
emphatic securitising calls exhibited in the corpus. The term ‘catastrophic’ was used elsewhere in the corpus, 
for instance, by Viscount Waverley (Andersen, 2010) and by Lord Harris of Haringey, who noted that the UK 
was becoming more reliant on ICT systems, that “foreign states and others” had been identified as ‘probing’ 
British critical national infrastructure and that fellow Peers should “be quite clear that there would be 
catastrophic consequences in the event of something significant happening” (2015).  
 The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review – suitably entitled Securing Britain in an Age of 
Uncertainty, detailed that “over the last decade the threat to national security and prosperity from cyber 
attacks has increased exponentially. Over the decades ahead this trend is likely to continue to increase in 
scale and sophistication, with enormous implications for the nature of modern conflict” (Cabinet Office, 
2010b:4). The escalating threat of cyberterrorism was also articulated elsewhere in official documentation. 
For instance, Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, published in July 2011, 
noted that: 
 
“we continue to see no evidence of systematic cyberterrorism. But the first recorded incident of a terrorist ‘cyber attack’ 
on corporate computer systems took place in 2010. The so-called ‘here you have virus’ (the responsibility for which was 
claimed by the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades for Electronic Jihad) was relatively unsophisticated but a likely indicator of a 
future trend. Since the death of Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida has explicitly called not only for acts of lone or individual 
terrorism but also for ‘cyber jihad’ (Home Office, 2011:34). 
  
Terrorist groups that rally behind an ideology inspired by the Islamic faith do not have a monopoly 
on political violence. However, it is of note that the authors of the CONTEST document believed ‘cyber 
jihad’ to be a credible future threat. This document presented a relatively dour outlook on the future threat 
landscape, warning that: 
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“terrorist groups will use a range of attack techniques, both established and new. There will be more cyberterrorism … 
at present we believe the threat of a terrorist cyber attack is low but as the tools and technologies needed for cyber -
attack become more widely available and the success of criminal cyber operations becomes more widely known” 
(Home Office, 2011:41,74).  
  
From these excerpts, one can infer that the CONTEST document was unambiguous in its message on 
cyberterrorism; this was a threat that had not existed before, but would become an increasingly pressing 
reality. Terrorists were willing and eager to deploy cyber weapons against the British state as part of an 
electronic ‘jihad’, and when the barriers to entry to conduct cyber attack were sufficiently lowered, the UK 
would begin to experience these attacks.  
 An insightful report on UK Cyber Security: the Role of Insurance in Managing and Mitigating the 
Risk, co-published by the British Government and the insurance firm Marsh, listed terrorists in its taxonomy 
of malicious actors interested in damaging British firms, and warned that the threat picture “is likely to get 
starker as technology and internal processes get better at eliminating accidental failures, while malicious 
attacks grow in ambition and impact” (Cabinet Office and Marsh, 2015:8,9). The report made reference to 
the 2014 German steel mill failure that resulted from a malicious cyber attack, and informed its readers that: 
 
“physical losses are a growing concern – both in terms of severity and frequency – given the interconnectedness of 
cyberspace and the physical world. One example of this new category of risk can be seen in the way that industrial 
control systems operate in the energy sector. Today, these new generation control systems are built on the concept of 
openness and interoperability, and this has exposed the sector to a host of cyber security risks that are only just 
beginning to be understood (2015:13). 
  
This document appeared to make a conscious effort to avoid hyperbole. Whilst recognising that it is 
feasible for a cyber attack to cause human mortality, it noted that “for the time being, the probability of death 
and bodily injury resulting from a cyber attack is considered to be negligible. We should note, however, that 
in future, as more devices go online, cyber hacks and system malfunctions could pose a more material threat 
to human life” (2015:13).  
Theresa May, speaking as the Home Secretary in 2015, similarly eluded to a shifting and escalating 
threat. In an oral statement to Parliament, on the publication of the draft of the Investigatory Powers Bill, 
May stated that: 
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“we live in a digital age. Technology is having a profound effect on society. Computers are central to our everyday lives 
… but a digital society also presents us with challenges. The same benefits enjoyed by us all are being exploited by … 
terrorists. The threat is clear. In the past twelve months alone six significant plots have been disrupted in the UK, as 
well as a number of further plots overseas. The frequency and cost of cyber attacks is increasing, with 90% of large 
organisations suffering an information security breach last year” (2015).  
 
Here, May does not explicitly state whether the six significant thwarted plots in 2014-2015  
concerned cyber attacks or involved analogue methods. In November 2015, David Cameron spoke at the 
G20 summit in Turkey and noted that “over the past year alone our outstanding police and security services 
have already foiled no fewer than seven terrorist plots right here in Britain” (2015d), so one would presume 
that the plots were ‘analogue’. When Britain’s security agencies, or leading political figures, choose to 
publicly disclose the number of recently foiled plots, details of the attacks are typically scant, given that the 
agencies do not wish to risk disclosing the means by which they acquired the information leading to the 
successful containment of the threat. However, given the novelty of a cyberterrorist plot, had one been 
thwarted, it is reasonable to suggest that the security agencies might disclose the fact that they had 
successfully prevented a new form of terror strategy. A publicly-cited example of a thwarted cyberterrorist 
plot could substantially bolster the raison d’etre of the securitisation of cyberterrorism. Notwithstanding this, 
it is of note that Theresa May linked these six thwarted plots with the expanding role of technology in British 
society and the escalating frequency and costs of cyber attacks. 
 May’s Ministerial colleagues, when speaking on the subject, espoused similar sentiment; that the 
threat of cyberterrorism was likely to be an escalating one. James Brokenshire acknowledged that the British 
Government was “conscious of the changing nature of potential risk” (2012) when as Parliamentary under-
Secretary for the Home Office he delivered his June 2012 speech at the Securing Asia conference. 
Brokenshire elaborated further on this in his Cyber Crime speech in March 2013, when he informed his 
audience that: 
 
“to date, terrorists have not seen cyber attack as an important means of conducting their actions, although of course they 
use the internet to radicalise, spread propaganda, disseminate violent extremist material and communicate with each 
other. But we and other governments must be very mindful of the fact that this could change” (Home Office and 
Brokenshire, 2013). 
  
Baroness Neville-Jones, speaking during a Tackling Online Jihad conference in her capacity as the 
Security Minister, reportedly told her audience that the terrorist threat to the UK was a diverse one, and that 
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“as terrorists diversify their techniques and shift geographically, the range of tools available to them widens 
and opportunities for differing forms of terrorism, including cyber attack increase” (2011b). She 
substantiated this line of thought by noting that there was also a risk: 
 
“likely to grow over time and which we monitor closely, that terrorists will develop serious cyber attack capabilities: by 
this I mean the ability to commit acts of terror by hacking into critical infrastructure and online systems. In some form, 
a cyber attack attempted by terrorists, if not inevitable, is of so great a likelihood that we bear it in mind in developing 
operational capabilities” (2011b). 
  
Brokenshire and Neville-Jones were not alone in their Ministerial re-chanting of the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism, underpinned by the notion that it was an escalating rather than receding or static threat. In his 
May 2012 speech delivered in Estonia, Francis Maude, speaking as the Paymaster General and Minister for 
the Cabinet Office, implored that: 
 
“we need to protect the internet from hostile actors … the terrorists who want to exploit it for less positive ends … and 
we know the threat is accelerating. High end cyber security solutions that were used 18 months ago by a limited number 
of organisations to protect their networks may already be out in the open marketplace” (2012a).  
  
Maude had expressed similar sentiment in the previous year. In a written statement on the release day 
of the Cyber Security Strategy in November 2011, Maude stated that “the threat to our national security from 
cyber attacks is real and growing. Organised criminals, terrorists, hostile states, and ‘hacktivists’ are all 
seeking to exploit cyberspace to their own ends” (2011).  
 These were not the only instances of Francis Maude making this argument. In a written statement to 
Parliament in December that same year, Maude stated that “there exists a real and growing threat to our 
interests in cyberspace; these threats have increased concurrently with the growth of the ‘internet economy’”, 
but he sought to reassure his colleagues by adding that “the Security Service has developed and enhanced its 
cyber structures, focusing on investigating cyber threats from hostile foreign intelligence agencies and 
terrorists” (2012d). The next day, giving a speech at IA12, Maude told his audience that the internet had to be 
protected from terrorists, and that “the nature of the threat means we cannot afford to drop our focus even for 
an instant … the threats won’t disappear and they are ever-changing” (2012b, emphasis added). In 2014, 
Maude still espoused that “because of the relentless and ever-changing nature of cyber threats, we also need 
to be on the front foot to develop new skills and capabilities in the future” (2014e). 
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 In a speech in February 2016, then-serving in Maude’s former role as the Paymaster General and 
Minister for the Cabinet Office, Matt Hancock informed his audience that “cybercrime, espionage, or attacks 
on critical infrastructure, from both state and non-state actors are increasing. The average cost of the most 
severe online security breaches now starts at almost £1.5 million. The number of significant attacks has 
doubled in the UK in the last year alone” (2016b). Hancock expressed a similar view in a press release the 
following month in which he wrote that “the UK faces a growing threat of cyber attacks from states, serious 
crime gangs, hacking groups as well as terrorists” (2016c).  
 John Hayes, at the time the Minister of State for Security at the Home Office, delivered a speech the 
following month entitled What is Real is Reasonable, in which he raised the issue of Islamic State’s use of 
technology, articulating that: 
 
“it is all too tempting to view the threat we face as abstract, as theoretical. To believe that we have always faced threats. 
That the threats we face now are essentially the same as those in the past … the threat we face now is changing, 
ferocious and flexible. The threat is evolving rapidly. Responding to it is a testing challenge” (2016). 
  
For Hayes, the threat level was “unprecedented and growing”, and he quoted Andrew Parker, the 
Director General of MI5, who had claimed that “the threat we are facing today is on a scale and tempo that I 
have never seen before in my career” (2016).  
 Ed Vaizey, the then-Minister of State for Culture and the Digital Economy, wrote in the introduction 
to the Cyber Governance Health Check 2015/16 that “the UK faces a growing threat of cyber attacks from  
states, serious crime gangs, hacking groups as well as terrorists” (2016:2). 
 Lastly – for Ministerial contributions to this sub-strand – William Hague, at the time the Foreign 
Secretary and First Secretary of State, stated that “we do all face sophisticated and persistent threats in 
cyberspace from terrorists or organised criminals” (2013b). Hague also warned during his visit to GCHQ in 
August 2013 that terrorists and other adversaries’ approaches “and techniques are constantly changing and 
our intelligence agencies are faced with a tremendous challenge to keep pace” (2013c).  
 The contributions from Ministerial figures noted here do not constitute a majority of the Cabinet. 
However, the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, and the Home Secretary all advocated the notion that 
cyberterrorism was an escalating threat. With this notion endorsed by official Government publications 
(Cabinet Office, 2010b; Cabinet Office and Marsh, 2015), as well as Brokenshire (2013), Neville-Jones 
115 
(2011b), Maude (2011, 2012a), Hancock (2016b, 2016c), Hayes (2016), Vaizey (2016) and Hague (2013c), it 
is not unfair to state that this was, broadly, a cross-Cabinet sentiment. I would therefore suggest that the 
notion that cyberterrorism was an escalating threat was an entrenched sub-strand of the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism for the 12th May 2010 to 24th June 2016 period under scrutiny. 
 Similarly to the ‘Cyberterrorism as a Tier One Threat’ strand, there was no evidence from the corpus 
that this sub-strand was contested by the wider body of Parliamentarians and Peers. This section will now 
detail the wider official discourse endorsing the notion that cyberterrorism was an escalating threat to the 
UK.  
 The opposing front bench did not appear to dispute this sub-strand. Jim Murphy, the Labour MP for 
East Renfrewshire, speaking in November 2010 in his capacity as shadow Secretary of State for Defence, 
stated that “I sense that the unprecedented scale and pace of global change will, if anything, increase ever 
more sharply in the future”, elaborating by adding that “today’s threats are far more complex and difficult to 
map, and they are harder to repel. Terrorism, cyber attack, natural resource shortages, large-scale natural 
disaster  or unconventional attacks from chemical or biological weapons all threaten our shores, our interests 
and our values” (2010). Kevan Jones, Labour MP for North Durham, speaking in January 2013 as a shadow 
Minister for Defence, stated that “the security landscape today is both uncertain and unpredictable. New 
threats such as cyber warfare and biological terrorism exist alongside conventional threats” (2013). Yvette 
Cooper, the Labour MP for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, and at the time the shadow Home 
Secretary, stated in an Investigatory Powers debate in June 2015 that she had observed “growing problems 
with organised cyber attacks for major companies, infrastructure and the Government” (2015). In a Britain 
and International Security debate, Vernon Coaker, Labour Member for Gedling and the then-shadow 
Secretary of State for Defence, noted that the security landscape was “far more uncertain” than had been 
envisaged in 2010, and he warned his colleagues that there were “new emerging threats such as those 
involving cyber”, which appeared “to grow at an exponential pace” (2015).  
 As noted in the ‘Tier One’ strand analysis, some Members sought to co-opt the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism and wield it to legitimate their views on other political or security issues. There was one 
similar instance here. Russell Brown, who at the time was the Labour MP for Dumfries and Galloway, 
argued in November 2012 that: 
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“there is a positive case for Scotland to remain part of the United Kingdom. No one doubts that our country is capable 
of being independent, but why should we want to lose all those advantages? At a time of immense and fast-evolving 
challenges throughout the world, with a plethora of security threats on the horizon, why on earth should we want to 
devote time and money to dividing our resources north and south of the border? We should be working together, 
throughout Britain, to remain vigilant against the constant threat of cyberterrorism” (2012). 
  
Here, Brown is soliciting the evolving threat of cyberterrorism as a discursive tool to argue in favour 
of a constitutional status quo. In alignment with Lynton Crosby’s ‘project fear’-style of political campaigning 
(Coates, 2016), this perspective placed the requirement to address the securitised threat of cyberterrorism – 
along with other threats – as a priori with respect to the aspirations of Scottish nationalists. Such co-opting of 
a securitisation for political expedience serves to solidify the securitisation, because such a re-chanting of the 
securitised motion is voiced by the speaking actor as unproblematic or without contention around its central 
rationale.  
 As with the ‘New Terrorism’ sub-strand detailed earlier in this chapter, there was also mention of 
nuclear weapons in relation to cyber weapons within this sub-strand. Whereas in the previous sub-strand this 
engagement drew similarities between cyber and nuclear weapons – in that both are unconventional – this 
sub-strand noted the ineffectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against cyber weapons. Whilst he did 
not reference a specific actor, Lord Browne, a Labour Peer, noted that “cyber attacks are more commonplace 
today and they will grow both in number and intensity”, adding that due to the potential diluting of the 
capacity to ascribe attribution to a cyber attack, nuclear weapons would provide “less of an insurance policy” 
against future challenges (2013). 
 Elsewhere in the corpus, Parliamentarians and Peers re-chanted similar calls made by the Ministerial 
figures cited above. For instance, Nigel Dodds, the Democratic Unionist MP for North Belfast and the then-
spokesperson on justice and foreign affairs for the DUP, advocated during a NATO Summit debate in May 
2012 the necessity to “spend more on the technology of tomorrow”, because “cyberterrorism poses an ever-
greater threat”. Referencing this threat of cyberterrorism, Dodds urged the Prime Minister to lobby for 
NATO to devote resources to “that big and growing problem across the world” (2012). Nick Harvey, at the 
time the Liberal Democrat MP for North Devon, iterated in a Defence Spending debate in March 2015 that 
one of the most significant threats to the UK was “the ever-growing threat of global terrorism and cyber 
attack” (2015). Sir Hugh Bayley, then the Labour MP for York Central and president of the NATO 
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parliamentary assembly, echoed a similar note in the same debate, emphasising that NATO needed to counter 
the new and emerging threat of cyber attack (2013). Mims Davies, the Conservative MP for Eastleigh, 
speaking during an Investigatory Powers debate in June 2015, noted that “the modern world presents new 
challenges for our security – challenges from terrorism at home and overseas, from cyber attacks” (2015). 
Lastly, The Earl of Courtown, speaking during a Global Challenges debate in the Lords chamber, told his 
fellow Peers that “in the past five years the threat levels from violent extremism and terrorism, Russian 
aggression, cyber attacks and global conflict have grown” (2015).  
 The next section of this chapter offers a critical analysis of the mapped discourse relating to the 
notion that cyberterrorism was likely to be a threat that would escalate over time.  
  
Cyberterrorism as a Temporally Unique Threat: Escalation of Threat – Analysis 
 
As noted above, this sub-strand of the ‘Cyberterrorism as a Temporally Unique Threat’ strand 
revolves around the notion that, from May 2010 to June 2016, and indeed, beyond this period, the threat to 
the UK posed by cyberterrorism increased. That this may be represented within the official discourse may 
not be exceptional; between this period, the integration of the internet into British society and economy 
increased. According to the Office for National Statistics, in 2010, 30.1 million adults in the UK used the 
internet every day or nearly every day, which was almost double the estimated figure for 2006 (ONS, 
2010:1). Including less frequent British users of the internet increased this figure for 2010. 38.3 million 
people, or 77% of the British population, were regarded as ‘internet users’; those who had used the internet 
in the three months prior to being surveyed (ONS, 2010:2). By 2016, this figure had reached 45.9 million 
people, or 87.9% of the British population (ONS, 2016:2). By 2010, the internet represented a significant 
asset for the British economy. For instance, in 2009, the internet contributed roughly £100 billion, or 7.2% of 
British GDP, according to a report commissioned by Google and undertaken by Boston Consulting Group 
(Kalapesi, Willersdorf and Zwillenberg, 2010:5). This report noted that the UK was a net exporter of e-
commerce goods and services, exporting £2.80 for every £1 imported (Kalapesi, Willersdorf and 
Zwillenberg, 2010:5). A 2012 report produced for Vodafone valued the size of the 2008 British internet 
ecosystem at £82 billion, of which 16% was cellular, and estimated that between 2010 and 2015, British 
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internet traffic would increase by 37% per annum (Vodafone, 2012:3). The Boston Consulting Group 
estimated that in 2016, the internet economy would account for 12.4% of British GDP; a figure that would 
have characterised the UK as more reliant on internet-mediated commerce than all of its G20 counterparts, 
with South Korea at 8% and the USA at 5.4% (Dean et al, 2012:9). CISCO projected that between 2015 and 
2020, British internet traffic would increase three-fold, with a compound annual growth rate of 21% 
(2016:1). To place this against analogue traffic, the Department for Transport (2016:1) noted that road traffic 
had increased by 2.2% in 2015, surpassing a pre-financial crisis peak to reach a total mileage of 317.8 
billion. This is not to negate the core function of the road network in the UK’s economic and societal 
security, but it highlights that the internet – as an industry and as an infrastructure – grew rapidly over the 
time period under scrutiny in this thesis and was set to increase at rapid pace for the foreseeable future. With 
increased reliance on the internet in the fields of commerce, research and development, education and 
national infrastructure over the period under scrutiny, it is perhaps reasonable to envisage there being an 
overall elevated insecurity surrounding this aspect of the British state and economy. 
From the official engagement with this sub-strand of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, it is 
apparent that not only was cyberterrorism characterised as a Tier One threat that was in alignment with the 
‘New Terrorism’ thesis, this threat was deemed to be an escalating one. As noted in the beginning of this 
section, this is not necessarily surprising; the UK’s increasing reliance on IT systems for the effective 
functioning of its economic and societal structures necessarily entails a heightened vulnerability. It is 
nevertheless intriguing that ‘cyberterrorism’ was explicitly referenced by Ministerial and other figures in this 
sub-strand; cyberterrorism was deemed to be an escalating threat irrespective of the lack of a bona fide 
cyberterrorist incident having occurred prior to, or during, the May 2010 to June 2016 period under scrutiny. 
As can be observed from the above mapped discourse, Al-Qaida was referenced as a concerted threat in 
relation to cyberterrorism in 2011 (May, 2011a; Neville-Jones, 2011a; Home Office, 2011:34), but by 2015 
this had shifted to the threat epitomised by ISIL (Cameron, 2015a, 2015e; Osborne, 2015; Hayes, 2016). 
However, juxtaposing the cyberterrorist threat against that posed by state actors, the US and Israeli state-
sanctioned Stuxnet attack against Iranian nuclear centrifuges across 2009 and 2010 demonstrated that, 
internationally, states were both willing and capable of engaging in aggressive and destructive cyber 
operations. In 2011, David Cameron had sought a reset of Russian relations (Stratton, 2011), but by 2014 and 
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the international furore over the shooting down of the airborne flight MH17, the UK was one of the keenest 
states advocating harsh sanctions on Russian trade in oil, gas, arms and financial transfers (Mason, Wintour; 
2014; Mason, 2014; Borger, Luhn and Norton-Taylor, 2014). Whilst Russian aggression in cyberspace 
against other states was predominantly associated with ‘information warfare’ (see Giles, 2016:2) - for 
instance, the hacking of Estonian state websites in 2007, the hacking of Mikheil Saakashvili’s website in 
2008, and the switching off of channels on the TV5Monde network in 2015 (Soshnikov, 2016; Jones, 2017) – 
it remains that Russia had both the motivation and the capability to conduct aggressive cyber maneuvers 
against the UK. That Ministers and non-ministerial figures publicly ‘chanted’ notions of an unsubstantiated, 
unproven cyber threat from terrorist organisations across May 2010 to June 2016, speaks to the serious 
concerns of the securitising actors and the vested audience(s) about non-state application of cyber weapons, 
including that epitomised by terrorists.  
The official discourse surrounding cyberterrorism that has been mapped in this chapter – 
incorporating the statements of Ministers, MPs and Lords – demonstrates that the threat of cyberterrorism 
was regarded as increasing across time. This notion was not merely promoted in ‘ritualistic chants’ by 
members of the first and second tiers of the audience, but was also encapsulated in the securitising acts of the 
national security documents. The Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 noted that “the actions of 
cyberterrorists … are likely to increase significantly over the next five to ten years, as our dependence on 
cyber space deepens” (Cabinet Office, 2010b:47). This notion was re-affirmed by the 2011 Cyber Security 
Strategy, which suggested that “the threat that [terrorists] might also use cyberspace to facilitate or to mount 
attacks against the UK is growing. We judge that it will continue to do so” (Cabinet Office, 2011:15). What 
is distinct about the threat of cyberterrorism is that it is a threat that has not occurred. Whilst this thesis has 
focused on the official British discourse of cyberterrorism, it is of express interest that, at least from the 
open-source and recorded discourses of cyberterrorism, statements from proscribed terrorist groups 
themselves are absent. Missing here, in essence, is the equivalent of Osama bin Laden’s ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ comment in his 1998 Time magazine interview (PBS, 2014), wherein a significant figurehead 
from a proscribed terrorist group openly signals their intent to develop cyber weapons of a capacity beyond 
those which only ‘disrupt’. Website defacement, and the use of DDoS attacks by terrorist groups or entities 
empathetic to the political causes of terrorists, are not terrifying. In 2014, a MailOnline article reported that:  
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“Islamic State militants are planning the creation of a ‘cyber caliphate’ … from behind which they will launch massive 
hacking attacks on the US and the West … both Islamic State and Al Qaeda claim to be actively recruiting skilled 
hackers in a bid to create a team of jihadist computer experts capable of causing devastating cyber disruptions to 
Western institutions” (Charlton, 2014). 
  
However, the source for this news item was a speculative comment provided to Fox News by Steve 
Stalinsky, an executive director of the Middle East Media Research Institute. In April 2015, an Observer 
article pondered: “could ISIS’s ‘cyber caliphate’ unleash a deadly attack on key targets?”; but again, this was 
a speculative piece by the author (Graham-Harrison, 2015), including comments from the respective authors 
of ISIS: The State of Terror and The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones. Lastly, a 
Mail on Sunday article, published November 2015, reported that “a group called Cyber Caliphate, set up by 
Junaid Hussain from Birmingham, urged its followers to take control of the [Twitter] accounts to spread IS 
propaganda” (Gallagher, 2015). Junaid Hussain – who was also notable as the husband of Sally Jones – had 
by this point been killed in an American drone strike, but his digital caliphate had conducted successful 
defacement attacks. These attacks have included that against Tasmania’s Hobart International Airport website 
in 2015, when it was defaced with a statement endorsing ISIS (Telegraph, 2015) and the hacking of the 
Facebook page of TV5Monde (France24, 2015). However, these hacks were more ‘nuisance’ or ‘information 
warfare’ than cyberterrorism per se.  
 As a consequence, the auditorium in which the discourse mapped in this chapter has occurred – 
including the securitising actors and the primary and secondary tiers of the audience – has been denied 
statements that one might expect from cyberterrorists, which, in effect, could have reasonably been expected 
to agree with the agents and audiences in the form of “yes, we intend to attack you in cyberspace”. Granted, 
the dearth of such statements could be because they may be self-defeating; disseminating a message about an 
intention to conduct a serious and prolonged hack against British critical national infrastructure could 
provide the Security Services with sensitive information that would make an attack less likely. Smeets (2018) 
has suggested that cyber weapons are uniquely ‘transitory’; the utility of a particular cyber weapon declines 
over time as security patches are released, old software becomes obsolete and is replaced, and new hardware 
systems replace legacy versions. Furthermore, according to Smeets (2018; see also Libicki, 2007; 
Krepinevich, 2012; Axelrod and Iliev, 2014), the ‘transitory’ nature of cyber weapons is particularly acute for 
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the offensive actor in cyberspace. Launching a weapon, or signalling an intention to launch a weapon, could 
mean that the weapon becomes ineffective against its intended target within months, days, or hours. 
However, the dearth of signalling statements from terrorist organsations, in combination with the absence of 
a bona fide cyberterrorist attack during the period under scrutiny, means that the official discourse operated 
in what is essentially a speculative echo chamber. Repeatedly warning of the existence of a serious threat to 
the UK, without unclassified evidence to support this claim, risks, in layman’s terms, ‘crying wolf’. In effect, 
the persistence of the temporal claims that are mapped in this chapter – the notion that cyberterrorism is an 
increasing threat over time and for the foreseeable future – could indicate a collective attempt by the agents 
and audiences who engaged in the official discourse of cyberterrorism in the UK to overcome the temporal 
conditioning of ‘crying wolf’. By arguing that the threat was not only here right now in an immediate 
present, but that it would continue to exist, become more likely over time and potentially more ‘catastrophic’ 
in its impact, the securitising calls and the ritualised chanting endorsing these calls sought to increase, or 
even remove, the shelf-life of the securitising moments.  
 Consequently, it is suggested here that the British experience of the securitisation of cyberterrorism 
may be most effectively conceptualised as a ‘process’ rather than a ‘single bombshell event’ (Guzzini, 
2011:335; see also Stritzel, 2011). The Government’s (Cabinet Office, 2010a) classification of cyberterrorism 
as a ‘Tier One’ threat in 2010 was, and is, a public-facing securitising act that shifted the perceived threat of 
cyberterrorism to a ‘securitised status’. However, this was simply a procedural labelling of the cyberterrorist 
threat as the most significant category of national security threat to the UK. The most emphatic endorsements 
of the securitisation of cyberterrorism are to be found in the discourse exhibited by the first and second tiers 
of the audience, in their ‘ritualistic chants’ (Osborne, 2015; Nevill-Jones, 2011b; Hayes, 2016; Brown, 2012). 
Given that cyberterrorism has not occurred, the maintenance of the securitisation of cyberterrorism was not 
necessarily guaranteed. The members of the first and second tiers of the audience rallied behind the 
securitisation, expressing their belief that this was a threat that was likely to increase over time. As was noted 
in the analysis of the role of the ‘New Terrorism’ thesis in the securitisation of cyberterrorism, the process 
through which the audience(s) mediated this securitisation could be said to have evolved it. Granted, unlike 
the ‘New Terrorism’ thesis, the notion that cyberterrorism was an escalating threat was explicitly detailed 
within two of the strategic document securitising acts (Cabinet Office, 2010b,2011). As a result, ‘ritualistic 
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chanting’ about the escalating threat of cyberterrorism was not adding an entirely novel concept to the 
partially-fixed nodal point of the securitisation. Nevertheless, members of the audience expanded on this 
sub-strand by using more expressive language than that encapsulated in the strategy documents. For George 
Osborne, the pace of innovation in cyber weaponry was “breathtakingly fast” (2015). For Francis Maude, 
because the threat was “ever-changing”, the focus on countering cyberterrorism could not be dropped “even 
for an instant” (2012b,2014e). For John Hayes, the threat was not only “evolving rapidly”, but was also 
“changing, ferocious and flexible” (2016). Lastly, for William Hague, the threat was “constantly changing” 
and the task of responding to this threat was “a tremendous challenge to keep pace” (2013c).  
The ‘anticipatory’-style of securitisation that has been applied to the threat of cyberterrorism befits a 
‘pre-crime’ format (see Zedner, 2007). The securitisation of cyberterrorism befits the future-orientedness of 
counter-terrorism narratives more generally (Frank, 2015; see also Schott, 2013; Coaffee and Fussey, 2015; 
Zulaika, 2012), but this is perhaps more acute in the case of cyberterrorism because it lacks a historical 
precedent. Temporalities are both implicated and produced in security politics (Cavelty, Kaufmann and 
Kristensen, 2015), and the British securitisation of cyberterrorism is not an exception to this. Whilst it has 
been argued in this thesis that one of the core functions of the securitisation of cyberterrorism is the tacit 
delineation between legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence in cyberspace, this conceptual distinction 
relies upon the longevity of the securitisation itself. Cyberterrorism has been ‘spoken into existence’ 
(Conway, 2005). As a result, a process in which the audience(s) are upheld as active participants in 
reinvigorating life into the securitisation offers a framework through which the apparent longevity of this 
securitisation – the overcoming of ‘crying wolf – can be explained. Like the British experience with counter-
terrorism more broadly (Fisher, 2013), in the absence of objective measurements of the risk of 
cyberterrorism, power is ascribed to ambiguous speculation in an ‘atemporal normality’. The discourse that 
has been mapped in the preceding section demonstrates that audience members were in agreement with the 
securitising act; cyberterrorism was a threat that was due to escalate over the years under scrutiny, and indeed 
for the foreseeable future. 
The next section offers a brief concluding summary of the arguments that can be drawn from the 
mapping and analysis contained in this chapter. 
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Conclusion 
  
 This chapter has mapped and analysed two sub-strands of the British securitisation of cyberterrorism, 
both of which relate to the ‘temporal uniqueness’ of this threat. These sub-strands were ‘New Terrorism’ and 
‘Escalation of Threat’ respectively. Regarding the ‘New Terrorism’ sub-strand, it was argued that whilst the 
securitising acts epitomised by the public-facing strategic documents had not overtly incorporated notions of 
‘New Terrorism’ in their articulation of cyberterrorism, this was something added by the first and second 
tiers of the audience. It was found that the articulated threat of cyberterrorism had inherited aspects of the 
‘New Terrorism’ thesis that has infiltrated British counter-terrorism narratives more broadly.  
 Concerning the second sub-strand, ‘Escalation of Threat’, it was found that the audience tiers had 
agreed with the warnings encapsulated in the securitising acts in the strategic documents. Without citing 
objective data, members of the first and second tiers of the audience included warnings about an increasing 
threat of cyberterrorism in some of their ‘ambiguous chants’. In some cases, the language used by members 
of the audience was found to be more expressive than that of the original securitising acts. This, it was 
suggested, was a symptom of a process-driven securitisation, particularly in the case of a threat that has not 
occurred and can be said to exist on the basis of speculation. Repeated ‘chants’ about the increasing threat of 
cyberterrorism, without reference to specific dates or events, was said to be a rhetorical means of increasing 
the intersubjective ‘shelf-life’ of the securitisation. By suggesting that the threat of cyberterrorism was set to 
increase for the foreseeable future – as opposed to stating that a cyberterrorist attack is expected by X date – 
the members of the audience were seeking to avoid the risk of ‘crying wolf’.  
In academic terms, over the passage of time it will be fascinating to see whether these forward-
viewing securitising calls are proven accurate by instances of cyberterrorism in or against the UK. This line 
of thinking also beckons a call for further research; in an environment in which anticipatory security is given 
credence, to what extent do forward-viewing securitising moves – concerning a threat that has not occurred 
and for which there is little substantive publicly-available information regarding its scale or likelihood – shut 
down or limit the scope for counter-securitising moves? Without oneself possessing a comprehensive 
knowledge of the nature of a threat, is it possible to successfully counter-securitise against a discourse that 
has been (re)constructed through dire, but unsubstantiated, warnings and calls for action? 
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 The next chapter maps and analyses elements of from the official discourse that concern the second 
unique aspect of cyberterrorism; its spatial exceptionality. This spatial strand is divided into two sub-strands, 
which are ‘Physical versus Cyber’ and ‘Safe Havens’. The next chapter will also map and analyse the final 
strand this thesis has identified from the official discourse of cyberterrorism in the UK; ‘From Fiction to 
Reality’. This is the notion that to some extent, the lack of substance pertaining to the nature of 
cyberterrorism can be ‘filled in’ by fictional representations of threat that are depicted in popular films and 
novels. 
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Chapter Six: Cyberterrorism as Spatially Unique, and ‘From Fiction to Reality’ 
 
 The previous chapter analysed elements of the official British construction of the threat of 
cyberterrorism between 12th May 2010 and 24th June 2016 that served to inform the ‘temporal uniqueness’ of 
this threat. It was established that securitising agents and members of the audience(s) had espoused their 
view that cyberterrorism was an escalating threat over time. This was notwithstanding a lack of a 
cyberterrorist incident during this period and the absence of public statements from cyberterrorists endorsing 
this notion of an increasing probability of imminent attack. This sixth chapter, which is the last instalment of 
the analytical sections of this thesis, continues the mapping and analysis of the official securitisation of the 
threat of cyberterrorism in the UK, specifically to highlight the remaining prominent strands that were 
identified from the corpus. The first of these strands is the notion that cyberterrorism is spatially unique. This 
strand is divided into two sub-strands, which are: ‘Safe Havens’ and ‘Physical versus Cyber’. The second 
strand is ‘From Fiction to Reality’, which is the notion that the lack of substance pertaining to the nature of 
cyberterrorism has been partially ‘filled in’ by fictional representations of threat that are depicted in popular 
media. Cyberterrorism fiction is perhaps a niche market; however, the popular James Bond film, Skyfall, 
made notable appearances in the corpus, as did William Forstchen’s novel, One Second After.  
 The analytical contribution of this chapter is therefore threefold. Firstly, it is argued that the 
linguistics of terrorist use of ‘safe havens’ – spaces where terrorists can plot without interference from state 
bodies – had been transferred from a generic UK post-9/11 terrorism discourse to the discourse constructing 
the threat of cyberterrorism. Secondly, it is found that whilst cyberterrorism as a perceived threat exists 
because it has been enabled by computing and internet technologies, the securitisation of cyberterrorism did 
not draw on these technological spaces. Building on the arguments made in the preceding analysis chapters – 
that a conceptual cyberterrorist identity is the threatening construct – it is argued that this is a pre-emptive 
securitisation. By avoiding tying the securitisation of cyberterrorism to a particular software, hardware, 
terrorist group, region or conflict, the audience’s ‘chanting’ sought to pre-empt an existing terrorist group 
developing a capacity to conduct cyber attacks against the UK, or a new cyberterrorist organisation 
emerging. Lastly, it is argued that there was an epistemic void in the UK’s social-construction of the threat of 
cyberterrorism. One means in which members of the audience sought to partially fill-in this epistemic void 
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was by drawing on popular fictional narratives in which cyberterrorist attacks were either described or 
visualised. 
 This chapter begins by mapping the excerpts from the discourse that related to the first sub-strand of 
the strand, ‘Cyberterrorism as a Spatially Unique Threat’. This sub-strand is the notion that cyberterrorists, in 
a similar fashion to conventional terrorists – would seek ‘safe havens’ from which they could plot or evade 
the UK’s counter-terrorism efforts. 
 
Cyberterrorism as a Spatially Unique Threat: ‘Safe Havens’ – Mapping 
 
 This section maps excerpts from the corpus that relate to the ‘Safe Havens’ sub-strand of the 
‘Cyberterrorism as a Spatially Unique Threat’ strand. It is worth noting here that the use of the term ‘safe 
haven’ in relation to the threat of terrorism pre-dates the securitisation of cyberterrorism. The notion that 
terrorists were interested in communicating, training and plotting within ‘safe havens’ gained traction rapidly 
after the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11th September 2001. Ten days after the 
attacks, the then-US President George Bush delivered a State of the Union address in which he declared, “we 
will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is 
no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism” (2001). Tony 
Blair, at the time the British Prime Minister, incorporated this phrase into speeches delivered at the Labour 
Party conference on 2nd October and to Parliament on 4th October (2001a; 2001b). The ‘save haven’ phrase 
was not retired in 2001; Gordon Brown continued to use the term during his premiership (2009), as did 
David Cameron, who notably spoke about the potential ‘safe haven’ of the internet-mediated spaces of 
Facebook and WhatsApp (Chorley, 2015). Nevertheless, British Government usage of the phrase was not 
uniformly concerned with terrorists seeking extra-judicial spaces. Similarly to the argument made in Chapter 
Four – that there is a discursive distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of cyber mediated 
violence – there has also been inferences of legitimate and illegitimate safe havens. For example, in February 
2002, the Government published a White Paper entitled Secure Borders, Safe Haven (Home Office, 2002; 
see also Walters, 2004; Sales, 2005), which sought to assuage public concerns about misuse of the UK’s 
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asylum-seeking process. In this use of the term, the ‘safe haven’ was a spatial environment in need of 
protection. 
 If adversaries are able to operate in ‘safe havens’, whether analogue or virtual, attribution becomes 
more difficult. It is this notion of attribution that was prominent in the corpus, in instances where the 
securitising act and members of the first and second tiers of the audience alluded to the characteristics of 
‘safe havens’.  
 For instance, in the case of the securitising act entailed by a strategic document, the 2011 Cyber 
Security Strategy highlighted that terrorists were “active today against the UK’s interest in cyberspace”, but 
that “with the borderless and anonymous nature of the internet, precise attribution is often difficult and the 
distinction between adversaries is increasingly blurred” (Cabinet Office, 2011:16). Those who engage in 
cyber attack typically – whether unconsciously or consciously – leave information in the code of the virus 
that will identify themselves as the attackers. IT security experts who are well-versed in common habits of 
hacking groups can also gleam insights on an attacker’s identity by drawing inferences from the ‘structure’ of 
the code, much like one might run analysis on sentence structure or calligraphy. Alternatively, it is also 
possible that attackers might deliberately attempt to misdirect investigators to an actor other than themselves.  
 In a June 2014 speech, the then-Home Secretary Theresa May noted that the internet “has become 
essential not just to the likes of you and me but to organised criminals and terrorists … we are in danger of 
making the internet an ungoverned, ungovernable space, a safe haven for terrorism” (2014). A similar view 
was expressed by Francis Maude, who, at the time was the Paymaster General and Minister for the Cabinet 
Office, stated in a press release that “cyber criminals and terrorists should have no refuge online, just as they 
should have no sanctuary offline” (2012).  
 Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister, gave a speech in March 2014 entitled Security and Privacy 
in the Internet Age, in which he warned his audience that the internet had “opened up new possibilities for 
criminals, terrorists and hostile states to plot, recruit and carry out attacks, while concealing their identities” 
(2014). William Hague, at the time the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, expressed 
similar sentiment when he noted that “we should never forget that threats are launched against us secretly, 
new weapons systems and tactics are developed secretly … terrorist groups that plan attacks or operations 
against us do so in secrecy” (2013a).  
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 One means through which an internet user can attempt to circumvent widely used means of online 
surveillance – and thereby increase the challenge of attribution – is to use free software known as The Onion 
Router (Tor). The utility of Tor, and terrorist interest in using this service, is examined further in the analysis 
section. However, it is worth noting here that references in the corpus to ‘Tor’, ‘dark web’ and ‘darknet’12 
were sparse. Only one reference had been made to this software. As a lone voice in the corpus explicitly 
discussing the darknet, James Morris, Conservative MP for Halesowen and Rowley Regis, stated during an 
Investigatory Powers debate in June 2015 that: 
 
“[technology] represents a profound threat to our future national security. It provides opportunities to our enemies – for 
countries operating and wanting to develop cyber attacks against our infrastructure; it enables terror groups to 
communicate below the radar in encrypted chatrooms on the dark web; and it allows networks to develop which are 
difficult to detect and to analyse” (2015). 
  
When David Cameron made his remarks on the potential for Facebook and Whatsapp to be ‘safe 
havens’ for terrorists (Chorley, 2015), he was discussing end-to-end encrypted communication, but this is not 
the same as Tor-enabled internet communication. A user can connect to end-to-end encrypted means of 
communication – for instance, by connecting to WhatsApp on their smartphone using their home router – but 
do so through a bona fide IP address. However, if a user tunnels all of their internet traffic through the Tor 
network, as far as their ISP will be aware, their communications will, by default, be encrypted. If the Tor-
connected user sends and receives end-to-end encrypted communications through this tunnel, they will be 
sending encrypted data packets within several layers of encryption. End-to-end encryption makes snooping 
more challenging for those who do not have the requisite private keys, but it is darknet services that offer the 
greatest mainstream capacity to exponentially increase the difficulty of attribution. 
 Francis Maude made repeated remarks in public in which he expressed his view that the internet was 
‘dark’ and ‘menacing’ (2012; 2013a; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c). However, in these five instances Maude did not 
expressly link this ‘darkness’ with the darknet; instead, he linked the dark nature of the internet to the 
potential darkness of human nature (2012). A socially introduced or inferred ‘darkness’ is not the same as the 
technical capacity to ‘darken’ online connections and communication through encryption. This is explored in 
greater detail in the analysis section. 
                                                          
12  ‘Dark web’ and ‘Darknet’ are interchangeable terms used to describe websites and web services that are hosted via 
Tor. These services can only be accessed by internet users who are connecting to the internet via the Tor network. 
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It is apparent from the analyses there was some evidence from the corpus that members of the 
audience – most notably, former Home Secretary Theresa May (2014) and former Prime Minister David 
Cameron (Chorley, 2015) – were concerned about the possibility that internet-mediated communication 
offered a new, virtual landscape and safe haven in which terrorists, with or without the cyber prefix, could 
communicate and evade authorities. This sub-strand is comparatively smaller than the previous sub-strands 
that have been mapped in this thesis. However, it is closely linked to the next sub-strand of the spatial 
uniqueness of cyberterrorism, ‘Physical versus Cyber’. This is the notion that there are distinct differences 
between analogue and virtual spaces, which have consequences for the nature of the threat of cyberterrorism. 
The next section offers an analysis of the ‘Save Haven’ sub-strand. 
 
Cyberterrorism as a Spatially Unique Threat: ‘Safe Havens’ – Analysis 
 
This section offers an analysis of the preceding mapped discourse. It is suggested here that the ‘Safe 
Havens’ sub-strand serves a similar function to that of the ‘Tier One’ strand identified in Chapter Four. 
Whilst in Chapter Four it was proposed that the ‘Tier One’ strand sought to create a delineation between 
legitimate and illegitimate forms of cyber enabled violence, it is argued in this section that the ‘Safe Havens’ 
spatial sub-strand created a conceptual distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of being in 
cyberspace. 
The spatiality of the internet can be defined in differing ways. One way to conceptualise the 
spatiality of the internet is to consider the storage and movement of data. Given the vast quantities of internet 
traffic generated by services such as Youtube, Google, Netflix and Facebook, it is perhaps easy to overlook 
the gargantuan expanse of internet data beyond these public-facing and accessible services. Research 
conducted by Sandvine in 2013 found that in North America, Netflix consumed 28.18% of data packets 
transferred across the internet, and Youtube consumed 16.78% (see Solsman, 2013). If one were to imagine 
that the world-wide-web is depicted as an iceberg, the sphere of the web in which publicly-accessible 
services operate can be classed as the ‘surface’ web, however, the vast majority of the data held on servers 
connected to the web exists in what could be termed the ‘deep web’, a phrase coined by Michael Bergman 
(2001). This deep web incorporates web content that cannot be accessed by running queries against 
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conventional search engines or is protected by security features such as passwords. Restricted content on a 
user’s Facebook page, or data held on a university’s intranet, would be examples of deep-web data. As 
Weimann (2016) has noted, due to the difficulty of accessing this content en-masse through systematic 
means13 it is near-impossible to meaningfully quantify the size of this ‘deep’ web, although some estimates 
have suggested that the deep web is 400-500 times larger than the ‘surface’ (Barker and Barker, 2013:4).  
 Within this ‘deep’ web – perhaps depictable on our iceberg as its deepest layer – is the ‘darknet’. 
This term was popularised in a paper authored in 2002 by Microsoft researchers (Biddle et al, 2002), in 
which they detailed peer-to-peer networks as future avenues for content dissemination. Today, the term 
‘darknet’ refers to servers and clients that use specific software to host and access web content. Several such 
services exist, but the most renowned is The Onion Router (Tor). When a host or client connects via the Tor 
network, their connections are tunnelled through Tor relays (proxies) around the world, essentially 
obfuscating their true IP address. Data packets are encrypted in several layers by the user’s computer, and 
each ‘relay’ unpacks one layer of this encryption, until the data packet reaches the exit node, which unpacks 
the final layer of this encryption and delivers the packet to its intended addressee. Darknet content is that 
which is hosted by a server using the Tor network; these are web domains that a suffixed with ‘.onion’, as 
opposed to say, ‘.co.uk’. The Tor network became increasingly popular globally over the May 2010 to June 
2016 period under scrutiny, with the estimated user base increasing from roughly one million in October 
2011 to approximately two million by 2016 (TorProject, 2017a). Between May 2010 and June 2016, the 
bandwidth usage of the Tor network increased from an estimate of just a few Gbit/s to an estimated 75 Gbit/s 
(TorProject, 2017b). The majority of this usage and demand on the Tor network’s bandwidth is by users who 
use the network to connect to ‘surface’ or ‘deep’, as opposed to ‘darknet’ content; the Tor Project has 
estimated that roughly 96.6% of Tor traffic is used for this purpose (2015). By connecting via the Tor 
network, for example, a Chinese political dissident might be able to access an unfiltered version of Google’s 
search engine and other sanctioned content hosted on the web.  
 However, it is the remaining 3.4% of Tor data usage that attracts alarmist media attention, given that 
Tor hidden services provide an environment in which proscribed content can be accessed and disseminated 
                                                          
13 ‘Surface’ web sites can be ‘trawled’. Trawling involves the use of a web crawler, which is a bot that systematically 
browses the web, saving pages as it works, which it can later use for the purposes of indexing. It is through this 
trawling and indexes that services such as Google and DuckDuckGo are able to compile large and useful search 
engines. 
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with relative impunity14. Drawing an incomplete list of 5,615 .onion addresses from the .onion search 
engines ‘onion.city’ and ‘ahmia.fi’, Daniel Moore and Thomas Rid (2016) ran a text-content crawler against 
these websites over a two month period between January and March 2015. This crawler yielded 300,000 
addresses, or 205,000 unique pages from the original 5,615 urls, and Moore and Rid (2016:21) were able to 
conclude that, at least from their corpus, the most common uses for Tor hidden services were narcotics sales, 
illicit finance and violent pornography involving children and animals. However, intriguingly, they found a 
relative near-absence of Islamic extremism on the hidden services, with just a small number of active Jihadist 
websites. Commenting on this finding, Moore and Rid noted that “the darknet’s propaganda reach is starkly 
limited … hidden services, secondly, are often not stable or accessible enough for efficient communication; 
other platforms seem to meet communication needs more elegantly. Islamic militants do commonly use the 
Tor browser on the open internet, however, for added anonymity” (2016:21-22; for instance, see an ISIS Tor 
guide at Archive.org, 2015). There is some evidence that terrorists have been encouraged to adopt internet 
safety measures such as the indiscriminate use of Tor for any online activity related to their political cause. 
For example, a blog post authored by presumed ISIS sympathisers, entitled Remaining Anonymous Online, 
included a section on Tor, which stated that “Tor is a world ahead of [virtual private networks] in terms of 
security and is the fundamental basic I recommend everyone to have” (see the full blog post cited in Bartlett 
and Krasodomski-Jones, 2015:10). 
 Curiously, given the disruptive potential of this technology, especially for the purposes of counter-
terror oriented intelligence gathering, ‘Tor’ and ‘darknet’ were barely mentioned in the corpus of the official 
construction of the threat of cyberterrorism in the UK. No strategic document, and just one member of the 
audience, elected to raise the matter of Tor or darknet with reference to cyberterrorism. However, I have 
discussed these technologies here to emphasise that not only does the internet offer transparent spheres of 
communication and content dissemination, but it has also created novel man-made digital ‘safe havens’. 
It is not the place of this thesis to contrast the British cyberterror discourse with those exhibited in 
other countries; however, it is worth noting that the official American and EU discourses have both been 
                                                          
14 News coverage is typically printed when there has been a failure in darknet obfuscation due to analogue 
investigations or the successful hacking of a Tor-connected sever (for instance, see Gibbs and Beckett, 2017; Evans, 
2015; Spillett, 2017).  
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more explicit in highlighting concern about Tor-encrypted traffic from Islamic State (for instance, see FBI 
Director Comey’s comments in Dunsmuir, 2015 and an Institute for Security Studies report by Berton, 2015).  
Academic literature has suggested that the desire to make use of ‘safe havens’ is a characteristic that 
terrorism and international crime networks share, where the success of their operations demand secrecy and 
untracked movements of goods and people (Shelley and Picarelli, 2002:307). This terrorism and organised 
crime ‘nexus’ or ‘continuum’ is said to flourish in localities where state functions have been usurped by 
entities sympathetic to, or even directly aligned with, terrorist and organised crime groups (Makarenko, 
2004:138; Cilliers, 2003). Kittner considered the role of safe havens explicitly for Islamic Terrorism, and 
defined safe havens as “geographical spaces where Islamist terrorists are able to successfully establish an 
organisation and operational base” (2007:308). These spaces could offer a useful environment for 
fundraising, communicating, training and movement. Whilst this thesis does not explicitly isolate a particular 
political ideology of terror – instead focusing on a type of terror (cyberterror) – these themes are instructive. 
In order to conduct a successful cyberattack against critical national infrastructure, a cyberterrorist 
organisation or cell would require funding, spaces to communicate, training programs and perhaps also the 
ability to move people or goods. The latter might seem counter-intuitive for a threat that could simply require 
an internet connection and the requisite knowledge about one’s cyber weapon and desired target, which is 
theoretically possible anywhere on the planet using a satellite connection. However, as was the case with the 
nuclear centrifuges at the Bushehr site, not all sensitive targets are connected to the internet. Where this is the 
case, the movement of infected hard discs or removable storage devices is paramount, and a cyberterrorist 
organisation may be forced to bribe or indoctrinate empathetic employees who have access to the target 
computer systems. 
The excerpts that have been mapped in the preceding chapter align with a broader fear that has been 
articulated by the British Government, concerning the ability to anonymise activity on the internet. David 
Cameron (Ball, 2015), as the then-Prime Minister, Theresa May (Lee, 2017), as the current Prime Minister, 
and Amber Rudd (Wheeler, 2017), as the Home Secretary at the time of writing, have all spoken of a desire 
to disrupt encryption services. Banning encryption – or placing restrictions on its usage – has some historical 
precedent. Prior to the widespread availability of consumer-oriented computer technology, the USA and UK 
had imposed restrictions on the movement of encryption technologies (Kahn, 1997). However, with the 
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advent of zero-cost, consumer-friendly encryption computer software such as the ‘GNU Privacy Guard’ 
(GPG), the enforcement of such restrictions is rendered impossible because the computer code can be 
disseminated via the internet instantaneously. End-to-end encryption serves a central component of internet-
mediated commerce. The UK’s unique positioning in global internet commerce, which was discussed in the 
preceding chapter, would be irrevocably disrupted were the Government to meaningfully attempt to 
implement restrictions on encryption software. An exodus of the City of London’s financial service industry 
would be unavoidable, and an economic recession would be likely. 
This is not, however, to suggest that the mapped discourse is vacuous or that those who spoke in 
relation to the identified ‘Safe Havens’ sub-strand were foolhardy. The discourse is still doing something. It 
is argued here that the ‘Save Havens’ sub-strand serves a similar function to that of the ‘Tier One’ strand 
analysed in Chapter Four. Whilst in Chapter Four it was proposed that the ‘Tier One’ strand sought to create 
a delineation between legitimate and illegitimate forms of cyber enabled violence, it is argued here that the 
‘Safe Havens’ spatial sub-strand created – or re-affirmed – a conceptual distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of being in cyberspace. 
Similarly to the analysis in Chapter Four, it can be identified in the excerpts that cyberterrorism was 
not the singular illegitimate form of being in cyberspace. In the securitising act of the 2011 Cyber Security 
Strategy mapped in this chapter, ‘terrorists’ were again ‘packaged’ with ‘criminals’ and ‘foreign intelligence 
services and militaries’ (2011:16). ‘Othering’ was another discursive tool that could be identified in this sub-
strand. For example, during Theresa May’s speech in which she made reference to the ‘safe haven’ of the 
internet, she suggested that the internet was essential “not just to the likes of you and me but to organised 
criminals and terrorists” (2014). Whereas the ‘Tier One’ strand served to distinguish between legitimate 
British state-based cyber arsenals and the illegitimate cyber weapons of terrorists, criminals and rogue states, 
this ‘Safe Haven’ sub-strand legitimises legal uses of the internet by the British population at large.  
Again, this is an identity-based conceptual delineation by the discourse, rather than a distinction 
based on technical details. The relative absence of references to the technical means by which cyberterrorists 
could implement their online ‘safe havens’ or general secrecy speaks to two possibilities. Firstly, it is 
possible that the members of the first and second tiers of the audience were unaware of software such as Tor. 
The average age of Members of Parliament elected in the 2015 election was 50 (Parliament.uk, 2017), 
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meaning that most MPs are likely to be members of an age group that Prensky (2001) would term ‘digital 
migrants’. ‘Digital migrants’, as opposed to younger ‘digital natives’, can, in generalised terms, be less 
aware of the existence and utility of novel computer software. Even if a Minister or Parliamentarian were 
aware of anonymising software, it is possible that they may have felt that their knowledge was insufficient to 
speak about the matter confidently on parliamentary record. The second possibility is that references to the 
technical means of implementing online ‘safe havens’ were deemed not necessary. The software, which 
exists and is widely disseminated, cannot be meaningfully curtailed, certainly not without a full-scale 
international consensus in which ISPs around the world agreed to shut down Tor exit nodes. Furthermore, 
like encryption software more broadly, anonymising software has bona fide utility by non-‘Othered’ citizens. 
An individual experiencing the appearance of an embarrassing ailment could use the Tor network to prevent 
their ISP or third parties from connecting their IP-address with the particular health issue. A Chinese 
dissident could use the Tor network to access a non-filtered version of the Google search engine. Indeed, this 
is one of the raison d’etras of the Tor network, and is one of the reasons that the US government has 
previously given funding to the Tor project. In 2013 alone, the US government provided $1,822,907 to the 
Tor Project (Hern, 2014).  
What can be cajoled, regulated and punished by law is human behaviour. As a result, the ‘Safe 
Havens’ sub-strand created the delineation between legitimate and illegitimate forms of being in cyberspace 
on the basis of the identities of internet users, rather than on the basis of internet technologies. This is a 
theme that is continued in the analysis of the second sub-strand of the ‘Cyberterrorism as a Spatially Unique 
Threat’ strand, ‘Physical versus Cyber’. The excerpts from the corpus that related to this sub-strand are 
mapped in the next section. 
  
Cyberterrorism as a Spatially Unique Threat: ‘Physical versus Cyber’ – Mapping 
  
 As has been detailed in Chapter Four, the constructed threat of cyberterrorism in the UK befits the 
‘anticipatory’ frame of security. ‘Anticipating’ future terrorist incidents creates spatial realities (Anderson, 
2010; Bialasiewicz et al, 2007; see also Aradau and Munster, 2012), not simply through the creation of new 
architectures in the effort to prevent such an attack occurring (Coaffee, Hare and Hawkesworth, 2009; Collier 
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and Lakoff, 2008; Galison, 2001; Graham, 2004), but also through the formation of imagined spaces. Former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne’s GCHQ speech (2015) that was mapped in Chapter Five, in 
which he urged his audience to imagine the cumulative impact of catastrophic breaches against the national 
grid, the banking sector, hospitals and government institutions is a case-in-point. By responding to Osborne’s 
call and imagining cyber attacks against these entities, his audience collectively create personal landscapes in 
their minds. It does not matter that Osborne did not specify a bank branch or a particular hospital; indeed, the 
spatial imagining is more powerful without these discursive anchors because the loosely-defined breaches 
could be targeting your bank(s), or your local hospital. This imagined space renders specificity in the 
temporal construct irrelevant, as the “future is seen to function in a positivistic epistemic mode, where the 
solution to future threats is not to understand their origins, conditions of possibility, and emergence, but to 
accommodate these threats through spatial ordering and mapping” (Aradau and Munster, 2012:105). To put 
this more succinctly, it is expected that the discourse of the socially-constructed threat of cyberterrorism 
would not seek to understand the conceptual cyberterrorist, but would instead accommodate them as a 
threatening actor in the UK’s future security relations. This process of discursive accommodation serves 
purposes that have been examined in this chapter and Chapters Four and Five. Further processes, which 
relate to the discourse of the ‘Physical versus Cyber’ sub-strand, are analysed in the next section. 
The constructed threat of cyberterrorism in the UK presents a seminal case study, because it is an 
anticipated future reality that would be delivered via a unique man-made fibre-optic and copper environment. 
Unlike the physical properties underpinning ‘land’, ‘sea’ ‘air’ and ‘space’, the experienced environment of 
the internet is rendered meaningful because of its ‘virtual’ as opposed to ‘physical’ being. One cannot project 
an imagined future involving a terrorist cyber atrocity without engaging both the virtual and the physical 
components of this environment.  
 There was some evidence in the corpus that securitising agents engaged with the notion that in 
spatial terms, the ‘cyber’ realm was distinct from the ‘physical’ realm. In 2013, Phillip Hammond, then-
Secretary of Defence, announced that the UK had been developing offensive cyber capabilities; making 
Britain the first state to publicly acknowledge the existence of such a programme. Noting in an interview 
with the Mail on Sunday that “you deter people by having an offensive capability”, Hammond referred to a 
“laptop army” and noted that future conflict would be fought by “IT geeks in rooms like this rather than 
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soldiers marching down the streets, or tanks or fighter aircraft” (2013). Hammond also used the interview to 
address the benefits of cyber in its capacity to reduce collateral damage (2013). For David Cameron, 
ensuring the armed forces were equipped with the tools to guarantee British security in the 21st century 
necessitated an overt recognition that the threats “had changed utterly in 30 years”, from “the clarity of the 
Cold War to the complex and shifting challenges of today: global terrorism … cyber attack” (2014). For 
Cameron, this threat was epitomised by an enemy that “may be seen or unseen” (2014). Similarly, for 
Francis Maude, the cyber threats facing the UK were “diffuse, unpredictable and generally anonymous” 
(2014b). Maude also raised the notion of spatial scale when he warned that “this is the threat we face: 
relentless in nature, global in reach and substantial in impact … the internet is too large – and the threat is too 
complex – for any single organisation to respond by itself” (2014d).  
 The novelty of internet-mediated terrorist threat was also highlighted by audience members outside 
of the Government. Jim Shannon, the DUP Member for Strangleford and the shadow DUP spokesperson for 
transport, health and human rights suggested in a Commons debate on Defence and Cyber Security that:  
 
“while cyberterrorism may not be physical terrorism of the sort some of us in the Chamber have faced personally, and 
whose effects can be seen in blood and tears, the effects of cyberterrorism can bring a nation to its knees and we must 
ensure we are not the ones who are brought to our knees, but are instead able to withstand any such attack” (2014).  
  
Mike Gapes, the Labour MP for Ilford South and a member of the ‘Arms Export Control’ and 
‘Foreign Affairs’ committees also distinguished between physical and digital attacks, noting that threats to 
British security “might come not from terrorist bombs but from somebody sabotaging a banking system or 
undermining the supply of electricity or water to our major cities by making a minor change to a software 
programme, albeit one with potentially disastrous consequences” (2015).  
 Whilst these excerpts from the corpus are relatively limited vis-a-vis the discourse that has been 
mapped in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, it is apparent that there was some recognition by those 
engaging with the official British discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism that there was a tangible 
distinction between ‘cyber’ and ‘physical’ forms of terror and threat. 
 The next section is an analysis of the mapped excerpts from the corpus that relate to this ‘Physical 
versus Cyber’ sub-strand.  
  
137 
Cyberterrorism as a Spatially Unique Threat: ‘Physical versus Cyber’ – Analysis 
 
This section is an analysis of the discourse that has been mapped in the preceding section. It is 
argued that the UK’s securitisation of cyberterrorism has not revolved around the technology that enables 
cyberterrorism to exist in the first place. Instead, the threatening entities that have been implicated in this 
securitisation are the identities and behaviours of particular users of the internet. This finding, it is suggested, 
may be due to legislative pragmatism. Whilst computers are machines that simply adhere to the laws of code, 
the human beings that use them can, in theory, be cajoled and encouraged into behaving in a certain way 
through laws and legislative acts. 
Writing on the ‘securitisation of the information superhighway’, Adam Kingsmith suggested that 
“the object to be secured is a borderless world of free-flowing information, a single seamless environment 
where ideas can be shared fluidly within a cyberspace that is not controlled by spatial and temporal 
conceptualisations of security” (2013:4). However, this is not entirely true. The internet is tied to physical 
spatial entities; for instance, the exchanges, the cables spanning the earth’s sea floors and the satellites 
orbiting its atmosphere, amongst many other objects. Owned primarily by private enterprises, these physical 
entities are no different ‘spaces’ than, say, a bustling shopping mall. Internet firms such as Microsoft and 
Facebook are reserved about revealing the exact locations of their vast datacentres, however, the spatial 
reality of the architecture underpinning the internet is, mostly, not an unknown. Cartographers at 
TeleGeography acquire valuable location information from industry contacts to produce their Global Internet 
Geography annual report; interested consumers here in the UK can purchase TeleGeography’s detailed map 
of metro-to-metro area bandwidth for $175 (TeleGeography, 2017). Blum’s (2012) Tubes: Behind the Scenes 
at the Internet provides an excellent insight into the tangible sights, smells and sounds of the internet.  
Furthermore, rather than being seamless, as Kingsmith (2013:4) suggests, the internet is seamed. 
These seams can, and have been, broken. Sharks have been recorded as having taken an interest in fibre-
optic cabling spanning seabeds. Shark attacks on cables were reported between 1985 and 1987, leading 
manufacturers to introduce Kevlar-like protective sheaves on cable installations (Kravets, 2015). In March 
2011, a 75-year old Georgian woman who had been scavenging for copper wiring accidentally sliced her 
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spade through fibre-optic cabling supplying internet connectivity to 90% of Armenian users for five hours 
until the service was restored (Parfitt, 2011). 
 The physical architecture of the internet is meaningless without the values that are applied to it by 
human beings; without human interaction the internet is simply a mass of silicon, plastic and metal. As an 
‘experienced’ spatial environment, the internet is singularly unique and without a true precedent. With 
internet-enabled technologies, internet users can inexpensively communicate with one another at the speed of 
light, thousands of miles from one another. Steuer aptly distinguishes this uniqueness in his application of the 
term ‘telepresence’; accordingly, he has stated that “’presence’ refers to the natural perception of an 
environment, and ‘telepresence’ refers to the mediated perception of an environment. This environment can 
be either a temporally or spatially distant ‘real’ environment, or an animated but non-existent virtual world 
synthesised by a computer” (1992:6, original emphasis).  
In reference to the American construction of an Islamic terrorist threat, Clara Eroukhmanoff 
(2015:248) has highlighted the role of euphemisms and metaphor in the articulation of securitised ‘Remote 
Others’, which she noted were distant from the securitising agent(s) in spatial, temporal, and ontological 
terms. In the construction of the threat of cyberterrorism against British critical national infrastructure, the 
anticipated cyberterrorists could be said to be remote actors operating in an environment that elevates this 
remoteness. Phillip Hammond was able to stand in a room amongst British operatives with invited journalists 
from the Mail on Sunday (2013), in an exclusive but defined space. In contrast, the cyberspace inhabited by 
the unseeable terrorist ‘Other’ (Cameron, 2014) was ‘large’, ‘diffuse’ and ‘anonymous’ (Maude, 2014b; 
2014d). These examples from the corpus demonstrate the significance of the experienced spatiality as 
opposed to the objective spatiality of the internet in the official British securitisation of the threat of 
cyberterrorism. The spatial environment of the security-providing British operatives was bounded and 
known, and conversely, the environment inhabited by the threatening terrorist ‘Other’ was characterised by 
its unknowability.  
The act of ‘knowing’ a threat serves to bound its capabilities. Threatening phenomena, such as the 
perceived threat of cyberterrorism, cannot be adequately ‘known’ because there has not been an incidence of 
cyberterrorism. The threat posed by cyberterrorism to the UK is a socially-constructed anticipated threat. 
Inadequately known threats, and those which cannot be seen, have a greater potential to incite fear because 
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they have a greater potential to activate the imagination of a given audience (see Mitchell, 2011; Andersen 
and Moller, 2013; O’Loughlin, 2011). There is evidence from psychological studies that the presence of fear 
elevates an individual’s perception of risk (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Mathews and MacLeod, 1986). 
Here, we could return to the notion of the ‘shelf life’ of the securitisation of cyberterrorism. The discourse 
promoting ambiguity about the spatial environment of cyberterrorists (Cameron, 2014; Maude, 
2014b,2014d) promotes fear of the threat of cyberterrorism. This is because the audience(s) are encouraged 
to understand that the threat exists, but are not provided with substantive knowledge about the specific actors 
who are likely to conduct the attacks, the kind of software that they will use, and the countries or regions 
from which the attacks would be launched. ‘Somebody’ would be the perpetrator (Gapes, 2015). Granted, 
three examples from the corpus mapped in the preceding chapters did explicitly state that particular groups 
were interested in conducting cyberterrorism against the UK. These groups were Al-Qaeda (Home Office, 
2011) and the Islamic State (Hayes, 2016; Osborne, 2015). However, this may be symptomatic of these 
organisations being the most prominent terrorist groups in British security discourse at the time. 
Furthermore, a majority of the excerpts in the corpus spoke of unspecified harmful cyberterrorists, without 
bounding this conceptual cyberterrorist identity to a particular spatial context. This renders the threat of 
cyberterrorism with a certain degree of timelessness; the threat of cyberterrorism is not bounded to any 
particular group or conflict. The decline of a particular terrorist organisation does not therefore implicate a 
corresponding fall in the perceived threat of cyberterrorism.  
 The social construction of a securitisation of a given threat requires the threat – and the referent 
object to be secured – to be contextualised both temporally and spatially. Something/someone, has to 
threaten something/someone at a given point in time. Philosophically, threat to human life and cherished 
human values is timeless, but policies are drafted in a specific time and space. By rendering cyberterrorism 
meaningful within defined contextual boundaries in their securitising moments, the securitising actors and 
the members of the audience established the parameters on which policy debate is formed. When Theresa 
May warned of the “danger of making the internet an ungoverned, ungovernable space, a safe haven for 
terrorism” (2014), she was implicitly engaging with a social construction on the spatiality of the internet. The 
world-wide-web depends, existentially, on the spatial network underpinning it; the cables, the exchanges, the 
servers, not to mention the myriad of offices and support staff working tirelessly and often unbeknown to the 
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vast sea of users. However, the social spatiality of the internet – for instance, the distinction between 
‘surface’ and ‘dark’ webs – is not recognised by the internet itself, which simply serves its core function of 
pushing data packets indiscriminately around the world in a decentralised fashion. These data packets 
contain information, and as the adage goes, ‘information wants to be free’ (Stewart, 1988:202). As they are 
not conscious, sentient beings, computers do not care about the behaviours of a human being behind the 
keyboard, but other human beings do, and it is using this socially-constructed social spatiality that actors 
such as Theresa May (2014) were able to distinguish between spaces on the internet. Again, computers do 
not care about legislation, policies, or rhetoric; but human beings do. As Greg Graffin and Bad Religion 
wrote in their song I Love My Computer:  
 
“I love my computer, for all you give to me, predictable errors and no identity … all I need to do, is click on you, and 
we’ll be joined in the most soul-less way … the world outside is so big, but it’s safe in my domain, because to you I’m 
just a number and a clever screen name” (2000).  
  
The love between a person and their computer may not be reciprocal, but this is a love that is 
mediated through law and conditioned by social identification. From the mapping and analysis of the ‘Tier 
One’, ‘Temporally Unique’ and ‘Spatially Unique’ strands, it is apparent that whilst the spatial architecture of 
the internet has made cyberterrorism a possible means of causing harm and inciting fear, this architecture is 
not the modus operandi on which the securitisation of cyberterrorism relies. Instead, the threatening entity 
that is articulated by the securitisation of cyberterrorism are the identities of particular users of the internet, 
even if these identities are ill-defined through much of the corpus. Whilst this ambiguity could be said to 
make the securitisation less objective, the potential longevity of the securitisation is increased because it is 
not tied to a particular type of software, hardware, group, region or conflict. Oblique references to 
‘cyberterrorists’ entail that any existing terrorist group could potentially engage in cyber attacks upon the 
UK, or alternatively, entirely new cyberterrorist groups may emerge. 
 In many respects, as human beings constructed in flesh, blood and bone, we are still in our seminal 
stages of developing our capacity to speak about and convey meaning regarding the spaces where the human 
and technical aspects of the internet intertwine. This is particularly evident in popular shows such as CSI 
Cyber, which was replete with binary digits across the screen, or computer-generated visuals of the vicarious 
self, zooming through a black ether criss-crossed with bright lines. Transhumanism may, in a near or distant 
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future, usher in an era in which man and computer are one in symbiosis. However, until this epoch, we are 
reliant on our language, our art and our narratives to construct our understandings of the internet and the role 
that it plays in contemporary society; both in holistic terms and in the manner in which it might be utilised 
for terroristic purposes. For the duration that our analogue selves remain reliant on linguistics, art and 
popular narratives, fiction will possess a central role. Here, it is suggested that the final strand that is 
analysed by this thesis is informative. 
 The next section maps and analyses the final strand that is considered in this thesis. This is the notion 
that, given the lack of a precedent for cyberterrorism in or against the UK, popular fiction has, to a certain 
extent, informed the discursive construction of this threat. 
 
‘From Fiction to Reality’: The Role of Fantasy, Imagination and Popular Fiction in the Construction of the 
Cyberterrorist Threat Against the UK 
 
 This section maps and analyses the excerpts from the corpus which were found to relate to the 
identified strand, ‘From Fiction to Reality’. The mapping and analysis is combined because this strand has 
the fewest excerpts. The mapped excerpts in this section adhere to two distinct categories. The first category 
is the notion that there was an epistemic void in the intersubjective knowledge of cyberterrorism. The second 
category includes excerpts that drew on the utility of fictional representations of the threat of cyberterrorism. 
It is argued that the use of popular fictional representations of cyberterrorism in the James Bond film, Skyfall, 
and Forstchen’s novel, One Second After, were both utilised to partially fill the epistemic void in the socially-
constructed discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK. 
 Existing literature considers the role of ‘fantasy’, ‘imagination’, and science fiction on contemporary 
security politics. For example, Zulaika has written on the role of fantasy in the application of armed drones 
in American counterterrorism operations (2012; 2014). Drone warfare itself has been described by Sluka as a 
fantasy, “if not literally science fiction” (2011:72). According to Andrews, an author close to the White 
House and Department of Homeland Security, “if you do not read science fiction, you’re not qualified to talk 
about the future” (quoted in Singer, 2009:160; see also Zulaika, 2014:175). The anticipatory, as opposed to 
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reactive, nature of counter-terrorism implicitly gives imagination a bona fide agency. As Richard Jackson 
notes: 
 
“in a reversal of empirically-informed preventive decision-making approaches which proceed on the basis of what is 
known about a certain risk, such as the risks posed by disease or automobile accidents, the counterterrorist must instead 
act upon what is unknown as projected through imagination and fantasy. The important point is that not acting is never 
an option, even if it means constructing a self-fulfilling prophesy or causing unnecessary suffering” (2015:36).  
  
The 9/11 Commission Report included a section entitled ‘institutionalising imagination’, in which the 
Commission proposed that: 
 
“it is therefore crucial to find a way of routinising, even bureaucratising, the exercise of imagination. Doing so requires 
more than finding an expert who can imagine that aircraft could be used as weapons. Indeed, since al-Qaeda and other 
groups had already used suicide vehicles … the leap to the use of other vehicles such as boats or planes is not far-
fetched” (2004:344).  
  
If senior figures in the American security complex had failed to imagine the potential for commercial 
aircraft to be used as missiles against key political and economic landmarks, their ‘failure of imagination’ 
was not universal. A close scenario was imagined by Chris Carter and Vince Gilligan and broadcast six 
months before 9/11 to an audience of 13.2 million in the USA (Archive.org, 2014). The Lone Gunmen, a 
spin-off show of the X-Files, which aired in March 2001, included in its plot a government conspiracy in 
which hijackers attempted to fly a commercial aircraft into the World Trade Center. Indicating a tacit 
recognition by the US military establishment of the imaginative capacity of the creative industries, USA 
Today (2001) reported in October 2001 that Pentagon officials had met Hollywood film-makers, including 
Steven Souza, who co-wrote Die Hard. The reported purpose of this meeting was to draw on the imaginative 
thinking of the creative writers to hypothesise potential terrorist plots. If a scenario could be hypothesised, it 
would be possible to refine suitable counter-terror systems and policies to reduce the likelihood of such an 
attack occurring. 
 The cyberterrorist threat to the UK, as an anticipated threat and as a threat that has no precedent, 
perhaps lends itself to drawing inspiration from popular fiction rather than recorded history. The most 
prominent example of a concerted and debilitating cyber attack against critical systems – Stuxnet – is more 
Pearl Harbor than 9/11 or 7/7, given that this was an unprovoked attack by two state entities against another 
state entity. The Stuxnet worm was developed and distributed by the USA’s Cyber Command and Israel’s 
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signal intelligence arm, Unit 8200. Whilst there is an existing field of literature on state-terrorism (Blakeley, 
2007; Claridge, 1996; Gareau, 2004; Jackson, 2008; Jarvis and Lister, 2014), there were no instances in the 
corpus where a Minister, MP or Peer made an inference to state-based cyberterrorism. According to the 
British discourse of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, this is a threat epitomised by non-state, rather than 
state actors. 
 This strand, ‘From Fiction to Reality’, is the notion that the official British securitisation of the threat 
of cyberterrorism has, in part, been informed by fictional depictions of cyber attack in which non-state actors 
have caused significant disruption and casualties. A point that has been laboured previously in this thesis is 
the absence of an incident – either in Britain or indeed overseas – that could be articulated as a bona fide 
cyberterrorist attack. Furthermore, there is an absence of publicly available data on the potential likelihood 
and scale of a cyberterrorist incident. Terrorist organisations and national intelligence services, crime 
agencies and police forces have obvious reasons for avoiding public indulgence of details of potential 
cyberterrorist operations. Were a terrorist organisation to publicly forewarn of their intention to attack, say, 
the water system, the public and private furore would cause water suppliers – and other utility firms – to 
rapidly order internal reviews of their security procedures. Internal review processes could potentially close 
the vulnerability that the terrorist organisation had been intending to exploit. Similarly, were GCHQ or MI5 
to break protocol and publicly announce an impending attack on a water supplier and this threat bore reality, 
one would assume that the vulnerability would have been closed following private correspondence between 
the firm and the intelligence services. Consequently, the terrorist organisation behind the preparations would 
abandon the operation, thereby severing a potentially significant source of intelligence for the authorities. 
This environment – understandably necessary for successful counter-terror and counter-espionage – has the 
consequence of starving the publicly-attainable official discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism of 
knowledge about the nature of the threat.  
 However, for a securitisation to be successful and pervasive, the necessity to safeguard a referent 
object should be accepted by audience tiers that include citizens who are not privy to sensitive data. In my 
proposed framework for the securitisation of cyberterrorism in the UK, detailed in Chapter Four, these are 
the second and third tiers of the audience. It is logical that some of this public-facing epistemic void would 
be filled by resort to metaphor, for instance by reference to historical instances that are like a cyber operation 
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that terrorists may wish to conduct. However, popular fiction can also present an epistemic source regarding 
the nature of a threat; films such as Die Hard IV and Skyfall, for instance, give their enraptured audiences a 
window through which they can project themselves – by empathising with John McLane and James Bond – 
into a fixed, fictionalised experiencing of a significant cyber event. In Die Hard IV, terrorists led by Thomas 
Gabriel, played by Timothy Olyphant, hack critical infrastructure in the US, including traffic systems and the 
stock market. In Skyfall, a hack of MI6 computer systems causes a significant explosion at the Vauxhall 
Bridge headquarters. These fictional representations articulate perpetrators, methods, effects and aftermaths 
of cyber attacks conducted for the purposes of inciting terror. Fictional representation can pioneer, rather than 
reflect, a public discourse; it is worthwhile remembering that the term ‘cyberterrorism’ was first coined by 
Barry Collin (2002) in the 1980s, in a science fiction capacity.  
 In conjunction with the dearth of a cyberterrorist incident, it should be noted that despite high levels 
of educational provision in the developed Western world and receding trepidation regarding the use of 
computers15 (Gilbert et al, 2003; Ha et al, 2011; Hogan, 2009; Jay, 1981; Rosen et al, 1987; Rosen and 
Maguire, 1990), knowledge of computers and associated technologies is markedly low. An OECD study of 
people aged 16-65 in 33 developed states found that in aggregate, 5% of the population possessed cogent 
computer-related skills16, one third could complete medium-complexity tasks with a computer17, and 26% 
were unable to use a computer at all (Nielsen, 2016). Given that none of the tasks demanded of the 
participants in the OECD study involved sifting through system logs, non-GUI command-line interfaces or 
compiling source code, these statistics are likely to mask the real figures of people living in the developed 
world – including Britain – who possess a cogent knowledge of computers and the respective hardware and 
software that make the connected world function. British ‘cyber' health drives, such as the Cyber Streetwise 
campaign18 focus on basic user guidance such as the installation of firewalls, anti-virus software and 
password protection, but do not detail explicitly the processes involved in typical cyber attacks. 
Consequently, when people are encountering information on cyber threat, they may become disinterested if 
                                                          
15 Concern about computers is not entirely absent. Some figures have articulated concerns about the development of 
advanced artificial intelligence (for instance, see British Science Association, 2016; Future of Life Institute, 2015). 
16 A ‘level three’ task, as defined by this survey, could involve asking participants to find what percentage of emails 
sent by John Smith were about ‘sustainability’.  
17 These ‘medium-complexity’, or ‘level two’ tasks involved, for instance, the completion of an online form.  
18 A cross-government campaign funded by the National Cyber Security Programme, led by the Home Office. The 
campaign's aim is to measurably improve the online safety behaviour of consumers and small businesses. 
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they encounter too many terms such as ‘TCP’, ‘exchange’, ‘packet-sniffing’, ‘botnet’, ‘zombie network’ etc. 
The media – whether televisual, radio or print – can only expend so much time or space explaining what 
such terms mean, thereby imparting on the discourse a superficiality that is shared with, say, the reporting of 
research on nano-technology or cutting-edge batteries (Beckford, 2011; Markoff, 2017).  
 However, as noted previously, in order for a securitisation to function it must be assimilated 
successfully by multiple tiers of an audience. For this assimilation to occur, the attention of the audiences 
must be held so that the pre-requisite knowledge and the securitising agent’s arguments can be transmitted. 
Immediate emotional engagement – and thus the interest and empathy required – can be summoned amongst 
the audience(s) if the speaker can raise a work of fiction dealing with ‘cyber’ that the audience has 
previously encountered and remembered. Skyfall was reportedly the highest grossing film at the UK box 
office by July 2013, earning nearly £103 billion (Brown, 2013). In this instalment of the Bond franchise, 
‘M’, played by Judi Dench, watches as the headquarters of MI6 is attacked with a cyber weapon that causes a 
significant detonation. The following film, Spectre, further illustrated the aftermath of this cyber attack, with 
the same building exhibited as a ruined derelict awaiting controlled demolition.  
 Two Hansard contributions and two speeches helped to construct this ‘From Fiction to Reality’ 
strand, making this strand the most limited of all three strands that this thesis has mapped from the corpus. 
However, this certainly does not necessitate that the strand is insignificant. Whilst the efforts of politicians to 
‘humanise’ themselves during electoral campaigns by gingerly recalling the price of a pint of milk, 
brandishing a jar of Hellman’s mayonnaise to journalists invited into their family home, or professing their 
enjoyment of NWA’s rambunctious ‘gangsta rap’ (Abbey, 2015) can prove humorous, our elected 
representatives are not automatons immune to the pervasiveness of popular culture, and I would argue that 
their references to popular culture during policy debates can prove revealing.  
 As discussed previously, then-Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne had urged an audience 
to imagine the impact of cumulative catastrophic non-state cyber attacks (2015). Urging audience members 
to apply their imagination befits an anticipatory threat framework, but it also speaks to the need to fill a void 
of substantive knowledge about a threat. Other figures in the corpus claimed that there was insufficient 
attention being paid to non-state cyber attacks, were confused about what cyberterrorism was, or resigned 
themselves to the impossibility of forecasting the nature of cyberterrorism.  
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 Whilst he did not reference specific actors – terrorist or otherwise – the crossbench Peer Lord 
Ramsbottom, a former Lieutenant General in the UK army, expressed alarm in January 2013 that: 
 
“insufficient attention is being paid to the ever-increasing threat of cyber warfare. Cyber weapons can not only disarm 
an adversary before he has even begun to fight, but render sophisticated armouries and even nuclear deterrence 
obsolete. Furthermore, as has been proven in Estonia and Georgia, cyber weapons threaten every aspect of a nation’s 
existence” (2013).  
 
 In a similar vein, the Liberal Democrat Peer, Lord Alderdice, expressed his view that the 
‘psychology’ of cyberterrorism was an under-developed field. Accordingly, he stated that: 
 
“I am yet to see sufficient attention being paid to research on the psychology of cyberwar and cyberterrorism. I declare 
an interest as someone who has given time academically and in business to this area. I hope that my noble friend will be 
able to tell me that additional resources will be devoted to research into understanding how people function in this fifth 
space” (2013).  
  
In defence of the field of psychology, British academics are engaging in research on 
cyberpsychology (for instance, see McAlaney, Taylor and Faily, 2015). Furthermore, the journal of 
Cyberpsychology, Behaviour and Social Networking has been publishing since 1998, and the journal of 
Psychological Research on Cyberspace has been publishing since 2007. However, Lord Alderdice is quite 
correct that there has not been any substantive research on the psychology of cyberterrorism. A period under 
which there is a lack of research into an incipient phenomenon such as cyberterrorism will contribute to the 
extent to which the threat can be considered ‘unknown’ in stature or nature. 
 Earl Howe, speaking in the Lords Chamber as a Minister of State for the Ministry of Defence, 
expressed concern about the ‘substantial’ increase in the threat from terrorism, and noted that “it is 
impossible to predict the threats that we will face in ten or fifteen years” (Curzon, 2015b). Earl Howe was 
not alone in his perception of cyberterrorism as a relatively ‘unknown’ threat. Prefacing his critique of the 
2010 SDSR and National Security Strategy, James Gray, Conservative Member for North Wiltshire, voiced 
his alarm that he and others present in the Commons Chamber had heard “about cyber warfare and so many 
other aspects of the world that are extraordinarily worrying and dangerous, but also extremely unknown. We 
simply do not know what is occurring in most of the world, and we do not know what we are going to do 
about it” (2015). Lord Patten also critiqued the epistemology of Government policy. In a debate on 
amendments to the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Bill in November 2011, Patten lamented 
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a ‘yawning gap’ in the drafting because cyber risks had not been included. Patten continued that “if anything 
is going to happen to disturb the games apart from random acts of terrorism, involving whatever devices or 
armaments, which may or may not be successful, it is going to be cyberattack – on the ticketing, on the 
transport infrastructure, on a whole range of other matters” (2011).  
 Baroness Finlay, speaking in 2011, perhaps identified one reason for the lack of consideration of 
cyberterrorism in Government policy outside of the Strategy and Strategic Review documents. The 
crossbench Peer and Vice President of Marie Curie Cancer Care, President of the Chartered Society of 
Physiotherapy and Chair of the Palliative Care Strategy Implementation Board for Wales commandeered a 
Health and Social Care Bill debate in December 2011, to convey to her colleagues that “we have heard today 
about infection, but the greatest threat to public health may well not come from infection but from issues 
such as cyberterrorism around our major utilities and the havoc that that could cause” (2011). Her point of 
contention was that personnel in local authorities might “feel that such things are remote and unlikely to 
happen” (2011). For such an experienced professional – who will have had some direct experience of 
governance of IT implementation for health services in local authorities – to use her time in the Lords 
Chamber to emphasise concerns about cyberterrorism rather than an explicit matter of health, is certainly of 
note. 
 Lastly, there was one instance of diversion from the overarching consensus on cyberterrorism as a 
terrorist attack against critical infrastructure. Margaret Ritchie, the SDLP Member for South Down 
advocated the perspective that cyberterrorism was already reigning havoc upon some UK citizens. 
Designating cyber bullying as a form of cyberterrorism in a debate on Cyber Bullying, Ritchie urged the 
Government to form an action plan with online communications firms, local communities and churches to 
tackle this insidious form of ‘cyberterrorism’ (2013). Whilst cyber bullying can cause immense discomfort, 
particularly to children – provoking suicide in the most extreme cases – the perception that this represented a 
form of cyberterrorism was not espoused by other figures in the corpus, and indeed, this notion runs counter 
to both the official discourse and cyberterrorism academia. Nevertheless, Ritchie’s comments are of note 
because they demonstrate the intersubjective, malleable nature of the linguistic label ‘terrorism’ and would 
have, in part, been fed by the lack of publicly-accessible substantive knowledge about cyberterrorism which 
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could be used to delineate between what cyberterrorism is and is not. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that 
more Parliamentarians did not similarly co-opt the cyberterrorism label for alternative purposes and issues.  
 Having mapped excerpts from the corpus that related to the epistemic and policy vacuum of 
cyberterrorism, the ensuing discussion maps the efforts by some Ministers and Parliamentarians to draw on 
popular fictional representations of cyberterrorism in an effort to assuage a lack of knowledge about the 
nature of this constructed threat.  
 Jim Shannon, at the time the shadow DUP spokesperson for transport, health and human rights, 
expressly articulated the power of fictional representation of cyber threats during a Defence and Cyber 
Security debate in the Commons Chamber in March 2014. Accordingly, he told fellow Parliamentarians that: 
 
“all of us, both inside and outside of the House, will have watched films on television in which Governments are 
brought down by computer networks. I remember thinking that that was science fiction and that it could never actually 
happen, but all of a sudden, in our own lives as elected representatives dealing with constituents, we have found 
ourselves relating to some of the issues with which they have had to deal in connection with, for instance, banks. There 
is a real, definite possibility, for which we must be prepared” (2014).  
  
Speaking during the same debate, Madeleine Moon, the Labour Member of Parliament for Bridgend 
and at the time a member of the Defence Committee, recalled reading William Forstchen’s (2009) One 
Second After. In this novel, which includes a foreword authored by Newt Gingrich, three ballistic missiles 
carrying thermonuclear warheads are fired from re-purposed shopping containers into the atmosphere above 
the United States, causing what is known as the ‘Compton Effect’ to occur. Traditional application of a 
nuclear weapon is to detonate the warhead much closer to the target – typically a populous city or strategic 
locale – without actually reaching ground surface. However, by detonating a nuclear warhead higher than 25 
miles above the earth’s surface, high-gamma radiation is released, which reacts with air molecules to produce 
positive ions and recoil electrons which are known as ‘Compton electrons’. The Compton electrons are 
rejected, leaving behind the positive ions, and the Compton electrons subsequently interact with the earth’s 
magnetic field to produce charge acceleration. This charge acceleration radiates an electromagnetic field as 
an instantaneous and pervasive electromagnetic pulse. In the novel, the result of this nuclear-induced EMP is 
the instantaneous destruction of all electronic equipment that is not sufficiently insulated in a vacuum or lead 
safe located underground. All mobile phones, computers, vehicles that require electronics for ignition (almost 
all currently running motor vehicles), container ships relying on automated software at shipping ports, and 
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modern farming techniques cease to function, and the entire landmass of the 48 states is plunged into a post-
electrical era. As the reader follows the story, they encounter widespread looting, homicide, the consumption 
of family pets and, eventually, human cannibalism. The novel’s protagonist, John Matherson, a lecturer at a 
rural North Carolina university campus, retains the privilege of mobility via his mother’s ‘59 Ford Edsel and, 
as a warmly-regarded professional member of the community, assumes a position of authority in his town, 
Black Mountain. The novel follows Matherson’s efforts to establish order and prevent Black Mountain from 
being ransacked or becoming plagued by the renaissance of diseases hitherto unknown to the memories of 
living North Carolinians. 
 In her recollection of her reading of the novel, Madeleine Moon told the Chamber that:  
 
“the Chairman of the Defence Committee [James Arbuthnot] and I were given a book for holiday reading: One Second 
After. That delightful read, which probably wrecked my summer, was a description of the United States after an electro-
magnetic attack had taken out all its computer-based systems. Everything went. No cars would go on the road and 
nothing would work. It was a scary prospect and I now understand why the Defence Committee’s Chairman runs a car 
that does not have a computer in it. I am sure the book was a great influence in the decision to purchase that car” 
(2014).  
  
The novel also appeared to instruct Moon’s perception of the nature of the adversary that might elect 
to conduct a catastrophic cyber attack. Accordingly, she continued that: 
 
“the book also made me aware of the very narrow issue of who is the enemy. In traditional warfare, we tend to know 
who we are fighting, but in future we may be fighting criminals who are holding the country to ransom. We could be 
fighting terrorists, because a state is not needed to manufacture a cyber attack, or activists or anarchists. It has been 
suggested that some of the attacks in Estonia were by third-party actors. At the bottom of the list is the potential for a 
state to attack, because states like rules and the rest do not follow rules. That is why they must be our focus, our worry 
and our concern” (2014). 
  
Moon’s admission that it ‘probably wrecked’ her summer indicates that she found the novel both 
emotive and instructive. Certainly, the personal impact of the novel was sufficient for her to weaponise it in 
her re-chanting of the securitisation of non-state launched cyber weapons; even though the atmospheric 
detonation of thermonuclear warheads is not cyber per se.  
 As noted earlier in this chapter, Skyfall was a significant commercial success that included within its 
plot an incident bearing concerted similarity with cyberterrorism. Skyfall was referenced by James 
Brokenshire, at the time Parliamentary under-Secretary for the Home Office, in the opening remarks of his 
March 2013 speech on Cyber Crime. Accordingly, Brokenshire informed his audience that: 
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“in the latest Bond movie Skyfall, technology and the ability to threaten the  UK’s interests through the internet are at 
the very heart of the drama. I’m sure you’ve all seen it, but Bond’s latest nemesis hacks into top secret Government 
systems, exposes the identities of covert agents online and in one of the most memorable scenes causes an explosion at 
the heart of MI6 by manipulating sensitive computer systems. It’s a great film and deserves the huge success it’s 
received around the world. Of course it’s fiction; Bond thwarts the villain and order is restored. But the real world 
threats we face as a country from the terrorists, the fraudsters, the hackers and those intent on using the internet and our 
ever more connected world to cause us harm are real, are significant, are enduring and our growing” (Home Office and 
Brokenshire, 2013).  
  
Skyfall was also referenced three and half years after its release date in a March 2016 speech on 
Expanding the Cyber First Programme delivered by Matt Hancock, at the time the Paymaster General and 
Minister for the Cabinet Office. In his opening remarks to his assembled audience at the Institute of 
Directors, Hancock stated that: 
 
“I’m told Ian Fleming was a regular here while he served, and I can’t help but think of a line from the new 
cyber savvy Q in Skyfall: ‘I can do more damage on my laptop sitting in my pyjamas before my first cup of Earl Grey 
than you can in a year in the field’. I’m glad to see you all made it out of your pyjamas this morning. But Q had a point. 
It’s not just soldiers, sailors, airmen, and policemen we need to protect our assets and livelihoods today. Today a line of 
code can ruin lives just as any bomb or bullet” (2016d). 
  
From these two excerpts, it is apparent that Skyfall was an instructive film for both Brokenshire and 
Hancock. For both men, the commercially successful Bond film illustrated the capacity of cyber weaponry to 
cause tangible, physical damage and provided them with a go-to fictional case study to illuminate the 
arguments about the necessity for the British state to invest in measures to counter cyber threats from a range 
of actors including terrorists. The ‘cyber as a means of perpetrating terror’ narrative in Skyfall has utility in 
the re-chanting of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, particularly in the UK, because the Bond franchise is a 
widely-watched and recognised platform and the filming locations for the cyber destruction scenes were in 
central London. That Matt Hancock (2016d) chose to solicit a reference to Skyfall three and a half years after 
its release indicates the longevity of this utility.  
 According to Roland Barthes, “narration can only receive its meaning from the world which makes 
use of it” (1977b:115; see also Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Kermode, 1967; Hall, 1987). When Matt Hancock 
(2016d), James Brokenshire (Home Office and Brokenshire, 2013) and Madeleine Moon (2014) referred to 
Skyfall and One Second After respectively in the securitising ‘moments’, they were invigorating meanings of 
these fictional pieces by directly relating their narratives to the ‘real world’ threat of cyber attacks against the 
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UK. For these figures, the fictional narratives were not abstract, nonsensical stories to be disregarded as 
irrelevant, but were instead warnings of the potential consequence of cyber attacks launched against the UK. 
Unless they are drafted by the Cabinet Office or another Government department, fictional narratives, 
whether represented in print media, in televisual image, in comic strips, in cartoons (Mazid, 2008; Hansen, 
2011), in photographs (Griffin, 1999; Mitchell, 2011; Campbell, 2003; Shepherd, 2008; Moller, 2007; 
MacDougal, 1998; Coskun, 2012; Rodriguez and Dimitrova, 2011; Hansen, 2015; Heck and Schlag, 2013; 
Perlmutter, 1993) or in symbols (Vouri, 2010), do not themselves possess the agency to be considered speech 
or visual acts within the official securitisation as defined in this thesis. However, when securitising agents or 
members of the tiered audience make an explicit or inferred reference to popular fictional narratives, the 
narratives become mobilised in the ‘moment’ of the securitisation.  
 Skyfall and One Second After are not the only popular fiction pieces engaging with the notion of 
cyberterrorism. Readers are likely to be aware of a plethora of relevant fictional pieces that could be linked 
to narratives of cyberterrorism; for instance, Die Hard IV or Wargames. As Rathmell has noted, “the 
entertainment industry, in the form of films and novels has popularised the notion of an electronic doomsday 
scenario in which sub-state groups manage to penetrate critical nodes of the NII and DII and are able to, 
variously, launch nuclear weapons, crash the telephone system, cause mayhem on the railways or in the air or 
bring the financial sector to a catastrophic halt” (2008:42).  
 However, the utility of popular fiction in securitising moments is not exceptional to the threat of 
cyberterrorism. In his article on the construction of a global health pandemic epitomised by the H1N1 virus, 
Abraham (2011:805) noted that after the collapse of the USSR, popular films and books in the USA had 
depicted ‘exotic viruses’ emerging from ‘wild zones’ around the world. As Heather Schell recognised, in an 
international environment in which the perceived Russian threat to the West receded, lethal new viruses had 
“become a hot topic for science best-sellers, medical research, action movies and science fiction. On the big 
screen, virus thrillers like Outbreak and Twelve Monkeys have attracted major stars and large audiences” 
(1997:94-95). Again, these fictional works were not crafted in isolation of an objective reality, but instead 
reflected the possibilities of threat contained within the ‘real world’ itself. An elevated concern about the risk 
of global health pandemics emerged during the Clinton administration in the USA, epitomised by the 
publication of the National Intelligence Council report entitled The Global Infectious Disease Threat and its 
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Implications for the United States (NIC, 2000:5; see also Abraham, 1997; Fidler, 2003). Furthermore, 
popular fiction not only appears to have a capacity to inform notions of threat, but it can also proscribe 
means to counter threats. For example, Shabtai Shoval, the founder of Suspect Detection Systems, an Israeli 
security firm, was inspired by the film Minority Report, set in a dystopian 2054 in which crimes are 
predicted and prevented before they can occur. Instead of feeling perturbed by the notion of pre-crime 
prevention, Shoval mulled “how great it would be to be able to prophesise a crime before it happens” (Brinn, 
2005). His firm developed the SDS-VR-1000, a machine that ascertains a person’s emotions by measuring 
their facial and physiological responses to questioning (see Adey, 2009:282).  
 The mediums through which popular fiction is conveyed to its audiences is not static, but instead in a 
process of development and refinement. The changing technology alters the mediums of human interaction, 
and some mediums may possess a greater capacity to influence a securitisation than others. In his What is 
Cinema? essays, Bazin suggested that “one may think of the film as a supernovel of which the written form 
is a feeble and provisional version” (1972:59). As Bleed has noted, “visuals created with new technologies 
are changing what it means to be literate. Literacy of the 21st century will increasingly rely not only on text 
and words but also on digital images and sounds” (2005:1; see also Holland, 2016). As Mirzoeff has stated, 
“modern life takes place onscreen” (1999:1). In the future, the increasing extent to which these mediums can 
impart immersive virtual experiencing of a narrative, as opposed to vicarious enjoyment of it, may serve to 
intensify the scope of epistemic construction and emotive engagement that could be utilised in 
securitisations. As had been noted of an experience with 3D cinema:  
 
“you feel the experience, you don’t just see it. I felt if I had stepped through that window and was riding the roller 
coaster myself instead of watching somebody else. I felt vertigo … and was convinced on the spot … that the future of 
cinema would mean the creation of films that create the total illusion of reality (Heilig, quoted in Taylor, 1998:279; see 
also Bos and Kaulingfreks, 2002:16-17).  
  
If a ‘virtual reality’ release were feasible, rather than vicariously observe the cyber enabled 
destruction of the MI6 building in Skyfall, one could instead feel the intense reverberations, the deafening 
noise, smell the incendiary material, gasp as dust clogs the throat and stagger in a disoriented fashion. Future 
research could investigate how such fictional narration potentially influences securitising motions. On the 
one hand, the experiencing of a cyber enabled detonation could be a terrifying experience, shocking 
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audiences and re-affirming the prerogative to elect representatives who pledge to prevent such an incident 
from occurring in everyday life. As Julie Matthews has suggested, even with current and former 
technologies, “instant access to visual images and emotional accounts of terrorism have secured them a vivid 
place in our memory and reinforced the idea that ‘we’ have been targeted and are under immediate threat” 
(2005:203; see also Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006; Altheide, 2010; Nilges, 2010; Holland, 2011,2013,2016). 
The concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘fear’ are inherently linked; a presence of fear is understood to elevate an 
individual’s perception of risk (Lerner and Keltner, 2000,2001; Matthews and Macleod, 1986). Research has 
found that exposure to graphic imagery of victims of violent incidents could lead to minor shifts in 
perceptions regarding policies that relate to the violence, and that repeated exposure to the imagery did not 
necessarily entail de-sensitisation (for instance, see Scharrer and Blackburn, 2015; Aust and Zillmann, 1996; 
Scharrer, 2008; Gadarian, 2014; Gartner, 2011; Hayes and Myers, 2009; Morgan, Lewis and Jhally, 1992; 
Oliver, Mares and Cantor, 1993; Stahl, 2013; Norris, 1994). On the other hand, it is possible that virtual, but 
realistic, experiencing of such trauma could prove, for some, to be de-sensitising. The ability to film or 
photograph death, for instance, has created a process whereby the ‘unknown’ experience of death can be 
coded, and “the essentially unrepresentable event can be viewed, contained … and opened up to a scrutiny 
that is culturally sanctioned” (Sobchack, cited in Petley, 2005:182,184; see also Davies, 2010). Similarly, 
there is some evidence that phobias can be assuaged through repeated on-screen presentation of the object 
that one is afraid of (for instance, see Teasdale, 1977; Eysenck, 1977; Nias, 1979).  
 This section has mapped and analysed excerpts from the corpus that were found to adhere to two 
categories. The first category was the notion that there was an epistemic void in the intersubjective 
knowledge of cyberterrorism. The second category included excerpts from a Minister (Hancock, 2016d) and 
two MPs (Moon, 2014; Shannon, 2014) that drew on the utility of fictional representations of the threat of 
cyberterrorism to highlight its potential to cause severe damage to critical infrastructure. It has been argued 
that the use of popular fictional representations of cyberterrorism in Skyfall and One Second After served to 
partially fill the epistemic void in the socially-constructed discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism to the 
UK.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has mapped and analysed two separate strands that can be identified in the official 
construction of the threat of cyberterrorism in the UK. The first, ‘Cyberterrorism as Unique Spatially’, was 
divided into two distinct sub-strands. The first of these, labelled ‘Safe Havens’, was the notion that the 
decentralised nature of the internet, and in particular, encrypted ‘spaces’ epitomised by the ‘darknet’ offered 
terrorists a virtual locale in which they could plot and launch attacks against British infrastructure. From the 
mapping and analysis of the corpus, it was found that barring one instance, mentions of the ‘darknet’ were 
largely absent, but that the linguistics of terroristic ‘safe havens’ had been applied by securitising agents and 
members of the audience respectively. This was a useful finding, as it demonstrated that some of the 
linguistic tools typically applied to official narratives of post-9/11 terrorism had been transferred to the 
discourse of the threat of cyberterrorism. The second of these sub-strands, ‘Physical versus Cyber’, was the 
notion that the internet had established an entirely novel, man-made environment. Overarching these sub-
strands was the argument that the articulated distinctions between ‘spaces’ on the web were not technical, but 
instead social. Indeed, apart from James Morris (2015), those who engaged with the idea of ‘spatiality’ in 
their securitising moments did so entirely with respect to the social spatiality of the web, rather than its 
technical spatiality. This may speak to the knowledge gap amongst our elected representatives about the way 
in which computers and the internet function. It may also be indicative of legislative pressure; it is far easier 
to legislate the social spatiality of the internet (even if enforcement may be difficult), than it is to legislate the 
technical spatiality. This is because governing the technical spatiality of the internet cannot be conducted in 
the UK in isolation; all major parties to the internet would need to agree to the imposition of legislation and 
be comfortable enforcing the technical means of delivering this legislation. Nevertheless, this was an 
important finding, because it demonstrated that the UK’s securitisation of cyberterrorism was not tied to any 
particular software, hardware, terrorist group, region or conflict. Building on the findings of Chapter Five – 
that the audience’s ‘chanting’ had sought to increase the longevity of the securitisation of cyberterrorism by 
implying that the threat was likely to increase over time – this suggests that the securitisation was pre-
empting the possibility that an existing terrorist organisation might develop the capacity to conduct cyber 
attacks against the UK, or that entirely new cyberterrorist organisations might emerge. 
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 Lastly, the final strand that this chapter mapped and analysed was ‘From Fiction to Reality’, which 
was the idea that in the absence of a real-life incident that could agreeably be labelled as an instance of 
cyberterrorism, securitising agents and members of the audience had, to a certain extent, been informed by 
popular fictional representations of what a cyberterrorist incident might feel and look like. Given our limited 
linguistic capabilities of describing the experiencing of our computer-ised world, in combination with the 
lack of a cyberterrorism case study, there were three instances from the corpus in which popular narratives, 
in particular those from Skyfall and One Second After, were found to have been given utility. 
 The final chapter of this thesis, the Conclusion, serves four functions. Firstly, the concluding chapter 
summarises the arguments that have been established in the mapping and analysis chapters of this thesis. 
Secondly, the limitations of the research are considered. Thirdly, this final chapter suggests some future 
avenues for research that would further elucidate the research questions that have underpinned the mapping 
and analysis here. The last section offers some final remarks.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 This concluding chapter to the thesis serves several functions. Firstly, this chapter summarises the 
contributions that have been made both to our understanding of the securitisation of cyberterrorism and to 
securitisation theory. Secondly, this chapter reflects on the limitations of the research approach that has been 
used for the mapping and analysis of the official British securitisation of cyberterrorism. Thirdly, this chapter 
suggests future avenues for research that are related to either the analysis of securitisations, or to our 
understanding of cyber threat. Lastly, this chapter offers some final remarks. 
 This thesis has mapped a corpus of the official British political discourse that constructed the threat 
of cyberterrorism to the UK between 12th May 2010 and 24th June 2016. The thesis applied an interpretive 
discourse analysis against the 110 unique sources selected from the corpus in order to dissect them and 
ascertain the ‘strands’ that were shared between them. Whilst a plethora of strands could have been identified 
from the corpus, the thesis was able to make the strongest contribution to our understanding of the process by 
which the perceived threat of cyberterrorism came to be ‘securitised’ by focusing on the most prominent of 
these. The strands that were selected for mapping and analysis were chosen because the greatest number of 
excerpts adhered to them.  
 These strands were identified through a process of asking targeted questions against each unique 
source from the corpus. These questions, which directed the mapping and analysis, were informed by the 
research aims of the thesis. Accordingly, the research aims were: 
1. How has official discourse in the UK represented the threat posed by cyberterrorism to the UK? 
2. How do securitising actors and members of the audience securitise a threat that does not exhibit a 
historical precedent? 
3. Given that a cyberterrorist incident may not be attributable, could be delivered in a near-instantaneous 
fashion, and would rely on a man-made ‘fifth sphere’ of power, what novel contributions for the framework 
of securitisation theory, if any, can be inferred from this socially-constructed threat? 
 The next section summarises the findings of the preceding mapping and analysis chapters. 
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Findings 
 
 It was established that four strands and four sub-strands could be identified as the most concerted 
themes exhibited by the discourse. The first of these strands was the notion that cyberterrorism represented a 
‘Tier One’ or severe threat to the UK. This was a strand that first acquired formal traction in 2010, with the 
publication of updated strategy documents (Cabinet Office, 2010b:47), and the emergence of this strand 
established the securitisation of the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK in official British discourse. The 
appearance of this strand in the public-facing revision of British security priorities was, in effect, the 
securitising act.  
 It was argued that the Government’s effort to ascribe a ‘securitised’ status to the perceived threat of 
cyberterrorism did not simply begin a process in which cyberterrorism came to be regarded as a significant 
risk to British national security. By endorsing the discursive (re)construction of a particular illegitimate form 
of cyber violence, the securitisation of cyberterrorism not only served to justify extraordinary measures 
against cyberterrorists, but it also tacitly endorsed the UK’s cyber weaponry program.  
 It was apparent that cyberterrorism was regarded as a unique threat. Part of this uniqueness was 
characterised by its ‘temporal’ condition; which could be divided into two sub-strands. One of these sub-
strands aligned with the problematic, but nevertheless potentially influential, ‘New Terrorism’ thesis. In its 
mediation through the ‘chanting’ of audience members, the conceptual cyberterrorist identity was assumed to 
be ‘evil’, ‘depraved’, and ‘menacing’. It was suggested that the discursive treatment of the hypothetical, 
spoken-into-existence cyberterrorists by MPs, Ministers and Lords befitted a process of ‘silencing’ that had 
already been applied to conventional forms of terror. This silencing, in effect, further added to the notion that 
cyberterrorism was an illegitimate form of violence; there could be no rationale or space for cyberterrorism 
in a liberal democratic state such as the UK.  
 The second sub-strand aligned with the notion that cyberterrorism represented a threat that was likely 
to escalate over time, rather than recede or remain static. Because Ministers, MPs and Lords advocated the 
fear that this was a threat that would escalate, despite cyberterrorism having not occurred, it was suggested 
that this was a socially-constructed threat that meshed comfortably with ‘anticipatory’ (as opposed to 
preventative or reactive) articulations of threat. The mapped ‘ritualistic chanting’ from the audience was 
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found to have been more emphatic than the original statements of the security documents. The pro-active 
engagement from the audience, it was suggested, had served to extend the shelf-life of the securitised 
conceptual cyberterrorist. Whilst this evolution of the securitisation did not make it impossible to retract, it 
did make it harder to contest; particularly given that there were no dissenting voices to be found in the full 
corpus relating to the threat of cyberterrorism.  
 The novelty of the threat of cyberterrorism was also attributable in part to its ‘spatial’ condition, 
which, similarly, could be divided into two sub-strands. The first of these sub-strands befitted the notion of 
‘Safe Havens’, a phrase which, when used in relation to terrorism, suggests that terrorists seek spaces in 
which they can operate with relative impunity. It was argued that this sub-strand created a delineation 
between legitimate and illegitimate forms of being in cyberspace. From the corpus, it was apparent that 
‘cyberterrorists’ were regarded as a standalone entity, but they were also ‘packaged’ with cyber criminals and 
rogue states. By ‘packaging’ more than one form of illegitimate cyber being together, the ‘Safe Havens’ sub-
strand legitimised legal uses of the internet by the British population at large.  
 The second sub-strand was the perception that there is a distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘cyber’ 
spatial environments. It was established that the ‘cyber’ environment, as the man-made ‘fifth sphere’ of 
power projection, could be characterised as exhibiting both a ‘technical’ realm, underpinned by the 
computers, servers and other infrastructure that enable data packets to be pushed between computer systems, 
and a ‘human’ realm. Concerning the securitisation of cyberterrorism, the human, or ‘experienced’ 
environment of cyberspace was a priori to the technical environment. Given that computers do not respect 
laws nor rhetoric, it was suggested that the securitisation of a ‘cyberterrorist’ identity revolved around the 
projected and anticipated behaviour of cyberterrorists, rather than the hardware and software that would 
permit cyberterrorism to occur in the first place. This finding substantiated and re-affirmed the preceding 
analyses. The securitisation of cyberterrorism was an identity-based securitisation, rather than a securitisation 
of the technology that enabled cyberterrorism to exist as a potential threat. This suggestion was supported by 
the relative dearth of discussion of the Tor-enabled ‘darknet’ within the mapped corpus, and represented a 
novel contribution to our understanding of the securitisation of a cyber threat. 
 Finally, it was identified that there was an epistemic void in the discourse of the threat of 
cyberterrorism. This epistemic void was said to exist because there had not yet been a bona fide case study of 
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a cyberterrorist incident, and there was an absence of publicly-available information on the propensity of 
proscribed organisations to actively develop or use cyber weaponry. Through the mapping and analysis of the 
discourse relating to this strand, it was found that this epistemic void in the securitisation of cyberterrorism 
had been partially filled-in by references to fictional narratives that were offered by the James Bond film, 
Skyfall, and William Forstchen’s (2009) novel, One Second After.  
  
Pantomime Audience Framework 
 
An alternative framework for the relationship between securitising actors and the audience was 
offered. This framework, which I termed the ‘Pantomime’ model of securitisation, was built on the notion of 
Oren and Solomon’s (2015) ‘ritualised chanting’, and was an overt response to claims that the existing model 
for the actor-audience relationship was inadequate. Instead of maintaining the concerted dichotomy between 
securitising actors and the audience, this framework actively promoted the idea that securitising actors were 
themselves also a part of the audience. In essence, after the core securitising move which establishes the 
discursive foundation for the securitisation (for instance, in the case of the threat of cyberterrorism, this was 
the publishing of the 2010 National Security Strategy), the securitising actor(s) can depart the stage but 
continue to ‘feed’ the securitisation by chanting from their seated position in the audience. Furthermore, this 
framework extended the agency of the audience. The original framework for securitisation theory (Buzan, 
Waever and Wilde, 1998) bestowed upon the audience the power to offer a relatively binary response to a 
proffered securitisation. The audience could either accept or reject the securitisation, but could not actively 
debate, deliberate, or invigorate further life upon the securitisation after they had agreed that a ‘securitised’ 
label was necessary and proportionate. This was a deficiency that masks the de facto operation of 
securitisations. For instance, in this mapping of the official British securitisation of the threat of 
cyberterrorism, a substantive offering from the corpus came from backbench MPs and Lords. It would not be 
appropriate to suggest that a Member of Parliament who is not part of her Majesty’s Government, nor an 
influential member of a defence or security related committee, nor a member of the Privy Council, could be a 
bona fide participant in the securitisation process as a securitising actor. However, it is clear from the 
mapping and analysis that MPs could, and did, offer substantive contributions in which they stated their 
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belief that cyberterrorism represented a significant threat to the UK, and described characteristics of 
cyberterrorism. These contributions did more than simply affirm a binary ‘yes, I agree to this securitisation’; 
indeed, these contributions could be said to have furthered the epistemology underpinning the British 
securitisation of cyberterrorism. Examining such audience contributions would be of utility for any threat, 
but it is particularly of interest in the case of cyberterrorism because this is a threat that has not occurred and 
is relatively loosely defined. Each contribution, or what I term ‘securitising moment’, that has been mapped 
in this thesis, is an attempt – whether by a securitising actor or a member of the audience – to ascribe a 
partial fixing to the discourse of cyberterrorism. 
 An additional contribution of the ‘Pantomime’ framework of securitisation was that it expanded the 
audience into a ‘tiered’ rather than monolithic entity. Membership of a particular tier infers a certain capacity 
for engagement with a given securitisation. In the case of the official British securitisation of cyberterrorism, 
the first tier of the audience – consisting of those who are capable of performing as securitising actors – had 
the greatest capacity to create and influence the securitisation of cyberterrorism. The second tier of the 
audience, representing MPs and Lords who were outside of the core of the formal Government, had less 
capacity to influence the securitisation of cyberterrorism; but, importantly, their capacity was greater than 
that of the third tier, which subsumed those who were outside of political office. Whilst this thesis 
conceptualised three tiers of the audience, it is possible that I could have created more tiers. As stated 
previously, tiers would differ depending on the securitisation in question and its context; the international 
securitisation of the Global War on Terrorism, for instance, would need to incorporate many more tiers. In 
addition, whilst this thesis dealt with tiers on a purely ‘vertical’ basis (where each tier had a differing 
capacity to influence the securitisation), a more in-depth framework could offer ‘horizontal’ tiers. For 
example, in the case of the Global War on Terrorism, the governments of France and Germany could be 
regarded as ‘horizontal’ tiers, as this would recognise their status as distinct governing entities, whilst 
acknowledging that they may ‘speak’ or ‘perform’ to different audience tiers, such as the French or German 
parliaments. 
 The audience was not limited to simply responding to the securitising actor; instead, the audience 
could enjoy ‘securitising moments’ amongst themselves, either within their own tier, to a specific alternate 
tier, or to all audience tiers. Whilst there was almost no consideration given to the ‘third tier’ in this thesis, it 
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is conceivable within this framework that the general public could write to their constituency representative 
on the matter of cyberterrorism, perhaps in the form of an open letter, because their capacity to influence 
their constituency MP may be greater than their ability to address the Government directly. 
 The next section outlines some of the limitations of the thesis and the research approach that I have 
applied.  
 
Limitations of the Thesis 
 
 There are a number of limitations regarding this thesis and its research approach that should be 
acknowledged. By default, analysing discourse through a securitisation-oriented lens imparts a superficiality 
onto the research findings. The corpus from which the 110 unique sources were sourced is probably only a 
small snapshot of the overall discussions and deliberations regarding the threat of cyberterrorism that were 
held at an official level within British political discourse. For instance, the 2010 Strategic and Review 
documents, which seminally classified cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat to the UK, would not have 
appeared out of thin air. There will have been discussions between Ministers, members of the intelligence 
services, and representatives from the private sector in discussions on the matter of cyber security, which will 
have informed the decision to place cyberterrorism as a Tier One threat. Many of these discussions will be 
absent from public record, and they are therefore out of reach for the securitisation analyst. As has been 
stated previously, this thesis mapped and analysed the public-facing ‘securitising moments’, because A) there 
was sufficient public-facing discursive sources to form a relevant corpus and B) securitising discourse that 
can reach all audience tiers must, in essence, be unclassified, legal to possess and readily available. I have 
outlined the means by which I acquired sources in the third chapter, and anyone with an internet connection 
which can access the gov.uk and Hansard websites would be able to replicate my searches. An analyst’s 
reliance on public-facing documentation and discourse is a necessity in the case of a public-facing 
securitisation, but it is an important dependency to note. I do not claim that this thesis is a fully 
comprehensive overview of the construction of the securitisation of cyberterrorism, although I hope that it 
has provided a reasonable and warranted snapshot. 
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 Some of the context surrounding the ‘securitising moments’ could have been substantiated by 
contacting or interviewing those who engaged with the cyberterrorism discourse. However, given the word-
count constraint of the thesis, it would have been challenging to incorporate a bona fide analysis of such 
responses and/or interviews. Furthermore, as respondents would have partaken on a voluntary basis, it would 
not have been guaranteed that I would have received a sufficient quantity of responses to justify this 
endeavour. 
 As has been noted, the ‘public’ represented the third tier of the conceptualised audience. 
Notwithstanding this, the public were essentially ignored by this thesis. It was recognised in the fourth 
chapter that this is partly down to the lack of cyberterrorism-centric polling and surveying to-date. I could 
have conducted surveys of my own, however, again, as this would have been on a voluntary and non-
incentivised basis, I could not have guaranteed a high quantity (or quality) of returns.  
 The 12th May 2010 date from which sources were collected missed some elements of the discourse 
that would have helped to inform the discursive construction of the threat of cyberterrorism and the rationale 
for the Cabinet Office’s decision to declare it a Tier One threat in 2010. For example, as was noted in the 
fourth chapter, the 2009-2010 Annual Report of the Intelligence and Security Committee noted that:  
 
“GCHQ informed the Committee that it is not known whether terrorist groups intend, or have the capacity, to launch 
significant attacks over the internet but this, along with extremist use of the internet, remains an area of considerable 
concern. Nevertheless, we have been told by GCHQ that the greatest threat of electronic attack to the UK comes from 
State Actors, with Russia and China continuing to pose the greatest threat” (Intelligence and Security Committee, 
2010:22).  
  
As a consequence, this thesis could be said to miss the deliberations that led to the formation of the 
securitisation of the threat of cyberterrorism to the UK, instead leaping straight to the core ‘securitising 
moments’ which established the securitisation in official British discourse. It is, nevertheless, interesting that 
the securitisation of cyberterrorism was established by the Cabinet Office after GCHQ had informed the 
Intelligence and Security Committee that as far as the intelligence service was concerned, there was no 
substantive evidence that terrorists were particularly eager to develop, or capable of developing, cyber 
weapons which could endanger British security. In this regard, the establishment of the securitisation of 
cyberterrorism could again be said to befit the ‘anticipatory’ model of security provision. 
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 Another self-imposed limitation of this thesis was my restricting the definition of cyberterrorism to 
how the discourse itself defined it. Predominantly, cyberterrorism could be read as referring to use of cyber 
weapons, by terrorists, to damage critical computer systems. The corpus was based on sources that resulted 
from hits related to cyberterrorism, and sources were used irrespective of how the person in question decided 
to frame cyberterrorism. However, I could have loosened the constraints of ‘cyberterrorism’ and added, for 
instance, ‘Electromagnetic Pulse’ and ‘EMP’ to my search queries. This would have increased the number of 
overall hits, although perhaps not by a great deal. Searching for ‘Electromagnetic Pulse’ on Hansard under 
the thesis’s timeline parameters returns six hits (Parliament.uk, 2017). By discussing Madeleine Moon’s 
(2014) account of her reading of One Second After, I had already indirectly discussed the way in which the 
British cyberterrorism discourse had been influenced by a fictionalised account of the use of a pervasive 
EMP. The House of Commons Defence Committee’s tenth report of the 2010-2012 session, entitled 
Developing Threats: Electro-Magnetic Pulses is an example of the discourse that was missed, in my 
intentional avoidance of including hits for ‘EMP’ when I created the corpus. Some of the contributions made 
in this report draw on the USA’s EMP Commission, which raised concern about the kind of EMP attack upon 
which One Second After is based; the detonation of a thermonuclear warhead in the atmosphere above a state 
(House of Commons Defence Committee, 2012a). Intriguingly, whilst the Committee’s report included 
references to the potential terrorist application of EMP devices, the Government’s response to this report did 
not (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2012b). However, in defence of my adherence to hits based on 
‘cyberterror’, ‘cyberterrorism’, ‘cyberterrorist’ and variations thereof, the express interest of this thesis was 
to analyse the securitisation of cyberterrorism however the discourse defined it. Other than Madeleine 
Moon’s contribution, no other hits from the corpus actively or indirectly linked EMP-related means of attack 
to cyberterrorism. If I had expressly searched for ‘EMP’ and had included this in my corpus, I would have 
been imposing a particular interpretation of cyberterrorism onto the discourse. This would have run counter 
to my ‘interpretive’ aims.  
 The next section considers future novel avenues for research that, having completed this thesis, I 
would suggest should be a priority in the short-to-medium term. Some future avenues for research were 
raised in the ‘Physical versus Cyber’ section of Chapter Five and the ‘From Fiction to Reality’ section of 
Chapter Six, but given that transhumanism remains on the horizon and virtual reality portrayals of fictional 
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narratives are still in their seminal phase, these calls for research may be early. However, the following 
avenues for research could be accommodated in the immediate present. 
 
Future Avenues for Research 
 
 This thesis highlights several under-developed fields that beckon further research, relating to either 
cyberterrorism, cyber security and/or securitisation theory. These under-developed fields are considered here. 
 Whilst this thesis has examined the construction of the threat of cyberterrorism in the UK, the British 
experience does not necessarily correlate with other states that have also securitised this threat. Studies that 
map and analyse the construction of the threat of cyberterrorism elsewhere (or that perhaps highlight the 
absence of this securitisation) would be novel. Further studies could also offer comparisons between the 
British experience and the securitisations exhibited by other states, for instance the USA. 
 Cyberterrorism remains an incipient field of research, not only for Security Studies, but also for 
Psychology, Sociology and Criminology. Broadly, there is a need to apply psychological studies to the way 
in which catastrophic cyber threat influences human perceptions of threat and human decision-making. This 
research could include, but need not be singular to, the anticipated threat of cyberterrorism. It would be 
useful – particularly from a policy and public awareness standpoint – to know whether threats of 
cyberterrorism provoke a greater or weaker perception of insecurity vis-a-vis conventional terror. 
 Chapter Four noted that notwithstanding the excellent Cyberterrorism Project survey (MacDonald et 
al, 2013) there is, at present, a lack of suitable surveys that have expressly considered the threat of 
cyberterrorism, or at least included this threat in a box-ticking exercise in which respondents are able to rank 
the threats that they believe to be the greatest risk. Considering that cyberterrorism has been categorised as a 
Tier One threat to the UK, it is perhaps surprising that pollsters have not been commissioned to undertake 
surveys of the British public on this issue. Granted, a securitisation does not by default need to heed 
democratic agreement on the prioritisation of threat; at its core, a securitisation involves the removal of a 
threat from a ‘politicised’ status and the placement of it in an exceptionalised ‘security’ realm. The public 
could wholeheartedly disagree with the notion that cyberterrorism should be securitised, but the foundation 
of the official securitisation of cyberterrorism would remain. That being said, it would be useful, again from 
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a policy and public awareness standpoint to know: whether the British public agree with this securitisation; 
whether they are more concerned about the cyber threat posed by other nation states; whether they agree with 
the development of the British state’s cyber arsenal, and whether they believe cyberterrorism will become an 
increasing risk over time relative to conventional forms of terror.  
 As has been suggested previously, Swansea University’s Cyberterrorism Project and Oxford 
University’s Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre could both be excellent launchpads for such research, 
but research need not be exclusive to these bodies. Given the UK’s exceptional reliance on internet 
infrastructure and internet-mediated communication for the functioning of its economy (Dean et al, 2012:9), 
in addition to the UK’s role in the development of techniques for cyber offence and cyber surveillance, it 
would seem apt that British institutions should be taking a lead on tracing public awareness and knowledge 
of cyber threat. As the latest Cyber Security Strategy notes, “offensive cyber forms part of the full spectrum 
of capabilities we will develop to deter adversaries and to deny them opportunities to attack us, in both 
cyberspace and the physical sphere. Through our National Offensive Cyber Programme, we have a dedicated 
capability to act in cyberspace and we will commit the resources to develop and improve this capability” 
(Cabinet Office, 2016:51). Further research in this area would build on our understanding of the ‘legitimate’ 
and ‘illegitimate’ forms of cyber violence and cyber being. 
 In general, there is a need to scrutinise discourses justifying the developing and acquisition of cyber 
weapons by not only non-state actors but also states themselves, particularly at a time when there is no 
‘Geneva Convention’ on cyber weapons. Normatively, it would be best if a cyber Hiroshima or Nagasaki 
could be avoided. Some of the sources in the corpus may have drawn similarities between cyber and nuclear 
weapons (Patten, 2010; Hannay, 2010), but there are also marked divergences between cyber and other non-
conventional weapons which have direct interplay with weapon storage and application in practice. Nuclear 
weapons, regulated and monitored by the IAEA, are difficult to transport, maintain, sell, buy, and steal, let 
alone build. Nuclear material has an awkward tendency to leave a trace of its passage. In contrast, computer 
code is not restricted by the properties restricting the dissemination of nuclear weaponry. Code can be 
infinitely copied. Code can be transported across borders and, feasibly, can evade authorities even if they run 
a search on the device of a detainee. Code can be anonymously sold for a profit on darknet markets and 
inexpensively distributed around the planet at the speed of light. Code does not need to be transported to its 
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designated target in a dirty bomb, an aircraft or a ballistic missile; indeed, in some respects, code makes 
ICBMs appear as antiquated relics of the Cold War. Why would one use an environmentally-devastating 
nuclear weapon against an adversary’s population when a cyber weapon could, if only temporarily, reduce 
their livelihoods to a pre-electronic age for a sufficient duration for them to run out of food and engage in 
systematic looting and manslaughter amongst themselves? Deterrence theory may be irrelevant with code 
which can be delivered through means that make precise attribution difficult. Code can be quietly introduced 
to a designated target through a malicious virus, either disseminated remotely or installed through a 
removable storage device. I stress this point not as an exercise in hyperbole, but because the development of 
code that is capable of destroying a state’s banks and utilities is not risk-free.  
 The Stuxnet attack is the best example of nation states explicitly targeting another state’s critical 
infrastructure, but this attack was only the tip of the iceberg of the capabilities of the USA’s Cyber 
Command. Alex Gibney’s Zero Days documentary revealed the existence of the ‘Nitro Zeus’ programme, 
which, whilst seemingly unused, had been developed to disable Iran’s air defences, communications systems 
and national grid (Sanger and Mazzetti, 2016). The leaking of cyber weaponry has occurred before; in April 
2017, 300mb of cyber exploits for Windows operating systems that had been developed by the NSA were 
released by the covert group The Shadow Brokers, who had been drip-feeding a cache of exploits for the 
preceding eight months (Goodin, 2017a; 2017b). If cyber weaponry capable of destroying a state’s apparatus 
were to be leaked, a Godwin’s Law-type process would ensure that its attempted use would be a matter of 
when rather than if. As was highlighted with the NHS ransomware19 attack (Graham, 2017), a legacy attack 
may be outdated and impotent against many systems; but for the purposes of cost-reduction and a reluctance 
to retrain staff with new systems, individuals and organisations have a tenancy to operate outdated software 
and hardware. Even computer systems on the UK’s newest £3.5bn aircraft carrier, the Queen Elizabeth, 
appeared – in images released from a tour of the ship – to have been installed with Windows XP (MacAskill, 
2017b), an operating system that has not been supported with Microsoft security updates since 2014. 
Because the development of cyber weaponry is not a zero-sum process that guarantees British security – and 
                                                          
19 Ransomware encrypts a computer’s hard drive, without the user’s permission. Typically, the private key, which is 
required to de-encrypt the hard drive, is only released to the victim if they pay the ransom. In the case of the May 
2017 attack, which affected not only the NHS but around 300,000 computers operated by organisations 
internationally, the ransom demanded on each infected machine was roughly £230-worth of the pseudoanonymous 
cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. 
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indeed, could create risks of its own – there are important, public-facing conversations that are 
disconcertingly absent from our discourse. 
 In terms of further research beckoned by the contribution-to-theory that has been offered by this 
thesis, scholars could apply the ‘Pantomime’ framework to other cases of securitisation. It would be of great 
interest to see an in-depth mapping of the way in which vertical and horizontal audiences have interacted 
with one another in a particular securitisation. As securitisation is predominantly a speech-act based theory, 
this framework relies first and foremost on qualitative data; however, the Pantomime framework could also 
serve quantitative purposes. For instance, it could be ascertained from the weight of interaction between two 
particular audience tiers that that particular route of interactivity had the greatest impetus in the cementing of 
a securitisation, or perhaps in the snowballing of a process of counter-securitisation. Such research could 
have policy relevance. For instance, if the interactive pathway between two particular audience tiers could be 
said to have a significant influence over the nature of a securitisation, certain policies or communicative 
spaces could be proposed to further facilitate that discursive pathway, or to encourage the development of 
pathways to and between ‘lagging’ audience tiers. Securitisations need not be democratic processes, but their 
exclusivity can be mitigated and scholars should not be afraid of offering frameworks to normatively 
encourage the disruption of barriers-to-entry for discursive engagement. 
 Further research could also elaborate on more context-specific determinants of the dividing lines 
between audience tiers. In this thesis, I defined this through a simple comprehension of ‘exclusivity’. This 
inter-subjectivity of this choice was partially arrested because I selected so few audience tiers, and because 
there were distinct professional distinctions between each tier: a) the Cabinet Office, b) backbench MPs and 
Peers, and c) the general public. However, professional roles are not the only means by which to ascribe 
exclusivity to agency. Exclusivity could, for instance, also be influenced by one’s private income, one’s 
education, or one’s particular vulnerability to, or positioning within, a security threat. For instance, in the 
case of cyber threat, Gavin Patterson, the Chief Executive Officer of British Telecommunications might have 
a greater influence over a securitisation than Anthony Bamford, Chairman of JCB, because of the positioning 
of BT in the UK’s internet communication infrastructure. Similarly, the Chief Executive of an at-risk 
organisation such as National Grid Plc could also be said to have a privileged exclusive position within the 
securitisation of a cyber threat to the UK. Whilst this thesis did not incorporate the voice of the private sector 
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in the so-termed ‘official’ securitisation of cyberterrorism, this was for the purposes of brevity rather than 
because the private sector was deemed irrelevant. A framework that incorporates audience tiers for the 
private sector would need to find alternative means by which to ascribe and quantify ‘exclusivity’.  
 This author agrees with the notion that a securitisation creates its audience(s), rather than the 
audience existing as an a priori entity. Different securitisations could create entirely different audience tiers. 
However, it is possible that a securitisation analyst could juxtapose two securitisations against one another. 
Whilst this thesis has identified some correlations between the securitisation of cyberterrorism and the 
securitisation of post-9/11 terrorism more broadly, it is possible that the securitisation of cyberterrorism 
could have been influenced by a wider range of securitisations. Such influence could be observed by 
examining the exchanges between the audience tiers of one securitisation with the audience tiers of another. 
 The next section offers some final remarks. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
 It has been stated throughout this thesis – perhaps to the point of cliché – that cyberterrorism is a 
socially-constructed threat to the UK that does not, at the time of writing, have any true historical precedent. 
It is not my place to speculate whether the Cabinet Office’s decision in 2010 to position cyberterrorism as 
Tier One threat will be proven foretelling or overly precautionary either in a five year, ten year, or fifty year 
timespan. This thesis has sought simply to map and analyse the strands of the official British securitisation of 
cyberterrorism, rather than pass judgement upon it. 
 In his book, Hacking the Hacker, Roger Grimes states that: 
 
“if we do an intellectual comparison alone, the defenders on average are smarter than the attackers. A defender has to 
know everything a malicious hacker does plus how to stop the attack. And that defence won’t work unless it has almost 
no end-user involvement, works silently behind the scenes, and works perfectly (or almost perfectly) all the time. Show 
me a malicious hacker with a particular technique, and I’ll show you more defenders that are smarter and better” 
(2017:12.2/524).  
 
In the case of the terrorist application of cyber weapons against critical computer systems, even a 
layman can propose that the odds are not stacked in the terrorist’s favour. Terrorist organisations come and 
go: causes encouraging a group’s existence can dissipate; senior membership can be incarcerated; or they 
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may lose the support of their key constituencies. States, in contrast, exist for centuries. Surveying their pieces 
on the chess-board of the strategic application of violence, a state can sit and watch the clock whilst terrorist 
entities sweat. Cyber weapons may be exceptional in several respects, as has been argued in this thesis, but 
they take time to develop and there is no guarantee that they will work as intended. If individuals want to 
guarantee that their faces – and their causes – are on the front pages of tomorrow’s newspapers, there are 
more sure ways of achieving this than sitting in front of a computer terminal, writing code with a steady flow 
of Red Bull and coffee. 
 This is not to advocate complacency, however. Some catastrophic exploits may be sought 
intentionally for months or years, but others can be stumbled upon by accident. Here, the story of Dan 
Kaminsky is instructive.  
 You probably use the Domain Name System (DNS) every day. The DNS is a network service that 
translates convoluted, difficult-to-remember IP addresses to the familiar domain names that you know; for 
instance, yahoo.com and bbc.co.uk. In 2008, Dan Kaminsky pondered an exploit that he had used previously 
to access free wifi in a Starbucks branch. This exploit, he realised, was more powerful than simply being a 
means of bypassing the Starbucks webpage to pay for wifi usage. As Alexander Klimburg writes: 
 
“what Kaminsky discovered was that under certain conditions, if you provided the DNS server with the location of a 
fake page in someone else’s domain, the DNS server would start trusting you about other pages in that same domain, 
regardless of who you were and whether you were affiliated with the owner of the domain at all. He could basically 
send all traffic from any web site anywhere in the world to himself. And, even worse, his realisation wasn’t merely 
theoretical; it actually worked when he tried it. This meant he could effectively impersonate any web site in the world – 
from Bank of America to the Department of Defence – and therefore steal the log-in data of those trying to access their 
networks through the web site” (2017:156.6/893).  
  
However, rather than become stupendously wealthy very quickly, Kaminsky telephoned Paul Vixie, 
one of the developers of the DNS, who agreed to find a solution to the problem, hastily summoning 16 of the 
world’s DNS experts to quietly fix the bug before it became publicly-known (Zetter, 2008). A system with 
the subsequently-created patch would have a one in four-billion chance of being hacked, compared to a one 
in 65,536 chance for an unpatched system (Klimburg, 2017:158/893). Had Kaminsky been a ‘blackhat’20 
hacker, however, the story could have been starkly different. 
                                                          
20 The terms ‘whitehat’, ‘blackhat’ and ‘greyhat’ are often used to characterise computer hackers. Whitehat hackers 
hack for positive causes; particularly proficient whitehat hackers are hired by firms to intentionally target their 
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 Cyberspace, as the fifth sphere of power projection, is perhaps unique in its democratisation of 
power. A lone individual cannot hope to compete with advanced states in military power projection on land, 
at sea, in the air or in space; but, equipped with a computer, under the right circumstances and with the 
requisite abilities, a malicious actor could cause a state entity genuine concern. Whether proscribed terrorist 
organisations adopt cyber arsenals and become ad-hoc or fully fledged cyberterrorists may only become 
apparent with the revelation of time.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
systems so that the vulnerabilities can be patched. Blackhat hackers will hack for malicious intention or for profit 
irrespective of the consequences. Greyhat hackers may dabble with both positive and harmful forms of hacking. 
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